fix: check directory traversal attack without file system visit #473
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yoshuawuyts
approved these changes
Apr 25, 2020
| } | ||
| log::info!("Requested file: {:?}", dir); | ||
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| log::info!("Requested file: {:?}", file_path); |
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Ideally we could warn here with the full requested path if it contained a .. instead.
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We don't want to leak information of which files exist to adversaries, but the origin version of
ServeDirdid.We are using
canonicalizeto make surefile_pathis simple, but, unfortunately, it would visit file system, which might be slow, and attackers could count the time that server response, with hundreds of requests, attacker would know which file is exists even it is not sub path ofroot.read more: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_attack