From 94e44d74ec8b7a78bde04f072a4a8c6d514b1ad9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Hudak <33522493+leohhhn@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2023 22:40:06 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] docs: migrate `peace.md` out of docs (#1358) ## Description This PR migrates `peace.md` out of the docs directory to the official Gno blog, in [this](https://github.com/gnolang/blog/pull/49) PR. EDIT: Peace has been migrated to the blog, awaiting deployment.
Contributors' checklist... - [x] Added new tests, or not needed, or not feasible - [x] Provided an example (e.g. screenshot) to aid review or the PR is self-explanatory - [x] Updated the official documentation or not needed - [x] No breaking changes were made, or a `BREAKING CHANGE: xxx` message was included in the description - [ ] Added references to related issues and PRs - [ ] Provided any useful hints for running manual tests - [ ] Added new benchmarks to [generated graphs](https://gnoland.github.io/benchmarks), if any. More info [here](https://github.com/gnolang/gno/blob/master/.benchmarks/README.md).
--- docs/peace.md | 246 ------------------------------------ misc/docusaurus/sidebars.js | 1 - 2 files changed, 247 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 docs/peace.md diff --git a/docs/peace.md b/docs/peace.md deleted file mode 100644 index 5eb876ecac8..00000000000 --- a/docs/peace.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,246 +0,0 @@ ---- -id: peace ---- - -# Peace! - -_or, Everyone is Invited to Gno.land, if you want!_ - -I've never been put in such a difficult position, of having information that I -cannot reveal. And if you know me, you know that I like to speak my mind. But -I cannot say the things that I would rather say, because you get a lot of flack -for saying anything bad about a public chain. - -So I have been sitting on this issue, losing sleep about it for years, because -it leads me to worry about the safety of the hub. From an external person's -point of view, the solution is obvious -- reveal the information for the -betterment of everyone, no matter the consequences, because that is the right -thing to do. As a stakeholder, and I agree with the majority of the community -that peace and silence is better, with exceptions. - -So without turning this into a war of accusations bringing back past drama, -let's just do this: dear core contributors, Ethan Buchman, Zaki Manian, Jack -Zampolin, and everyone, here is my peace plan. - ----------------------------------------- - -## On Prop 69 - -Prop 69 is about adding CosmWASM to the hub. I have repeatedly talked about -the dangers of adding CosmWASM to the hub, including a document shared two -years ago. - -https://github.com/jaekwon/cosmos_roadmap/tree/master/shape_of_cosmos#smart-contracts - -Even before prop 69, I had declared publicly that stakers voting yes to adding -WASM on the hub would not receive airdrops. Primarily, because it increases -the surface area for attack by an order of magnitude. CosmWASM adds two layers -of new complexity to the hub. WASM itself, as well as CosmWASM. WASM as a spec -and its implementations are still maturing, and though available on browsers, -and some blockchains, it still hasn't gone through the gauntlet of time. All -new complex technologies like WASM, Java, Linux, and even Go, in hindsight -have numerous bugs that could have or were used maliciously. The same will be -true of any WASM integration with the hub, and this potential for exploits -combined with the massive potential rewards (especially of pegged PoW tokens) -makes such exploits an inevitability. - -In Juno recently there was a bug that halted the chain for three days. Worse -can happen on the Cosmos Hub. The very identity of the Cosmos Hub (its most -valuable asset is specifically a schelling point brand, of being a "common IBC -hub") is threatened if a bug were to result in the theft or loss of coins. On -platforms like Ethereum or Polkadot, perhaps they would have a better time -rolling back the chain to undo a hack as in the DAO hack. The major difference -with an *IBC hub* is that it cannot simply reverse the transactions of other -chains. - -We have yet to experience such a bug in any of our zones on a major scale, and -have yet to learn how to coordinate in the case of such in an interconnected -web of zones. Where are the planning documents for disaster scenarios? Between -PoS chains with good governance, we will learn how to roll back transactions -across connections, if need be in exceptional circumstances, but we aren't -there yet. This option isn't even available with pegged PoW coins. - -Yes, the contracts that are approved to run will be governance gated, but this -is not enough. For one, even with perfect governance, there are two new pieces -of complexity that will see more zero day bugs in the future for exploitation. -In terms of governance, the contracts are probably going to be written in Rust, -and so suddenly the validators that joined the project by inspecting the Go -code are now required