Kernel crash when using pm_nl_ctl and use_mptcp.sh
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Here is the output of |
Can you please specify which tree/hash are you using ? or ev. dump the code for the above line with some context in your tree? It would help understanding which is the faulty instruction. Thanks! |
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I'm not anymore on the same hash, sorry for that. I'm currently on top of |
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Here is the trace produced on hash 9e8e97d : The The old code may produce a string rather than an array. The new stack trace provided has been generated with this new loop version. I also noticed that when using |
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addressed by: commit 61e82de664dffde9ff445ed6f776d6809b198693 (HEAD -> join_fail_fixes, net58/oops_subflow) |
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The current implementation of L2CAP options negotiation will continue
the negotiation when a device responds with L2CAP_CONF_UNACCEPT ("unaccepted
options"), but not when the device replies with L2CAP_CONF_UNKNOWN ("unknown
options").
Trying to continue the negotiation without ERTM support will allow
Bluetooth-capable XBox One controllers (notably models 1708 and 1797)
to connect.
btmon before patch:
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #64 [hci0] 59.182702
L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 2 len 8
Destination CID: 64
Source CID: 64
Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
Status: No further information available (0x0000)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 23 #65 [hci0] 59.182744
L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 15
Destination CID: 64
Flags: 0x0000
Option: Retransmission and Flow Control (0x04) [mandatory]
Mode: Basic (0x00)
TX window size: 0
Max transmit: 0
Retransmission timeout: 0
Monitor timeout: 0
Maximum PDU size: 0
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #66 [hci0] 59.183948
L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 1 len 8
Destination CID: 64
Flags: 0x0000
Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
MTU: 1480
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #67 [hci0] 59.183994
L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 1 len 10
Source CID: 64
Flags: 0x0000
Result: Success (0x0000)
Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
MTU: 1480
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 15 #69 [hci0] 59.187676
L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 7
Source CID: 64
Flags: 0x0000
Result: Failure - unknown options (0x0003)
04 .
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #70 [hci0] 59.187722
L2CAP: Disconnection Request (0x06) ident 4 len 4
Destination CID: 64
Source CID: 64
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 12 #73 [hci0] 59.192714
L2CAP: Disconnection Response (0x07) ident 4 len 4
Destination CID: 64
Source CID: 64
btmon after patch:
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #248 [hci0] 103.502970
L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 5 len 8
Destination CID: 65
Source CID: 65
Result: Connection pending (0x0001)
Status: No further information available (0x0000)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #249 [hci0] 103.504184
L2CAP: Connection Response (0x03) ident 5 len 8
Destination CID: 65
Source CID: 65
Result: Connection successful (0x0000)
Status: No further information available (0x0000)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 23 #250 [hci0] 103.504398
L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 6 len 15
Destination CID: 65
Flags: 0x0000
Option: Retransmission and Flow Control (0x04) [mandatory]
Mode: Basic (0x00)
TX window size: 0
Max transmit: 0
Retransmission timeout: 0
Monitor timeout: 0
Maximum PDU size: 0
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 16 #251 [hci0] 103.505472
L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 3 len 8
Destination CID: 65
Flags: 0x0000
Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
MTU: 1480
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 18 #252 [hci0] 103.505689
L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 3 len 10
Source CID: 65
Flags: 0x0000
Result: Success (0x0000)
Option: Maximum Transmission Unit (0x01) [mandatory]
MTU: 1480
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 15 #254 [hci0] 103.509165
L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 6 len 7
Source CID: 65
Flags: 0x0000
Result: Failure - unknown options (0x0003)
04 .
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #255 [hci0] 103.509426
L2CAP: Configure Request (0x04) ident 7 len 4
Destination CID: 65
Flags: 0x0000
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 12 #257 [hci0] 103.511870
L2CAP: Connection Request (0x02) ident 8 len 4
PSM: 1 (0x0001)
Source CID: 66
> ACL Data RX: Handle 256 flags 0x02 dlen 14 #259 [hci0] 103.514121
L2CAP: Configure Response (0x05) ident 7 len 6
Source CID: 65
Flags: 0x0000
Result: Success (0x0000)
Signed-off-by: Florian Dollinger <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Florian Dollinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Luiz Augusto Von Dentz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
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Similarly to bitmap functions, find_next_*_bit() users will benefit if
we'll handle a case of bitmaps that fit into a single word inline. In the
very best case, the compiler may replace a function call with a few
instructions.
This is the quite typical find_next_bit() user:
unsigned int cpumask_next(int n, const struct cpumask *srcp)
{
/* -1 is a legal arg here. */
if (n != -1)
cpumask_check(n);
return find_next_bit(cpumask_bits(srcp), nr_cpumask_bits, n + 1);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpumask_next);
Currently, on ARM64 the generated code looks like this:
0000000000000000 <cpumask_next>:
0: a9bf7bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
4: 11000402 add w2, w0, #0x1
8: aa0103e0 mov x0, x1
c: d2800401 mov x1, #0x40 // #64
10: 910003fd mov x29, sp
14: 93407c42 sxtw x2, w2
18: 94000000 bl 0 <find_next_bit>
1c: a8c17bfd ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
20: d65f03c0 ret
24: d503201f nop
After applying this patch:
0000000000000140 <cpumask_next>:
140: 11000400 add w0, w0, #0x1
144: 93407c00 sxtw x0, w0
148: f100fc1f cmp x0, #0x3f
14c: 54000168 b.hi 178 <cpumask_next+0x38> // b.pmore
150: f9400023 ldr x3, [x1]
154: 92800001 mov x1, #0xffffffffffffffff // #-1
158: 9ac02020 lsl x0, x1, x0
15c: 52800802 mov w2, #0x40 // #64
160: 8a030001 and x1, x0, x3
164: dac00020 rbit x0, x1
168: f100003f cmp x1, #0x0
16c: dac01000 clz x0, x0
170: 1a800040 csel w0, w2, w0, eq // eq = none
174: d65f03c0 ret
178: 52800800 mov w0, #0x40 // #64
17c: d65f03c0 ret
find_next_bit() call is replaced with 6 instructions. find_next_bit()
itself is 41 instructions plus function call overhead.
Despite inlining, the scripts/bloat-o-meter report smaller .text size
after applying the series:
add/remove: 11/9 grow/shrink: 233/176 up/down: 5780/-6768 (-988)
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Klimov <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <[email protected]>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Cc: Jianpeng Ma <[email protected]>
Cc: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Rich Felker <[email protected]>
Cc: Stefano Brivio <[email protected]>
Cc: Wei Yang <[email protected]>
Cc: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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arm32 uses software to simulate the instruction replaced
by kprobe. some instructions may be simulated by constructing
assembly functions. therefore, before executing instruction
simulation, it is necessary to construct assembly function
execution environment in C language through binding registers.
after kasan is enabled, the register binding relationship will
be destroyed, resulting in instruction simulation errors and
causing kernel panic.
the kprobe emulate instruction function is distributed in three
files: actions-common.c actions-arm.c actions-thumb.c, so disable
KASAN when compiling these files.
for example, use kprobe insert on cap_capable+20 after kasan
enabled, the cap_capable assembly code is as follows:
<cap_capable>:
e92d47f0 push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, sl, lr}
e1a05000 mov r5, r0
e280006c add r0, r0, #108 ; 0x6c
e1a04001 mov r4, r1
e1a06002 mov r6, r2
e59fa090 ldr sl, [pc, #144] ;
ebfc7bf8 bl c03aa4b4 <__asan_load4>
e595706c ldr r7, [r5, #108] ; 0x6c
e2859014 add r9, r5, #20
......
The emulate_ldr assembly code after enabling kasan is as follows:
c06f1384 <emulate_ldr>:
e92d47f0 push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, sl, lr}
e282803c add r8, r2, #60 ; 0x3c
e1a05000 mov r5, r0
e7e37855 ubfx r7, r5, #16, #4
e1a00008 mov r0, r8
e1a09001 mov r9, r1
e1a04002 mov r4, r2
ebf35462 bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4>
e357000f cmp r7, #15
e7e36655 ubfx r6, r5, #12, #4
e205a00f and sl, r5, #15
0a000001 beq c06f13bc <emulate_ldr+0x38>
e0840107 add r0, r4, r7, lsl #2
ebf3545c bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4>
e084010a add r0, r4, sl, lsl #2
ebf3545a bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4>
e2890010 add r0, r9, #16
ebf35458 bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4>
e5990010 ldr r0, [r9, #16]
e12fff30 blx r0
e356000f cm r6, #15
1a000014 bne c06f1430 <emulate_ldr+0xac>
e1a06000 mov r6, r0
e2840040 add r0, r4, #64 ; 0x40
......
