From c46461aa352247a331870cf34ca5f0e07ca4800f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 23:12:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 01/16] edited for clarity MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit “up to” indicates that the lockup duration may be extended by any amount that results in a total duration not greater than 48 months. --- 0076-linear-lockup-curve.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md index 619247c56..92a27f1a9 100644 --- a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md +++ b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ During the 7-day landrush period, the following rules apply. - The landrush position may be split into multiple landrush positions, which may be extended or delegated separately. -- The lockup duration may be extended to the maximum of 48 months. +- The lockup duration may be extended up to the maximum of 48 months. - HNT may be added to the landrush position. - The position may be delegated to a subDAO or re-delegated to a different subDAO. From 468fd64b44bc7e002b3c8a86ae76e6c4323e2710 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 23:13:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 02/16] typo as noted by Siegfried --- 0076-linear-lockup-curve.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md index 92a27f1a9..265637474 100644 --- a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md +++ b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ We also propose that the 6-month minimum lockup period be removed and HNT holder HNT for any desired period, including periods less than 6 months. The implementation calculates veHNT with a granularity of 1 day. The maximum lockup duration, -specified in HIP-51 as 48 months, corresponds to 1561 days. +specified in HIP-51 as 48 months, corresponds to 1461 days. The amount of veHNT associated with a position of HNT locked for d days will be determined by the linear function: From be6fe37c9b4e5794c433422b58d6d9332c41aab1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:03:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 03/16] clarify amount not time --- 0076-linear-lockup-curve.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md index 265637474..3ebddf5e1 100644 --- a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md +++ b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ The behavior of the 3x landrush multiplier is unchanged from HIP-51. To clarify, remains in effect for the duration of the most recent HNT lockup set during the 7-day landrush period, even if the HNT lockup is extended to a longer duration after the end of the landrush. -# Minimum Lockup +# Minimum Lockup Amount We propose to introduce a minimum HNT lockup amount per position of 1 HNT. This amount is set through a chain variable and may be modified later through governance. From 684c069fdeebe6fafca78377645576b755a2f0c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2023 12:19:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 04/16] correct beginning of 3x multiplier period --- 0076-linear-lockup-curve.md | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md index 3ebddf5e1..4a37805cc 100644 --- a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md +++ b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md @@ -210,10 +210,13 @@ During the 7-day landrush period, the following rules apply. - The position may be delegated to a subDAO or re-delegated to a different subDAO. At the end of the landrush, the duration of the 3x landrush multiplier is set to whatever the lockup -duration of the position is. The duration of the landrush multiplier is counted from the moment of -L1 transition. +duration of the locked HNT position is. -After the landrush ends, the following rules apply to landrush positions: +The duration of the landrush multiplier is counted from the day at which the lockup was last set or +extended during the landrush, or from the day of L1 transition in the case of validator stakes which +were automatically rolled over to lockup positions and not extended during the landrush. + +After the 7-day landrush period ends, the following rules apply to landrush positions: - The position may be split, but the landrush multiplier stays with the original position. The new position is not a landrush position and receives no 3x multiplier. @@ -222,7 +225,7 @@ After the landrush ends, the following rules apply to landrush positions: - No additional HNT may be transferred into the landrush position. - The position may be delegated or re-delegated. -At the end of the duration of the 3x landrush multiplier, as determined at the end of landrush, the +At the end of the duration of the 3x landrush multiplier, as determined at the end of the landrush, the 3x multiplier ends, and the landrush position reverts to a regular position. # Consequences From bde4bf4f82c9a889db140ede6eb5b134a044e0e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2023 12:37:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 05/16] clarify cooldown clarify that cooldown may be started or stopped at any time independently of the 3x landrush multiplier --- 0076-linear-lockup-curve.md | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md index 4a37805cc..78c66080b 100644 --- a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md +++ b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md @@ -120,12 +120,13 @@ that HNT locked for 6 months should receive 1x veHNT per HNT. HNT locked for the graph in HIP-51. Using available tools and following the specification of the Curve implementation referenced in -HIP-51, when the cooldown is triggered for a position of locked HNT, the amount of associated veHNT -will decay linearly to zero over the entire lockup duration. +HIP-51, a locked position initially maintains the same lockup duration indefinitely. At any time, +the holder of the position may trigger cooldown, and then the amount of associated veHNT will decay +linearly to zero over the entire lockup