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Encrypted history sharing: design "key bundle" format #2688
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Two main options: Option 1: JSON object with two properties:
Option 2: basically, key export format, but add in "withheld" events. So an array of JSON objects, that have a
I'm leaning towards option 1. The idea for option 2 was to have something more compatible with key exports, but it may already be different enough. Some ideas that I considered:
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AIUI, the difference between your proposals is that Option 1 is an object containing two arrays (ie, splitting the sessions by shared vs withheld) whereas Option 2 combines the two arrays and differentiates the types with a In both cases, both types of entry contain I'm minded towards option 1 as well, mostly because it means the typing can be stricter.
What do you mean by this? Why is option 2 more compatible? |
So, the thought process was that we start with the key export format (a simple array of So I don't think that the thought experiment produced anything useful, but I wanted to include it for completeness. |
Additional thought: for history sharing, all the keys/withheld messages will be for the same room, so we might be able to get away with omitting the |
Our proposed solution to sharing encrypted room history on invite involves uploading all of the room keys to an encrypted media blob.
This issue tracks the design of a format for that encrypted blob. Likely it will be based on the key export format, but also bear in mind that the key should be autogenerated (rather than derived from a passphrase) and will be shared over a to-device message (see #2689), so see the encrypted attachment format.
We should also consider allowing a way to indicate that a given key was deliberately withheld (eg because the original sender didn't set the "you can reshare it" flag)
We have some ideas for security improvements over the current encrypted attachment format which we should implement too. In particular, we would like to address some of the points raised by the Missing Salamanders blog post.The missing salamanders attack is not relevant to this usecase.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: