diff --git a/index.bs b/index.bs index 84ab7b70..1ace5fbe 100644 --- a/index.bs +++ b/index.bs @@ -2214,24 +2214,40 @@ Note: Is is suggested that poses reported relative to a {{XRReferenceSpaceType/" Note: Is is suggested that poses reported relative to a {{XRBoundedReferenceSpace}} be [=limiting|limited=] to a distance of 1 meter outside the {{XRBoundedReferenceSpace}}'s [=native bounds geometry=]. -
-Gaze Tracking {#gazetracking-security} -------------- - -While the API does not yet expose eye tracking capabilities a lot can be inferred about where the user is looking by tracking the orientation of their head. This is especially true of XR devices that have limited input capabilities, such as Google Cardboard, which frequently require users to control a "gaze cursor" with their head orientation. This means that it may be possible for a malicious page to infer what a user is typing on a virtual keyboard or how they are interacting with a virtual UI based solely on monitoring their head movements. For example: if not prevented from doing so a page could estimate what URL a user is entering into the user agent's URL bar. - -To prevent this risk the user agent MUST set the [=visibility state=] of all {{XRSession}}s to {{XRVisibilityState/"hidden"}} when the user is interacting with sensitive, trusted UI such as URL bars or system dialogs. Additionally, to prevent a malicious page from being able to monitor input on other pages the user agent MUST set the {{XRSession}}'s [=visibility state=] to {{XRVisibilityState/"hidden"}} if the [=currently focused area=] does belong to the document which created the {{XRSession}}. Trusted Environment {#trustedenvironment-security} ------------------- -If the virtual environment does not consistently track the user's head motion with low latency and at a high frame rate the user may become disoriented or physically ill. Since it is impossible to force pages to produce consistently performant and correct content the user agent MUST provide a tracked, trusted environment and an [=XR Compositor=] which runs asynchronously from page content. The compositor is responsible for compositing the trusted and untrusted content. If content is not performant, does not submit frames, or terminates unexpectedly the user agent should be able to continue presenting a responsive, trusted UI. +A Trusted UI is an interface presented by the User Agent that the user is able to interact with but the page cannot. The user agent MUST support showing [=trusted UI=]. -Additionally, page content has the ability to make users uncomfortable in ways not related to performance. Badly applied tracking, strobing colors, and content intended to offend, frighten, or intimidate are examples of content which may cause the user to want to quickly exit the XR experience. Removing the XR device in these cases may not always be a fast or practical option. To accommodate this the user agent SHOULD provide users with an action, such as pressing a reserved hardware button or performing a gesture, that escapes out of WebXR content and displays the user agent's trusted UI. +A [=trusted UI=] MUST have the following properties: -When navigating between pages in XR the user agent should display trusted UI elements informing the user of the security information of the site they are navigating to which is normally presented by the 2D UI, such as the URL and encryption status. + - It must not be spoofable + - It indicates where the request/content displayed originates from + - If it relies on a shared secret with the user, this shared secret cannot be observed by a mixed reality capture (e.g. it may not be a gesture that can be seen by the camera) + - It is consistent between immersive experiences in the same UA + +Broadly speaking, there are two options for user agents who wish to support [=trusted UI=]. One option is trusted immersive UI, which is a [=trusted UI=] which does not exit immersive mode. Implementing [=trusted immersive UI=] can be challenging because `XRWebGLLayer` buffers fill the XR Device display and the User Agent does not typically "reserve" pixels for its own use. User agents are not required to support [=trusted immersive UI=], they may instead temporarily pause/exit immersive mode and show non-immersive [=trusted UI=] to the user. + +
+Note: Examples of [=trusted UI=] include: + - The default 2D mode browser shown when not in immersive mode + - A prompt shown within immersive mode which can only be interacted with via a reserved hardware button to prevent spoofing + - Pausing the immersive session and showing some form of native system environment in which a prompt can be shown + +
+ +The ability to read input information (head pose, input pose, etc) poses a risk to the integrity of [=trusted UI=] as the page may use this information to snoop on the choices made by the user while interacting with the [=trusted UI=]. To prevent this risk the user agent MUST set the [=visibility state=] of all {{XRSession}}s to {{XRVisibilityState/"hidden"}} when the user is interacting with [=trusted UI=] ([=trusted immersive ui|immersive=] or non-immersive) such as URL bars or system dialogs. Additionally, to prevent a malicious page from being able to monitor input on other pages the user agent MUST set the {{XRSession}}'s [=visibility state=] to {{XRVisibilityState/"hidden"}} if the [=currently focused area=] does belong to the document which created the {{XRSession}}. + + +The user agent MUST use [=trusted UI=] to show permissions prompts. + +If the virtual environment does not consistently track the user's head motion with low latency and at a high frame rate the user may become disoriented or physically ill. Since it is impossible to force pages to produce consistently performant and correct content the user agent MUST provide a tracked, trusted environment and an [=XR Compositor=] which runs asynchronously from page content. The compositor is responsible for compositing the trusted and untrusted content. If content is not performant, does not submit frames, or terminates unexpectedly the user agent should be able to continue presenting a responsive, [=trusted UI=]. + +Additionally, page content has the ability to make users uncomfortable in ways not related to performance. Badly applied tracking, strobing colors, and content intended to offend, frighten, or intimidate are examples of content which may cause the user to want to quickly exit the XR experience. Removing the XR device in these cases may not always be a fast or practical option. To accommodate this the user agent MUST provide users with an action, such as pressing a reserved hardware button or performing a gesture, that escapes out of WebXR content and displays the user agent's [=trusted UI=]. + +
-{{XRSession}}s MUST have their [=visibility state=] set to {{XRVisibilityState/"hidden"}} when the user is interacting with potentially sensitive UI from the user agent (such as entering a URL) in the trusted environment. Context Isolation {#contextisolation-security} -----------------