duration. (Cooldown may also be stopped at any time.) -As the cooldown decay curve is linear but different from the lockup curve, the amount of veHNT -associated with an HNT position during cooldown would be different from the amount of veHNT -associated with a similar HNT position that is newly locked for the same lock duration. +As the cooldown decay curve is linear but different from the lockup curve specified in HIP-51, the +amount of veHNT associated with an HNT position during cooldown would be different from the amount of +veHNT associated with a similar HNT position that is newly locked for the same lock duration. For example, if 1 HNT is newly locked for 6 months, HIP-51 specifies that it will receive 1 veHNT. However, if 1 HNT is locked for 48 months, receiving 100 veHNT, and then enters cooldown for 42 @@ -208,6 +209,7 @@ During the 7-day landrush period, the following rules apply. - The lockup duration may be extended up to the maximum of 48 months. - HNT may be added to the landrush position. - The position may be delegated to a subDAO or re-delegated to a different subDAO. +- Cooldown may be started or stopped. At the end of the landrush, the duration of the 3x landrush multiplier is set to whatever the lockup duration of the locked HNT position is. @@ -224,6 +226,7 @@ After the 7-day landrush period ends, the following rules apply to landrush posi multiplier. - No additional HNT may be transferred into the landrush position. - The position may be delegated or re-delegated. +- Cooldown may be started or stopped. At the end of the duration of the 3x landrush multiplier, as determined at the end of the landrush, the 3x multiplier ends, and the landrush position reverts to a regular position. From 3cf496556b2c7afd624d438a73db928ac1b88fa0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 19:52:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 06/16] correct punctuation --- 0076-linear-lockup-curve.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md index 78c66080b..47c908570 100644 --- a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md +++ b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ We propose introducing a 1 HNT minimum per lockup position to prevent spam posit We define rules of operation for the special-case 3x “landrush” veHNT multiplier that HIP-70 introduced but did not specify in detail. -The mechanics described here in terms of HNT, and veHNT will apply equally to veMOBILE and veIOT +The mechanics described here in terms of HNT and veHNT will apply equally to veMOBILE and veIOT when they are introduced. As HIPs 51–53 and HIP-70 do not specify a 3x landrush period for IOT and MOBILE, the landrush From ea4ad97ee9da78f7f8bfe067cfc2853d8b1d3241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 20:08:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 07/16] edits for clarity --- 0076-linear-lockup-curve.md | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md index 47c908570..a4d3a6209 100644 --- a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md +++ b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ participant while decreasing the total amount of locked HNT. Therefore, the linear lockup function proposed in this HIP will encourage greater total lockup and thereby promote long-term goals. -Similarly, we propose dropping the 6-month minimum lockup period for simplicity and encouraging +Similarly, we propose dropping the 6-month minimum lockup period for simplicity and to encourage maximum participation. For background, the 6-month minimum lockup period was intended to prevent holders of large HNT @@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ Finally, we make the rules governing 3x landrush positions explicit to document veHNT implementation that is being developed in accordance with HIP-70, which does not specify details. -In summary, the motivation of this HIP is to improve governance usability and long-term engagement -and to provide clarity on the rules governing landrush. +In summary, the motivation of this HIP is to improve governance, usability, and long-term +engagement, and to provide clarity on the rules governing landrush. # Stakeholders @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ We propose to introduce a minimum HNT lockup amount per position of 1 HNT. This through a chain variable and may be modified later through governance. The intention is to prevent bad actors from creating very large numbers of frivolous lockup -positions and spamming the chain. +positions and spamming the smart contract. # Landrush 3x Multiplier @@ -199,12 +199,12 @@ positions”), according to the veHNT implementation as currently in development At any time during the landrush, a wallet owner may open one or multiple HNT positions locked to any duration up to 48 months. Wallets with staked validators that have not completed validator cooldown -at transition will automatically have each 10,000 HNT validator position migrated as a locked HNT -position with a 6-month lockup duration. +at transition will automatically receive a locked HNT position with a 6-month lockup duration +containing 10,000 locked HNT per staked validator. During the 7-day landrush period, the following rules apply. -- The landrush position may be split into multiple landrush positions, which may be extended or +- A landrush position may be split into multiple landrush positions, which may be extended or delegated separately. - The lockup duration may be extended up to the maximum of 48 months. - HNT may be added to the landrush position. @@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ duration of the locked HNT position is. The duration of the landrush multiplier is counted from the day at which the lockup was last set or extended during the landrush, or from the day of L1 transition in the case of validator stakes which -were automatically rolled over to lockup positions and not extended during the landrush. +were automatically rolled over to locked positions and not extended during the landrush. After the 7-day landrush period ends, the following rules apply to landrush positions: @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ After the 7-day landrush period ends, the following rules apply to landrush posi At the end of the duration of the 3x landrush multiplier, as determined at the end of the landrush, the 3x multiplier ends, and the landrush position reverts to a regular position. -# Consequences +# Consequences of this HIP As the requirement for a 6-month minimum lockup duration is removed by this HIP, the change to veHNT allocation will make veHNT accessible to all participants willing to lock HNT for any duration, with @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ and reduce the cost of changes should they become necessary in the future. The 6-month minimum lockup period for legacy validator stakes that have not completed cooldown at transition is unaffected. Validator stakes that transition to locked HNT will be assigned the same -6-month lockup period but will benefit from a 12.5x veHNT multiplier instead of the 1x multiplier +6-month lockup period, but will benefit from a 12.5x veHNT multiplier instead of the 1x multiplier specified in HIP-51. Other participants will be able to lock HNT for any period without a 6-month minimum. The veHNT From fda39e1772b44837dd9637bf140a52aaa9fd6f6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2023 23:14:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 08/16] change subhead --- 0076-linear-lockup-curve.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md index a4d3a6209..1cdfff6f8 100644 --- a/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md +++ b/0076-linear-lockup-curve.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ This proposal is relevant to: who may not have considered locking their HNT due to the 6-month minimum lockup period specified in HIP-51. -# Detailed Explanation +# Simplified Lockup Curve HIP-51 specifies that HNT must be locked for a minimum of 6 months in order to receive veHNT, and that HNT locked for 6 months should receive 1x veHNT per HNT. HNT locked for the maximum duration of From b9f79c808a3e420956360428297092efe0f06cbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 02:12:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 09/16] Create XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md --- XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+) create mode 100644 XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md diff --git a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..337813918 --- /dev/null +++ b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +# HIP XX: subDAO Onboarding Fees + +- Author(s): @ferebee +- Start Date: 2023-03-10 +- Category: Economic, Technical +- Original HIP PR: #XX +- Tracking Issue: #XX + +# Summary + +Since HIP-51 and HIP-53 were passed, thousands of Helium 5G radios have come online. + +[HIP-51](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0051-helium-dao.md#omni-protocol-poc-incentive-model) specifies the DAO Utility Score, which determines the distribution of HNT between all Helium subDAOs. The hotspots of each subDAO count towards its Utility Score based on the onboarding fee set by that subDAO. + +However, current 5G hotspots, as introduced by FreedomFi, contain both a LoRa and a 5G hotspot. While HIP-53 specifies that 5G hotspots should burn a $40 onboarding fee, just like LoRa hotspots, the existing implementation only onboarded the LoRa component. All active 5G hotspots have been onboarded to LoRa, but no separate onboarding process for 5G was ever implemented. + +As a result, no onboarding fees have yet been burned towards the 5G subDAO. + +This prevents the tokenomics based on DAO Utility Score, as defined in HIP-51, from working as designed. + +HIP-XX solves this problem by requiring that hotspots participating in a particular Helium subDAO must burn an onboarding fee towards that subDAO. Specific fee schedules will be determined by subDAO governance. A mechanism is specified whereby the existing 5G hotspots may be onboarded retroactively. + +# Motivation + +The current situation impairs the growth of the Helium 5G subDAO by artificially suppressing its DAO Utility Score, limiting the HNT emitted to the 5G treasury, the value of the MOBILE tokens earned by 5G hotspots, and thereby the incentive to grow the Helium 5G network. + +On the other hand, the LoRa subDAO would benefit if the 5G hotspots, including those which are already online, pay appropriate onboarding fees for the privilege of joining the Helium DAO, rather than being counted despite not paying any fee, as is the case under the current implementation. The HNT burn from their fees will contribute additional value to the entire HNT/DNT ecosystem, including the LoRa subDAO. + +As the Helium DAO grows, new devices may be introduced that participate in multiple current and future subDAOs at once. Both the LoRa and the 5G subDAOs will benefit if appropriate onboarding fees are paid to all subDAOs involved. + +# Stakeholders + +This proposal is relevant to: + +- Existing and future LoRa and 5G hotspot owners, who are affected by the clarification of fees and the 5G DAO Utility Score. +- 5G hotspot manufacturers, who may need to budget for onboarding fees as decided by the 5G subDAO. +- Anyone designing a future subDAO. + +# Detailed Explanation + +HIP-51 introduces the [DAO Utility Score](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0051-helium-dao.md#omni-protocol-poc-incentive-model), which determines the proportion of HNT emissions distributed to each subDAO. + +HIP-53 describes a [$40 onboarding fee](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0053-mobile-dao.md#economics-overview) and $10 location assertion fee, analogous to LoRa hotspots. However, the gateways developed by FreedomFi and used to launch the Helium 5G network, as well as models introduced by other manufacturers, include both LoRa and 5G hotspot functions, which operate independently. In the existing