This is an encryption utility designed to backup a set of files. The files are packed into a gzipped tarball in-memory, and this is encrypted using NaCl via a scrypt-derived key.
It derives from the passcrypt utility in the
cryptutils, and was written as
an example for the book "Practical Cryptography with Go."
This program arose from the need to backup and archive files on removeable media that may be restored on multiple platforms. There aren't any well-supported and readily available disk encryption systems that work in this type of environment, and using GnuPG requires GnuPG, the archiver, and a suitable decompression program to be provided. This program is statically built and can run standalone on all the needed platforms.
This program assumes that an attacker does not currently have access to either the machine the archive is generated on, or on the machine it is unpacked on. It is intended for medium to long-term storage of sensitive data at rest on removeable media that may be used to load data onto a variety of platforms (Windows, OS X, Linux, OpenBSD), where the threat of losing the storage medium is considerably higher than losing a secured laptop that the archive is generated on.
Key derivation is done by pairing a password with a randomly-chosen 256-bit salt using the scrypt parameters N=2^20, r=8, p=1. This makes it astronomically unlikely that the same key will be derived from the same passphrase. The key is used as a NaCl secretbox key; the nonce for encryption is randomly generated. It is thought that this will be highly unlikely to cause nonce reuse issues.
The primary weaknesses might come from an attack on the passphrase or via cryptanalysis of the ciphertext. The ciphertext is produced using NaCl appended to a random salt, so it is unlikely this will produce any meaningful information. One exception might be if this program is used to encrypt a known set of files, and the attacker compares the length of the archive to a list of known file sizes.
An attack on the passphrase will most likely come via a successful dictionary attack. The large salt and high scrypt parameters will deter attackers without the large resources required to brute force this. Dictionary attacks will also be expensive for these same reasons.
filecrypt [-h] [-o filename] [-q] [-t] [-u] [-v] [-x] files...
-h Print this help message.
-o filename The filename to output. If an archive is being built,
this is the filename of the archive. If an archive is
being unpacked, this is the directory to unpack in.
If the tarball is being extracted, this is the path
to write the tarball.
Defaults:
Pack: files.enc
Unpack: .
Extract: files.tgz
-q Quiet mode. Only print errors and password prompt.
This will override the verbose flag.
-t List files in the archive. This acts like the list
flag in tar.
-u Unpack the archive listed on the command line. Only
one archive may be unpacked.
-v Verbose mode. This acts like the verbose flag in
tar.
-x Extract a tarball. This will decrypt the archive, but
not decompress or unpack it.
Examples:
filecrypt -o ssh.enc ~/.ssh
Encrypt the user's OpenSSH directory to ssh.enc.
filecrypt -o backup/ -u ssh.enc
Restore the user's OpenSSH directory to the backup/
directory.
filecrypt -u ssh.enc
Restore the user's OpenSSH directory to the current directory.
filecrypt is released under the ISC license.
Copyright (c) 2015 Kyle Isom <[email protected]>
Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.