when running in emulate_ldr to simulate the ldr instruction, panic
occurred, and the log is as follows:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000090
pgd = ecb46400
[00000090] *pgd=2e0fa003, *pmd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 206 [#1] SMP ARM
PC is at cap_capable+0x14/0xb0
LR is at emulate_ldr+0x50/0xc0
psr: 600d0293 sp : ecd63af8 ip : 00000004 fp : c0a7c30c
r10: 00000000 r9 : c30897f4 r8 : ecd63cd4
r7 : 0000000f r6 : 0000000a r5 : e59fa090 r4 : ecd63c98
r3 : c06ae294 r2 : 00000000 r1 : b7611300 r0 : bf4ec008
Flags: nZCv IRQs off FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 32c5387d Table: 2d546400 DAC: 55555555
Process bash (pid: 1643, stack limit = 0xecd60190)
(cap_capable) from (kprobe_handler+0x218/0x340)
(kprobe_handler) from (kprobe_trap_handler+0x24/0x48)
(kprobe_trap_handler) from (do_undefinstr+0x13c/0x364)
(do_undefinstr) from (__und_svc_finish+0x0/0x30)
(__und_svc_finish) from (cap_capable+0x18/0xb0)
(cap_capable) from (cap_vm_enough_memory+0x38/0x48)
(cap_vm_enough_memory) from
(security_vm_enough_memory_mm+0x48/0x6c)
(security_vm_enough_memory_mm) from
(copy_process.constprop.5+0x16b4/0x25c8)
(copy_process.constprop.5) from (_do_fork+0xe8/0x55c)
(_do_fork) from (SyS_clone+0x1c/0x24)
(SyS_clone) from (__sys_trace_return+0x0/0x10)
Code: 0050a0e1 6c0080e2 0140a0e1 0260a0e1 (f801f0e7)
Fixes: 35aa1df ("ARM kprobes: instruction single-stepping support")
Fixes: 4210157 ("ARM: 9017/2: Enable KASan for ARM")
Signed-off-by: huangshaobo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]>
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The BPF STX/LDX instruction uses offset relative to the FP to address
stack space. Since the BPF_FP locates at the top of the frame, the offset
is usually a negative number. However, arm64 str/ldr immediate instruction
requires that offset be a positive number. Therefore, this patch tries to
convert the offsets.
The method is to find the negative offset furthest from the FP firstly.
Then add it to the FP, calculate a bottom position, called FPB, and then
adjust the offsets in other STR/LDX instructions relative to FPB.
FPB is saved using the callee-saved register x27 of arm64 which is not
used yet.
Before adjusting the offset, the patch checks every instruction to ensure
that the FP does not change in run-time. If the FP may change, no offset
is adjusted.
For example, for the following bpftrace command:
bpftrace -e 'kprobe:do_sys_open { printf("opening: %s\n", str(arg1)); }'
Without this patch, jited code(fragment):
0: bti c
4: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
8: mov x29, sp
c: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
10: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
14: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
18: mov x25, sp
1c: mov x26, #0x0 // #0
20: bti j
24: sub sp, sp, #0x90
28: add x19, x0, #0x0
2c: mov x0, #0x0 // #0
30: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff78 // #-136
34: str x0, [x25, x10]
38: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff80 // #-128
3c: str x0, [x25, x10]
40: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff88 // #-120
44: str x0, [x25, x10]
48: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff90 // #-112
4c: str x0, [x25, x10]
50: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffff98 // #-104
54: str x0, [x25, x10]
58: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffa0 // #-96
5c: str x0, [x25, x10]
60: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffa8 // #-88
64: str x0, [x25, x10]
68: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffb0 // #-80
6c: str x0, [x25, x10]
70: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffb8 // #-72
74: str x0, [x25, x10]
78: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffc0 // #-64
7c: str x0, [x25, x10]
80: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffc8 // #-56
84: str x0, [x25, x10]
88: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd0 // #-48
8c: str x0, [x25, x10]
90: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffd8 // #-40
94: str x0, [x25, x10]
98: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffe0 // #-32
9c: str x0, [x25, x10]
a0: mov x10, #0xffffffffffffffe8 // #-24
a4: str x0, [x25, x10]
a8: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffff0 // #-16
ac: str x0, [x25, x10]
b0: mov x10, #0xfffffffffffffff8 // #-8
b4: str x0, [x25, x10]
b8: mov x10, #0x8 // #8
bc: ldr x2, [x19, x10]
[...]