implementation, the LoRa component is onboarded in the same way as all other Helium LoRa hotspots, with a $40 onboarding fee and optionally a $10 location assert. The 5G component itself currently performs no onboarding operation of its own, but it is treated as if it were onboarded nonetheless. + +As a result, no onboarding fee has ever been burned towards the 5G subDAO. The [DAO Utility Score](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0051-helium-dao.md#omni-protocol-poc-incentive-model) is defined in HIP-51 as + +$\text{DAO Utility Score} = V \times D \times A$ + +where + +$A = \text{max}(1, \sqrt[4]{\text{DNP Active Device Count} \times \text{DNP Device Activation Fee}})$ + +As a result, the A component is currently 1 for the 5G subDAO, as no onboarding fees (a. k. a. Activation Fees) have yet been burned. + +With the implementation of HIP-70, a separate rewardable entity will be created for each subDAO a hotspot takes part in, and the onboarded components of each hotspot will be counted separately towards the DAO Utility Score. Maker apps onboarding hotspots after transition will allow the hotspot owner to select which subDAO(s) to onboard to, and burn a fee to each subDAO accordingly. + +In the future, devices may be introduced that participate in many different subDAOs simultaneously, such as LoRa, 5G, future networks such as Wi-Fi, and other services such as dVPN or storage networks. In some cases, it may become possible to onboard existing hotspots to new subDAOs, through software or hardware upgrades. + +To ensure that all participating hotspots contribute appropriately to the various DAO Utility Scores, we propose the following provisions. + +# Provisions + +### Independent Onboarding + +If a hotspot participates in one or more Helium subDAOs, it must be onboarded to each subDAO individually, and the onboarding fee in DC as set by each subDAO must be accordingly burned separately towards that subDAO. + +### DAO Utility Score + +As specified in HIP-51, each hotspot contributes to the DAO Utility Score of its subDAO according to its onboarding fee. For the purposes of this calculation, hotspots which participate in multiple subDAOs shall be considered as multiple independent hotspots, one for each subDAO, and each shall contribute separately to the DAO Utility Score of its subDAO with the onboarding fee burned towards that subDAO. No onboarding fee shall be double-counted towards multiple subDAOs. + +### Fees Are Decided By subDAOs + +Each subDAO may set a schedule of onboarding fees for its participating hotspots through subDAO governance. All onboarding fees must be paid in DC burn from HNT according to procedures specified by the Helium DAO. + +Subject to change through subDAO governance by the 5G subDAO, the onboarding fee per Helium 5G hotspot to the 5G subDAO is $40 as defined in HIP-53, independent of other subDAO onboarding fees paid by the same hotspot, such as the $40 LoRa onboarding fee that has been paid by the LoRa component of existing 5G hotspots under the current implementation. + +### Paying the Missing 5G Onboarding Fees + +In cooperation with hotspot manufacturers, Helium Foundation may perform one or several one-time burn operations which cover, in total, the $40 onboarding fee for each 5G hotspot which has been onboarded to LoRa under the existing implementation, and thus neglected to pay for onboarding to the 5G subDAO. Once these fees are paid, a corresponding number of 5G hotspots shall be considered, for the purpose of the DAO Utility Score, to be onboarded to the 5G subDAO. + +# Drawbacks + +This proposal may require hotspot manufacturers and therefore, indirectly, hotspot owners, to pay additional fees towards the Helium DAO. These fees have not been assessed to date, although they are specified by existing HIPs. + +# Benefits + +- Under this proposal, all subDAOs will contribute onboarding fees to the Helium DAO, and in return will obtain a DAO Utility Score as proposed in HIP-51. Rules for hotspots participating in multiple subDAOs are clarified, including subDAOs which may be introduced in the future as upgrades to existing hotspot hardware. +- Onboarded 5G hotspots will be counted towards the 5G DAO Utility Score as intended by HIP-53. + +# Deployment Impact + +Implementation will be simplified if the fees for existing 5G hotspots can be paid retroactively, as that will remove the requirement to distinguish between hotspots that have or have not paid an onboarding fee. The design currently being implemented already supports all necessary features. + +# Clarification + +To resolve any ambiguity in HIP-51, the distribution of HNT to subDAOs is clarified as follows. The Helium DAO HNT emissions contract distributes HNT to HST holders as specified in HIP-20. All remaining HNT is distributed between all subDAOs in proportion to their relative DAO Utility Scores. Rewards to individual hotspots for PoC and Data Transfer are issued in DNT according to the reward schedules defined for each subDAO, which may be modified through subDAO governance. + + + + From 0b3b0268fea16de3157a1755fa55f815c25b58d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 12:47:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 10/16] merge terminology normalizations by gutentag MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit replace “5G” with “MOBILE” and “LoRa” with “IOT” --- XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md | 66 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md index 337813918..cee567f07 100644 --- a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md +++ b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md @@ -8,41 +8,39 @@ # Summary -Since HIP-51 and HIP-53 were passed, thousands of Helium 5G radios have come online. +[HIP-51](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0051-helium-dao.md#omni-protocol-poc-incentive-model) specifies the DAO Utility Score, which determines the distribution of HNT between all Helium subDAOs. The Hotspots of each subDAO