to also audit Rust code. But also, we are now truly -opening the doors to all kinds of contracts to be run, because while governance -does sometimes reject proposals, it is generally accommodating to new features -especially endorsed by core contributors. - -I know of three alternatives: - -(1) we can use IBC to offload features to other zones. For liquid staking -(which should not be the focus of the hub) the hub could allow validators to -restrict the destination of unbonded ATOMs, and smart contracts running on -other zones can distribute those ATOMs according to the logic of whatever -liquid staking contract. This ensures separation of concerns, and a minimal -hub. - -(2) we can use Go plugins to extend the functionality of the chain. _UPDATE_ -Some have said that Go plugins are not mature enough. There are options like -https://github.com/hashicorp/go-plugin. Spawning a sub-process is superior to -running it under a new virtual machine, on top of a new framework, written in a -different language than the rest of the stack. One uses the operating system. -The other invents a new one. - -(3) we can do nothing. if liquid staking is such a big deal, something is wrong -about priorities for a cosmic "hub". If the liquid staking market is larger -than the base non-liquid staking market, the system is open for manipulation -and is insecure. The focus should not be on self-limiting use-cases, but the -infinite market of running validators with replicated security, perhaps running -a simple dex, and most of all innovating on and offering interchain security, -the business of judging validation faults as related to Tendermint, and perhaps -the interpretation and enforcement of self-enforced customs (law) of a -blockchain as defined by its shareholders who defer validation (and perhaps -judicial services) to the Cosmos Hub because it has a reputation for being the -longest ever running proof of stake hub that has never gone down, even as -compared to the upcoming Ethereum2.0. - -And note, I'm not proposing that the ATOM stakers forgo the benefits of -supporting contracts with CosmWASM. I support Juno and Tardigrade and Ethan -Frey’s work, but I also support the Hub running shared security, especially -simple replicated shared security where the validators also validate other -chains. I think this, and interchain staking, are the only profit models needed -for the hub (besides being a hub). NOTE: But those "consumer chains" ought to -be provided with full disclosures that the Cosmos Hub validators do not -maintain their respective software (as it would be impossible to audit all -zones that would benefit from the hub's security) but only offering validation -services as-is. This would force the hub validators to solve process isolation -(and I would much prefer building the protocol to NOT require particular -solutions like Docker, but allows validator choice), or else they would quickly -get slashed from malware (and that would be good to prune those validators from -the hub). - -So many options that don't require putting WASM on the Cosmos Hub. - ------------------------------------- - -## On Incentivized Votes - -In corporations, you can buy shares to influence the outcome of governance -votes. In democracy, this is not allowed because the vote could be bought to -infringe upon the rights of other people. - -What do you do when the chain's own core contributors propose a proposal that -you judge damages the integrity of the system? I think that's a good time to -create a fork of the hub's ATOM distribution led by a new development team. -Sometimes this option is the only option because of safety concerns, and this -is the case for me here. - -### Why is the snapshot date 5/19/2022? - -A snapshot in the past is more vulnerable to insider gaming, because there is -an imbalance of information--only the coordinator knows, and so can game the -premine. - -It is good to give many people the advantage of participating in a snapshot. -Excluding anyone who would have been an ally of a chain, in turn creates -animosity that would rather see another project succeed where they are -included. - -Even before the proposal I had pre-declared that anyone who votes for WASM on -the hub would not receive a gno.land airdrop. The proposer probably knew this -when the proposal was submitted. - -The snapshot date would have been 7/4/2022, because that is Independence Day in -the United States. I originally chose Independence Day because of the general -original mission of Tendermint, Cosmos, Bitcoin, and the crypto spirit; and -because the United States (as flawed as it is) is the best historic ideal of -human liberty we've had since before the days of Rome. - -Then prop 69 was submitted. I had said previously that we would exclude those -who vote in favor of WASM on the hub, but we don't have the tools yet to tally -the movement of tainted ATOMs after the unbonding period for the hub. So I -decided to move the snapshot date to 5/19/2022. - -Now with prop 69, I see that to me, 21 days after the beginning of proposal -\#69, 5/20/2022 (but 5/19/2022 PDT) is a chance to create a new community within -the Cosmos ecosystem that champions safety with a zero tolerance policy and a -mission to develop social coordination tools like the GNO smart contract VM, to -create even better governing bodies than the one we have today. - -### Gno.land and Cosmos Hub - -Now, I feel compelled to exit should prop \#69 pass. But as it is now, 16.57% -are voting YES, while NO and NO WITH VETO have 70.73% and 8.38% of the votes -with turnout at 30%. If the proposal does not pass, I would feel no need to -exit. For as long as the Cosmos Hub remains minimal and secure, we will favor -it as the dominant or only token hub connected to gno.land via the current IBC -implementations for the purpose of interchain token transfers. It's a job that -we'd rather not solve, as specialization is what will get us to the finish line -before other platforms do, and also I'm quite hooked on gnolang programming and -just want to make gnolang apps. Not everybody wants to build a DTCC, but many -would prefer to use it. - -### Airdrop distribution - -When I was asked on Cryptocito what I would have changed if I were to do it all -again, well, I would put the ICF in the hands of the chain. So in gno.land, the -ICF's portion of $GNOT will go to DAOs on gno.land. As for me, I have a -significant amount of ATOMs that voted for NO WITH VETO, but most of my tokens -by far are with the company that I previously founded, then called All in Bits, -Inc. AIB will not receive any $GNOT except by completing negotiations with me, -which is taking a lot longer than is reasonable--or not. - -For reference, for the genesis of the Cosmos Hub, the total distribution for -both entities was 20% of all ATOMs, and today it is still significant. The -total premine that I control directly or indirectly will not exceed 1/3 of the -total $GNOT distribution, but I am considering 20% again. - -Some more guidelines, which may change, so don't take anything here as -financial advice: - - * NO with VETO is slightly better than NO. - * NO is better than ABSTAIN. - * ABSTAIN is better than not voting at all. - * Delegators inherit the votes of the validators (unless delegators override). - * If you vote YES on \#69, you will not receive gno.land $GNOTs. - -Regarding ATOMs locked in IBC channels, those will count as not voting, -which is fine, and corresponding $GNOT will be released once the respective -zone communities create a provable audited distribution given the snapshot date, -which is defined to be exactly when those who voted on #69 can unbond and move their -tokens, which is 21 days from the start of the proposal. Soon we will be more precise -about what that is, but communities please prepare accordingly. If you aren't sure, -leave ATOMs on the hub. - -$ATOM in centralized exchanges will not result in $GNOT in the airdrop. Centralized -exchanges will not be allowed to redeem them even after genesis, even if they are -included. We will try to distinguish between custodial $ATOM vs non-custodial $ATOM -for all centralized exchanges with legally binding attestations, with good faith effort; -and so centralized exchanges would be welcome with their own capital, but not with client -funds. Nothing is guaranteed. - -We reserve the right to change our minds. This project is highly experimental and has -non-zero chances of failure. Nothing I tweet should be construed as financial -advice. And finally, what you do with $ATOM is not my responsibility; I don't have -control of the Cosmos Hub. - -NOTE: If you don't like my airdrop rules, you are free to make your own, and if -you're nice you can even run gno.land contracts if you so want there, or you -can just run a fork of gaia. - -If you have a better ideal for such an exit-drop by tweaking the governance -module, I'd love to hear your feedback, or generally how you think I could have -done this better. Some say that they don't want to see more of this kind of -forking, but I think we ought to celebrate it instead. - ----------------------------------------- - -## Conclusion - -Here's a peace offering. - -Just change your vote from YES to NO, and I will not intervene upon the second -submission of the proposal (and I would even fund its deposit if need be). But -if you instead feel strongly about signaling in favor of CosmWASM, here you can -express it, and I celebrate you, for being different than I, and wish you the -best of luck. That is equivalent to a no-confidence vote on gno.land, and is a -proper way to diss me. Again, I salute you. - -If you can reconsider your vote to be a NO, or even better, a NO WITH VETO, I -welcome you to gno.land. Happy 5/19/2022 (5/20/2022 Europe) Gno.land -Independence Day! diff --git a/misc/docusaurus/sidebars.js b/misc/docusaurus/sidebars.js index 8405d9a05c5..265bfb49f9c 100644 --- a/misc/docusaurus/sidebars.js +++ b/misc/docusaurus/sidebars.js @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ const sidebars = { tutorialSidebar: [ 'overview', - 'peace', { type: 'category', label: 'Getting Started',