With this patch, jited code(fragment):
0: bti c
4: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
8: mov x29, sp
c: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
10: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
14: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
18: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
1c: mov x25, sp
20: sub x27, x25, #0x88
24: mov x26, #0x0 // #0
28: bti j
2c: sub sp, sp, #0x90
30: add x19, x0, #0x0
34: mov x0, #0x0 // #0
38: str x0, [x27]
3c: str x0, [x27, #8]
40: str x0, [x27, #16]
44: str x0, [x27, #24]
48: str x0, [x27, #32]
4c: str x0, [x27, #40]
50: str x0, [x27, #48]
54: str x0, [x27, #56]
58: str x0, [x27, #64]
5c: str x0, [x27, #72]
60: str x0, [x27, #80]
64: str x0, [x27, #88]
68: str x0, [x27, #96]
6c: str x0, [x27, #104]
70: str x0, [x27, #112]
74: str x0, [x27, #120]
78: str x0, [x27, #128]
7c: ldr x2, [x19, #8]
[...]
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
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Map the leaf SPTE when handling a TDP MMU page fault if and only if the target level is reached. A recent commit reworked the retry logic and incorrectly assumed that walking SPTEs would never "fail", as the loop either bails (retries) or installs parent SPs. However, the iterator itself will bail early if it detects a frozen (REMOVED) SPTE when stepping down. The TDP iterator also rereads the current SPTE before stepping down specifically to avoid walking into a part of the tree that is being removed, which means it's possible to terminate the loop without the guts of the loop observing the frozen SPTE, e.g. if a different task zaps a parent SPTE between the initial read and try_step_down()'s refresh. Mapping a leaf SPTE at the wrong level results in all kinds of badness as page table walkers interpret the SPTE as a page table, not a leaf, and walk into the weeds. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1025 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:1070 kvm_tdp_mmu_map+0x481/0x510 Modules linked in: kvm_intel CPU: 1 PID: 1025 Comm: nx_huge_pages_t Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc4+ #64 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_tdp_mmu_map+0x481/0x510 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000072fba8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000072fcc0 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000027 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffff888277c5b4c8 RBP: ffff888107d45a10 R08: ffff888277c5b4c0 R09: ffffc9000072fa48 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffc9000073a0e0 R13: ffff88810fc54800 R14: ffff888107d1ae60 R15: ffff88810fc54f90 FS: 00007fba9f853740(0000) GS:ffff888277c40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010aa7a003 CR4: 0000000000172ea0 Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_tdp_page_fault+0x10c/0x130 kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x103/0x680 vmx_handle_exit+0x132/0x5a0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0x60c/0x16f0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1e2/0x9d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x271/0x660 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Invalid SPTE change: cannot replace a present leaf SPTE with another present leaf SPTE mapping a different PFN! as_id: 0 gfn: 100200 old_spte: 600000112400bf3 new_spte: 6000001126009f3 level: 2 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:559! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 1025 Comm: nx_huge_pages_t Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc4+ #64 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:__handle_changed_spte.cold+0x95/0x9c RSP: 0018:ffffc9000072faf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000000c1 RBX: ffffc90000731000 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffff888277c5b4c8 RBP: 0600000112400bf3 R08: ffff888277c5b4c0 R09: ffffc9000072f9a0 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 06000001126009f3 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000012600901 R15: 0000000012400b01 FS: 00007fba9f853740(0000) GS:ffff888277c40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010aa7a003 CR4: 0000000000172ea0 Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_tdp_mmu_map+0x3b0/0x510 kvm_tdp_page_fault+0x10c/0x130 kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x103/0x680 vmx_handle_exit+0x132/0x5a0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0x60c/0x16f0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1e2/0x9d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x271/0x660 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 </TASK> Modules linked in: kvm_intel ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 63d28a2 ("KVM: x86/mmu: simplify kvm_tdp_mmu_map flow when guest has to retry") Cc: Robert Hoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Jan 6, 2023