count towards its Utility Score based on the onboarding fee set by that subDAO. -[HIP-51](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0051-helium-dao.md#omni-protocol-poc-incentive-model) specifies the DAO Utility Score, which determines the distribution of HNT between all Helium subDAOs. The hotspots of each subDAO count towards its Utility Score based on the onboarding fee set by that subDAO. +However, current MOBILE Hotspots, as introduced by FreedomFi, contain both an IOT Hotspot and a MOBILE Hotspot. While HIP-53 specifies that MOBILE Hotspots should burn a $40 onboarding fee, just like IOT Hotspots, the existing implementation only onboarded the IOT network component. All active MOBILE Hotspots have been onboarded to the IOT network, but no separate onboarding process for the MOBILE network was ever implemented. -However, current 5G hotspots, as introduced by FreedomFi, contain both a LoRa and a 5G hotspot. While HIP-53 specifies that 5G hotspots should burn a $40 onboarding fee, just like LoRa hotspots, the existing implementation only onboarded the LoRa component. All active 5G hotspots have been onboarded to LoRa, but no separate onboarding process for 5G was ever implemented. - -As a result, no onboarding fees have yet been burned towards the 5G subDAO. +As a result, no onboarding fees have yet been burned towards the MOBILE subDAO. This prevents the tokenomics based on DAO Utility Score, as defined in HIP-51, from working as designed. -HIP-XX solves this problem by requiring that hotspots participating in a particular Helium subDAO must burn an onboarding fee towards that subDAO. Specific fee schedules will be determined by subDAO governance. A mechanism is specified whereby the existing 5G hotspots may be onboarded retroactively. +HIP-XX solves this problem by requiring that Hotspots participating in a particular Helium subDAO must burn an onboarding fee towards that subDAO. Specific fee schedules will be determined by subDAO governance. A mechanism is specified whereby the existing MOBILE Hotspots may be onboarded retroactively. # Motivation -The current situation impairs the growth of the Helium 5G subDAO by artificially suppressing its DAO Utility Score, limiting the HNT emitted to the 5G treasury, the value of the MOBILE tokens earned by 5G hotspots, and thereby the incentive to grow the Helium 5G network. +The current situation impairs the growth of the Helium MOBILE subDAO by artificially suppressing its DAO Utility Score, limiting the HNT emitted to the MOBILE subDAO treasury, the value of the MOBILE tokens earned by MOBILE Hotspots, and thereby the incentive to grow the MOBILE network. -On the other hand, the LoRa subDAO would benefit if the 5G hotspots, including those which are already online, pay appropriate onboarding fees for the privilege of joining the Helium DAO, rather than being counted despite not paying any fee, as is the case under the current implementation. The HNT burn from their fees will contribute additional value to the entire HNT/DNT ecosystem, including the LoRa subDAO. +On the other hand, the IOT subDAO would benefit if the MOBILE Hotspots, including those which are already online, pay appropriate onboarding fees for the privilege of joining the Helium DAO, rather than being counted despite not paying any fee, as is the case under the current implementation. The HNT burn from their fees will contribute additional value to the entire HNT/DNT ecosystem, including the IOT subDAO. -As the Helium DAO grows, new devices may be introduced that participate in multiple current and future subDAOs at once. Both the LoRa and the 5G subDAOs will benefit if appropriate onboarding fees are paid to all subDAOs involved. +As the Helium DAO grows, new devices may be introduced that participate in multiple current and future subDAOs at once. Both the IOT and the MOBILE subDAOs will benefit if appropriate onboarding fees are paid to all subDAOs involved. # Stakeholders This proposal is relevant to: -- Existing and future LoRa and 5G hotspot owners, who are affected by the clarification of fees and the 5G DAO Utility Score. -- 5G hotspot manufacturers, who may need to budget for onboarding fees as decided by the 5G subDAO. +- Existing and future IOT and MOBILE Hotspot owners, who are affected by the clarification of fees and the MOBILE DAO Utility Score. +- MOBILE Hotspot manufacturers, who may need to budget for onboarding fees as decided by the MOBILE subDAO. - Anyone designing a future subDAO. # Detailed Explanation HIP-51 introduces the [DAO Utility Score](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0051-helium-dao.md#omni-protocol-poc-incentive-model), which determines the proportion of HNT emissions distributed to each subDAO. -HIP-53 describes a [$40 onboarding fee](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0053-mobile-dao.md#economics-overview) and $10 location assertion fee, analogous to LoRa hotspots. However, the gateways developed by FreedomFi and used to launch the Helium 5G network, as well as models introduced by other manufacturers, include both LoRa and 5G hotspot functions, which operate independently. In the existing implementation, the LoRa component is onboarded in the same way as all other Helium LoRa hotspots, with a $40 onboarding fee and optionally a $10 location assert. The 5G component itself currently performs no onboarding operation of its own, but it is treated as if it were onboarded nonetheless. +HIP-53 describes a [$40 onboarding fee](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0053-mobile-dao.md#economics-overview) and $10 location assertion fee, analogous to IOT Hotspots. However, the gateways developed by FreedomFi and used to launch the MOBILE network, as well as models introduced by other manufacturers, include both IOT and MOBILE Hotspot functions, which operate independently. In the existing implementation, the IOT Hotspot component is onboarded in the same way as all other Helium IOT Hotspots, with a $40 onboarding fee and optionally a $10 location assert. The MOBILE Hotspot component itself currently performs no onboarding operation of its own, but it is treated as if it were onboarded nonetheless. -As a result, no onboarding fee has ever been burned towards the 5G subDAO. The [DAO Utility Score](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0051-helium-dao.md#omni-protocol-poc-incentive-model) is defined in HIP-51 as +As a result, no onboarding fee has ever been burned towards the MOBILE subDAO. The [DAO Utility Score](https://github.com/helium/HIP/blob/main/0051-helium-dao.md#omni-protocol-poc-incentive-model) is defined in HIP-51 as $\text{DAO Utility Score} = V \times D \times A$ @@ -50,51 +48,51 @@ where $A = \text{max}(1, \sqrt[4]{\text{DNP Active Device Count} \times \text{DNP Device Activation Fee}})$ -As a result, the A component is currently 1 for the 5G subDAO, as no onboarding fees (a. k. a. Activation Fees) have yet been burned. +As a result, the A component is currently 1 for the MOBILE subDAO, as no onboarding fees (a. k. a. Activation Fees) have yet been burned. -With the implementation of HIP-70, a separate rewardable entity will be created for each subDAO a hotspot takes part in, and the onboarded components of each hotspot will be counted separately towards the DAO Utility Score. Maker apps onboarding hotspots after transition will allow the hotspot owner to select which subDAO(s) to onboard to, and burn a fee to each subDAO accordingly. +With the implementation of HIP-70, a separate rewardable entity will be created for each subDAO a Hotspot takes part in, and the onboarded components of each Hotspot will be counted separately towards the DAO Utility Score. Maker apps onboarding Hotspots after transition will allow the Hotspot operator to select which subDAO(s) to onboard to, and burn a fee to each subDAO accordingly. -In the future, devices may be introduced that participate in many different subDAOs simultaneously, such as LoRa, 5G, future networks such as Wi-Fi, and other services such as dVPN or storage networks. In some cases, it may become possible to onboard existing hotspots to new subDAOs, through software or hardware upgrades. +In the future, devices may be introduced that participate in many different subDAOs simultaneously, such as IOT, MOBILE, future networks such as Wi-Fi, and other services such as dVPN or storage networks. In some cases, it may become possible to onboard existing Hotspots to new subDAOs, through software or hardware upgrades. -To ensure that all participating hotspots contribute appropriately to the various DAO Utility Scores, we propose the following provisions. +To ensure that all participating Hotspots contribute appropriately to the various DAO Utility Scores, we propose the following provisions. # Provisions -### Independent Onboarding +## Independent Onboarding -If a hotspot participates in one or more Helium subDAOs, it must be onboarded to each subDAO individually, and the onboarding fee in DC as set by each subDAO must be accordingly burned separately towards that subDAO. +If a Hotspot participates in one or more Helium subDAOs, it must be onboarded to each subDAO individually, and the onboarding fee in DC as set by each subDAO must be accordingly burned separately towards that subDAO. -### DAO Utility Score +## DAO Utility Score -As specified in HIP-51, each hotspot contributes to the DAO Utility Score of its subDAO according to its onboarding fee. For the purposes of this calculation, hotspots which participate in multiple subDAOs shall be considered as multiple independent hotspots, one for each subDAO, and each shall contribute separately to the DAO Utility Score of its subDAO with the onboarding fee burned towards that subDAO. No onboarding fee shall be double-counted towards multiple subDAOs. +As specified in HIP-51, each Hotspot contributes to the DAO Utility Score of its subDAO according to its onboarding fee. For the purposes of this calculation, Hotspots which participate in multiple subDAOs shall be considered as multiple independent Hotspots, one for each subDAO, and each shall contribute separately to the DAO Utility Score of its subDAO with the onboarding fee burned towards that subDAO. No onboarding fee shall be double-counted towards multiple subDAOs. -### Fees Are Decided By subDAOs +## Fees Are Decided By subDAOs -Each subDAO may set a schedule of onboarding fees for its participating hotspots through subDAO governance. All onboarding fees must be paid in DC burn from HNT according to procedures specified by the Helium DAO. +Each subDAO may set a schedule of onboarding fees for its participating Hotspots through subDAO governance. All onboarding fees must be paid in DC burn from HNT according to procedures specified by the Helium DAO. -Subject to change through subDAO governance by the 5G subDAO, the onboarding fee per Helium 5G hotspot to the 5G subDAO is $40 as defined in HIP-53, independent of other subDAO onboarding fees paid by the same hotspot, such as the $40 LoRa onboarding fee that has been paid by the LoRa component of existing 5G hotspots under the current implementation. +Subject to change through subDAO governance by the MOBILE subDAO, the onboarding fee per MOBILE Hotspot to the MOBILE subDAO is $40 as defined in HIP-53, independent of other subDAO onboarding fees paid by the same Hotspot, such as the $40 IOT network onboarding fee that has been paid by the IOT component of existing MOBILE Hotspots under the current implementation. -### Paying the Missing 5G Onboarding Fees +## Paying the Missing MOBILE Onboarding Fees -In cooperation with hotspot manufacturers, Helium Foundation may perform one or several one-time burn operations which cover, in total, the $40 onboarding fee for each 5G hotspot which has been onboarded to LoRa under the existing implementation, and thus neglected to pay for onboarding to the 5G subDAO. Once these fees are paid, a corresponding number of 5G hotspots shall be considered, for the purpose of the DAO Utility Score, to be onboarded to the 5G subDAO. +In cooperation with Hotspot manufacturers, Helium Foundation may perform one or several one-time burn operations which cover, in total, the $40 onboarding fee for each MOBILE Hotspot which has been onboarded to the IOT network under the existing implementation, and thus neglected to pay for onboarding to the MOBILE subDAO. Once these fees are paid, a corresponding number of MOBILE Hotspots shall be considered, for the purpose of the DAO Utility Score, to be onboarded to the MOBILE network. # Drawbacks -This proposal may require hotspot manufacturers and therefore, indirectly, hotspot owners, to pay additional fees towards the Helium DAO. These fees have not been assessed to date, although they are specified by existing HIPs. +This proposal may require Hotspot manufacturers and therefore, indirectly, Hotspot owners, to pay additional fees towards the Helium DAO. These fees have not been assessed to date, although they are specified by existing HIPs. # Benefits -- Under this proposal, all subDAOs will contribute onboarding fees to the Helium DAO, and in return will obtain a DAO Utility Score as proposed in HIP-51. Rules for hotspots participating in multiple subDAOs are clarified, including subDAOs which may be introduced in the future as upgrades to existing hotspot hardware. -- Onboarded 5G hotspots will be counted towards the 5G DAO Utility Score as intended by HIP-53. +- Under this proposal, all subDAOs will contribute onboarding fees to the Helium DAO, and in return will obtain a DAO Utility Score as proposed in HIP-51. Rules for Hotspots participating in multiple subDAOs are clarified, including subDAOs which may be introduced in the future as upgrades to existing Hotspot hardware. +- Onboarded MOBILE Hotspots will be counted towards the MOBILE DAO Utility Score as intended by HIP-53. # Deployment Impact -Implementation will be simplified if the fees for existing 5G hotspots can be paid retroactively, as that will remove the requirement to distinguish between hotspots that have or have not paid an onboarding fee. The design currently being implemented already supports all necessary features. +Implementation will be simplified if the fees for existing MOBILE Hotspots can be paid retroactively, as that will remove the requirement to distinguish between Hotspots that have or have not paid an onboarding fee. The design currently being implemented already supports all necessary features. # Clarification -To resolve any ambiguity in HIP-51, the distribution of HNT to subDAOs is clarified as follows. The Helium DAO HNT emissions contract distributes HNT to HST holders as specified in HIP-20. All remaining HNT is distributed between all subDAOs in proportion to their relative DAO Utility Scores. Rewards to individual hotspots for PoC and Data Transfer are issued in DNT according to the reward schedules defined for each subDAO, which may be modified through subDAO governance. - - - +To resolve any ambiguity in HIP-51, the distribution of HNT to subDAOs is clarified as follows. +- The Helium DAO HNT emissions contract distributes HNT to HST holders as specified in HIP-20. +- All remaining HNT is distributed between all subDAOs in proportion to their relative DAO Utility Scores. + - Rewards to individual Hotspots for PoC and Data Transfer are issued in DNT according to the reward schedules defined for each subDAO, which may be modified through subDAO governance. From 980e10a1a576f2f0ecb71d4d76a32c033aaa8703 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 15:05:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 11/16] Update XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md --- XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md index cee567f07..ea6e86311 100644 --- a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md +++ b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ This proposal may require Hotspot manufacturers and therefore, indirectly, Hotsp # Benefits - Under this proposal, all subDAOs will contribute onboarding fees to the Helium DAO, and in return will obtain a DAO Utility Score as proposed in HIP-51. Rules for Hotspots participating in multiple subDAOs are clarified, including subDAOs which may be introduced in the future as upgrades to existing Hotspot hardware. -- Onboarded MOBILE Hotspots will be counted towards the MOBILE DAO Utility Score as intended by HIP-53. +- Onboarded MOBILE Hotspots will be counted towards the MOBILE DAO Utility Score as intended by HIP-53, provided manufacturers and/or other parties successfully coordinate with Helium Foundation to pay the outstanding fees. # Deployment Impact @@ -95,4 +95,4 @@ To resolve any ambiguity in HIP-51, the distribution of HNT to subDAOs is clarif - The Helium DAO HNT emissions contract distributes HNT to HST holders as specified in HIP-20. - All remaining HNT is distributed between all subDAOs in proportion to their relative DAO Utility Scores. - - Rewards to individual Hotspots for PoC and Data Transfer are issued in DNT according to the reward schedules defined for each subDAO, which may be modified through subDAO governance. +- Rewards to individual Hotspots for PoC and Data Transfer are issued in DNT according to the reward schedules defined for each subDAO, which may be modified through subDAO governance. From 24a6cf39d0cc9095f38eead7805cbe24541ef4ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 20:00:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 12/16] Update XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md --- XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md index ea6e86311..7d26e76ca 100644 --- a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md +++ b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ As a result, no onboarding fees have yet been burned towards the MOBILE subDAO. This prevents the tokenomics based on DAO Utility Score, as defined in HIP-51, from working as designed. -HIP-XX solves this problem by requiring that Hotspots participating in a particular Helium subDAO must