Don't install a leaf TDP MMU SPTE if the parent page's level doesn't match the target level of the fault, and instead have the vCPU retry the faulting instruction after warning. Continuing on is completely unnecessary as the absolute worst case scenario of retrying is DoSing the vCPU, whereas continuing on all but guarantees bigger explosions, e.g. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:559! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 1025 Comm: nx_huge_pages_t Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc4+ #64 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:__handle_changed_spte.cold+0x95/0x9c RSP: 0018:ffffc9000072faf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000000c1 RBX: ffffc90000731000 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffff888277c5b4c8 RBP: 0600000112400bf3 R08: ffff888277c5b4c0 R09: ffffc9000072f9a0 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 06000001126009f3 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000012600901 R15: 0000000012400b01 FS: 00007fba9f853740(0000) GS:ffff888277c40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010aa7a003 CR4: 0000000000172ea0 Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_tdp_mmu_map+0x3b0/0x510 kvm_tdp_page_fault+0x10c/0x130 kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x103/0x680 vmx_handle_exit+0x132/0x5a0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0x60c/0x16f0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1e2/0x9d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x271/0x660 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 </TASK> Modules linked in: kvm_intel ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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May 17, 2023
'__net_initdata' becomes a no-op with CONFIG_NET_NS=y, but when this option is disabled it becomes '__initdata', which means the data can be freed after the initialization phase. This annotation is obviously incorrect for the devlink net device notifier block which is still registered after the initialization phase [1]. Fix this crash by removing the '__net_initdata' annotation. [1] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xcccccccccccccccc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 3 PID: 117 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.4.0-rc1-custom-gdf0acdc59b09 #64 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xc0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dev_set_mac_address+0x85/0x120 dev_set_mac_address_user+0x30/0x50 do_setlink+0x219/0x1270 rtnl_setlink+0xf7/0x1a0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x142/0x390 netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x188/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x470 __sys_sendto+0x12f/0x1a0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Fixes: e93c937 ("devlink: change per-devlink netdev notifier to static one") Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Aug 30, 2023
More than 8 whitespaces of the code indent are replaced with "tab +
whitespaces" to fix up such errors reported by scripts/checkpatch.pl:
ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
#64: FILE: tools/include/nolibc/arch-mips.h:64:
+^I \$
ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
#72: FILE: tools/include/nolibc/arch-mips.h:72:
+^I "t0", "t1", "t2", "t3", "t4", "t5", "t6", "t7", "t8", "t9" \$
This command is used:
$ sed -i -e '/^\t* /{s/ /\t/g}' tools/include/nolibc/arch-*.h
Signed-off-by: Zhangjin Wu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
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Oct 20, 2023
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xfrm_policy_inexact_list_reinsert+0xb6/0x430 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881051f3bf8 by task ip/668 CPU: 2 PID: 668 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-00182-g25aa0bebba72-dirty #64 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0xa0 print_report+0xd0/0x620 kasan_report+0xb6/0xf0 xfrm_policy_inexact_list_reinsert+0xb6/0x430 xfrm_policy_inexact_insert_node.constprop.0+0x537/0x800 xfrm_policy_inexact_alloc_chain+0x23f/0x320 xfrm_policy_inexact_insert+0x6b/0x590 xfrm_policy_insert+0x3b1/0x480 xfrm_add_policy+0x23c/0x3c0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x2d0/0x510 netlink_rcv_skb+0x10d/0x2d0 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x49/0x60 netlink_unicast+0x3fe/0x540 netlink_sendmsg+0x528/0x970 sock_sendmsg+0x14a/0x160 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4fc/0x580 ___sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x160 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x73/0xdd The root cause is: cpu 0 cpu1 xfrm_dump_policy xfrm_policy_walk list_move_tail xfrm_add_policy ... ... xfrm_policy_inexact_list_reinsert list_for_each_entry_reverse if (!policy->bydst_reinsert) //read non-existent policy xfrm_dump_policy_done xfrm_policy_walk_done list_del(&walk->walk.all); If dump_one_policy() returns err (triggered by netlink socket), xfrm_policy_walk() will move walk initialized by socket to list net->xfrm.policy_all. so this socket becomes visible in the global policy list. The head *walk can be traversed when users add policies with different prefixlen and trigger xfrm_policy node merge. The issue can also be triggered by policy list traversal while rehashing and flushing policies. It can be fixed by skip such "policies" with walk.dead set to 1. Fixes: 9cf545e ("xfrm: policy: store inexact policies in a tree ordered by destination address") Fixes: 12a169e ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list") Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