burn an onboarding fee towards that subDAO. Specific fee schedules will be determined by subDAO governance. A mechanism is specified whereby the existing MOBILE Hotspots may be onboarded retroactively. +HIP-XX solves this problem by requiring that Hotspots participating in a particular Helium subDAO must burn an onboarding fee towards that subDAO. The MOBILE subDAO onboarding fee has been set at $40 by HIP-43. In the future, fee schedules will be determined by subDAO governance. + +A mechanism is specified whereby the existing MOBILE Hotspots may be onboarded retroactively. # Motivation @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ This proposal is relevant to: - Existing and future IOT and MOBILE Hotspot owners, who are affected by the clarification of fees and the MOBILE DAO Utility Score. - MOBILE Hotspot manufacturers, who may need to budget for onboarding fees as decided by the MOBILE subDAO. -- Anyone designing a future subDAO. +- Anyone contributing to the design of the MOBILE subDAO or a future subDAO. # Detailed Explanation From 8b3752bdc2a5b6a9ff852a3e56cc74b70962b80b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ferebee Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 20:30:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 13/16] Update XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md --- XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md index 7d26e76ca..7d4cab60d 100644 --- a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md +++ b/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ As a result, no onboarding fees have yet been burned towards the MOBILE subDAO. This prevents the tokenomics based on DAO Utility Score, as defined in HIP-51, from working as designed. -HIP-XX solves this problem by requiring that Hotspots participating in a particular Helium subDAO must burn an onboarding fee towards that subDAO. The MOBILE subDAO onboarding fee has been set at $40 by HIP-43. In the future, fee schedules will be determined by subDAO governance. +HIP-XX solves this problem by requiring that Hotspots participating in a particular Helium subDAO must burn an onboarding fee towards that subDAO. The MOBILE subDAO onboarding fee has been set at $40 by HIP-53. In the future, fee schedules will be determined by subDAO governance. A mechanism is specified whereby the existing MOBILE Hotspots may be onboarded retroactively. From 41a4c528d91e6e8539cdfb9bbf8701588155de09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vincenzospaghetti <93289575+vincenzospaghetti@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 15:55:54 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 14/16] update file name and title --- ...dao-onboarding-fees.md => XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) rename XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md => XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md (99%) diff --git a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md b/XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md similarity index 99% rename from XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md rename to XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md index 7d4cab60d..ea41b33b1 100644 --- a/XXXX-subdao-onboarding-fees.md +++ b/XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -# HIP XX: subDAO Onboarding Fees +# HIP 78: subDAO Onboarding Fees - Author(s): @ferebee - Start Date: 2023-03-10 - Category: Economic, Technical -- Original HIP PR: #XX -- Tracking Issue: #XX +- Original HIP PR: #580 +- Tracking Issue: #582 # Summary From cacfc7fb301a04bd284b32f4a4e4b94e9c491bd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vincenzospaghetti <93289575+vincenzospaghetti@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 15:57:41 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 15/16] update summary --- XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md b/XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md index ea41b33b1..7ae2996b3 100644 --- a/XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md +++ b/XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ As a result, no onboarding fees have yet been burned towards the MOBILE subDAO. This prevents the tokenomics based on DAO Utility Score, as defined in HIP-51, from working as designed. -HIP-XX solves this problem by requiring that Hotspots participating in a particular Helium subDAO must burn an onboarding fee towards that subDAO. The MOBILE subDAO onboarding fee has been set at $40 by HIP-53. In the future, fee schedules will be determined by subDAO governance. +HIP 78 solves this problem by requiring that Hotspots participating in a particular Helium subDAO must burn an onboarding fee towards that subDAO. The MOBILE subDAO onboarding fee has been set at $40 by HIP-53. In the future, fee schedules will be determined by subDAO governance. A mechanism is specified whereby the existing MOBILE Hotspots may be onboarded retroactively. From e701674ac609f9e27c5885e017edaccec5adde0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vincenzospaghetti <93289575+vincenzospaghetti@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 15:58:12 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 16/16] rename file and title --- ...-onboarding-fees.md => XX78-mobile-subdao-onboarding-fees.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) rename XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md => XX78-mobile-subdao-onboarding-fees.md (99%) diff --git a/XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md b/XX78-mobile-subdao-onboarding-fees.md similarity index 99% rename from XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md rename to XX78-mobile-subdao-onboarding-fees.md index 7ae2996b3..2c89c31d3 100644 --- a/XX78-subdao-onboarding-fees.md +++ b/XX78-mobile-subdao-onboarding-fees.md @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# HIP 78: subDAO Onboarding Fees +# HIP 78: MOBILE subDAO Onboarding Fees - Author(s): @ferebee - Start Date: 2023-03-10