matttbe
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Aug 16, 2024
copy_fd_bitmaps(new, old, count) is expected to copy the first count/BITS_PER_LONG bits from old->full_fds_bits[] and fill the rest with zeroes. What it does is copying enough words (BITS_TO_LONGS(count/BITS_PER_LONG)), then memsets the rest. That works fine, *if* all bits past the cutoff point are clear. Otherwise we are risking garbage from the last word we'd copied. For most of the callers that is true - expand_fdtable() has count equal to old->max_fds, so there's no open descriptors past count, let alone fully occupied words in ->open_fds[], which is what bits in ->full_fds_bits[] correspond to. The other caller (dup_fd()) passes sane_fdtable_size(old_fdt, max_fds), which is the smallest multiple of BITS_PER_LONG that covers all opened descriptors below max_fds. In the common case (copying on fork()) max_fds is ~0U, so all opened descriptors will be below it and we are fine, by the same reasons why the call in expand_fdtable() is safe. Unfortunately, there is a case where max_fds is less than that and where we might, indeed, end up with junk in ->full_fds_bits[] - close_range(from, to, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE) with * descriptor table being currently shared * 'to' being above the current capacity of descriptor table * 'from' being just under some chunk of opened descriptors. In that case we end up with observably wrong behaviour - e.g. spawn a child with CLONE_FILES, get all descriptors in range 0..127 open, then close_range(64, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE) and watch dup(0) ending up with descriptor #128, despite #64 being observably not open. The minimally invasive fix would be to deal with that in dup_fd(). If this proves to add measurable overhead, we can go that way, but let's try to fix copy_fd_bitmaps() first. * new helper: bitmap_copy_and_expand(to, from, bits_to_copy, size). * make copy_fd_bitmaps() take the bitmap size in words, rather than bits; it's 'count' argument is always a multiple of BITS_PER_LONG, so we are not losing any information, and that way we can use the same helper for all three bitmaps - compiler will see that count is a multiple of BITS_PER_LONG for the large ones, so it'll generate plain memcpy()+memset(). Reproducer added to tools/testing/selftests/core/close_range_test.c Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
matttbe
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Oct 28, 2024
Alex reports that syzkaller has managed to trigger a use-after-free when tearing down a VM: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769 Read of size 8 at addr ffffff801c6890d0 by task syz.3.2219/10758 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 10758 Comm: syz.3.2219 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-dirty #64 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x17c/0x1a8 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:317 show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:324 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x94/0xc0 lib/dump_stack.c:119 print_report+0x144/0x7a4 mm/kasan/report.c:377 kasan_report+0xcc/0x128 mm/kasan/report.c:601 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381 kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769 kvm_vm_release+0x4c/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1409 __fput+0x198/0x71c fs/file_table.c:422 ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:450 task_work_run+0x1cc/0x23c kernel/task_work.c:228 do_notify_resume+0x144/0x1a0 include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 el0_svc+0x64/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 Upon closer inspection, it appears that we do not properly tear down the MMIO registration for a vCPU that fails creation late in the game, e.g. a vCPU w/ the same ID already exists in the VM. It is important to consider the context of commit that introduced this bug by moving the unregistration out of __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). That change correctly sought to avoid an srcu v. config_lock inversion by breaking up the vCPU teardown into two parts, one guarded by the config_lock. Fix the use-after-free while avoiding lock inversion by adding a special-cased unregistration to __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). This is safe because failed vCPUs are torn down outside of the config_lock. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: f616506 ("KVM: arm64: vgic: Don't hold config_lock while unregistering redistributors") Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
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Nov 1, 2024
During the migration of Soundwire runtime stream allocation from the Qualcomm Soundwire controller to SoC's soundcard drivers the sdm845 soundcard was forgotten. At this point any playback attempt or audio daemon startup, for instance on sdm845-db845c (Qualcomm RB3 board), will result in stream pointer NULL dereference: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000101ecf000 [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: ... CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1198 Comm: aplay Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-qcomlt-arm64-00059-g9d78f315a362-dirty #18 Hardware name: Thundercomm Dragonboard 845c (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus] lr : sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus] sp : ffff80008a2035c0 x29: ffff80008a2035c0 x28: ffff80008a203978 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 00000000000000c0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff1676025f4800 x23: ffff167600ff1cb8 x22: ffff167600ff1c98 x21: 0000000000000003 x20: ffff167607316000 x19: ffff167604e64e80 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffcec265074160 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff167600ff1cec x5 : ffffcec22cfa2010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000003 x2 : ffff167613f836c0 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff16761feb60b8 Call trace: sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus] wsa881x_hw_params+0x68/0x80 [snd_soc_wsa881x] snd_soc_dai_hw_params+0x3c/0xa4 __soc_pcm_hw_params+0x230/0x660 dpcm_be_dai_hw_params+0x1d0/0x3f8 dpcm_fe_dai_hw_params+0x98/0x268 snd_pcm_hw_params+0x124/0x460 snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x998/0x16e8 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x34/0x58 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0xf8 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x34/0xe0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: aa0403fb f9418400 9100e000 9400102f (f8420f22) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 0000000000006108 <sdw_stream_add_slave>: 6108: d503233f paciasp 610c: a9b97bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-112]! 6110: 910003fd mov x29, sp 6114: a90153f3 stp x19, x20, [sp, #16] 6118: a9025bf5 stp x21, x22, [sp, #32] 611c: aa0103f6 mov x22, x1 6120: 2a0303f5 mov w21, w3 6124: a90363f7 stp x23, x24, [sp, #48] 6128: aa0003f8 mov x24, x0 612c: aa0203f7 mov x23, x2 6130: a9046bf9 stp x25, x26, [sp, #64] 6134: aa0403f9 mov x25, x4 <-- x4 copied to x25 6138: a90573fb stp x27, x28, [sp, #80] 613c: aa0403fb mov x27, x4 6140: f9418400 ldr x0, [x0, #776] 6144: 9100e000 add x0, x0, #0x38 6148: 94000000 bl 0 <mutex_lock> 614c: f8420f22 ldr x2, [x25, #32]! <-- offset 0x44 ^^^ This is 0x6108 + offset 0x44 from the beginning of sdw_stream_add_slave() where data abort happens. wsa881x_hw_params() is called with stream = NULL and passes it further in register x4 (5th argument) to sdw_stream_add_slave() without any checks. Value from x4 is copied to x25 and finally it aborts on trying to load a value from address in x25 plus offset 32 (in dec) which corresponds to master_list member in struct sdw_stream_runtime: struct sdw_stream_runtime { const char * name; /* 0 8 */ struct sdw_stream_params params; /* 8 12 */ enum sdw_stream_state state; /* 20 4 */ enum sdw_stream_type type; /* 24 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ here-> struct list_head master_list; /* 32 16 */ int m_rt_count; /* 48 4 */ /* size: 56, cachelines: 1, members: 6 */ /* sum members: 48, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* padding: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 56 bytes */ Fix this by adding required calls to qcom_snd_sdw_startup() and sdw_release_stream() to startup and shutdown routines which restores the previous correct behaviour when ->set_stream() method is called to set a valid stream runtime pointer on playback startup. Reproduced and then fix was tested on db845c RB3 board. Reported-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 15c7fab ("ASoC: qcom: Move Soundwire runtime stream alloc to soundcards") Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Cc: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexey Klimov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Steev Klimaszewski <[email protected]> # Lenovo Yoga C630 Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
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Here is a minimal setup to reproduce this bug (
mptcp-toolsis supposed to be in the same folder than this script and theuse_mptcptool compiled as well aspm_nl_ctlfrom theselftests) :In shell 1 :
ip netns exec ns_server tcpdump -ni any tcpand in shell 2 :ip netns exec ns_client mptcp-tools/use_mptcp/use_mptcp.sh curl 10.0.1.2:8000 -o /dev/null.Here is the log of the crash :
I'm thus currently unable to create 2 subflows due to this issue and #63.
Do I have a wrong usage of
pm_nl_ctl?The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: