diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/application_added_to_google_workspace_domain.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/application_added_to_google_workspace_domain.json index ef43e6086589d..1d4724153e2da 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/application_added_to_google_workspace_domain.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/application_added_to_google_workspace_domain.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Application Added to Google Workspace Domain", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:ADD_APPLICATION\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:ADD_APPLICATION\n", "references": [ "https://support.google.com/a/answer/6328701?hl=en#" ], @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 5 + "version": 6 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_audio_capture.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_audio_capture.json index 65acfb8ba3d14..741c07504d920 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_audio_capture.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_audio_capture.json @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities", + "note": "## Triage and analysis.\n\n### Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities\n\nPowerShell is one of the main tools used by system administrators for automation, report routines, and other tasks.\n\nAttackers can use PowerShell to interact with the Windows API and capture audio from input devices connected to the\ncomputer.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n\n- Examine script content that triggered the detection. \n- Investigate script execution chain (parent process tree)\n- Inspect any file or network events from the suspicious powershell host process instance.\n- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n\n- Verify whether the script content is malicious/harmful.\n\n### Related Rules\n\n- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe\n- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d\n\n### Response and Remediation\n\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate, investigate, and potentially contain the activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\n\nThe 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nAdministrative Templates > \nWindows PowerShell > \nTurn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)\n```\n\nSteps to implement the logging policy via registry:\n\n```\nreg add \"hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1\n```\n", "query": "event.category:process and \n powershell.file.script_block_text : (\n Get-MicrophoneAudio or (waveInGetNumDevs and mciSendStringA)\n )\n", "references": [ "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-MicrophoneAudio.ps1" @@ -66,5 +67,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 2 + "version": 3 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_keylogger.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_keylogger.json index b586295b8f232..f128a2cac13cc 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_keylogger.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_keylogger.json @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "PowerShell Keylogging Script", + "note": "## Triage and analysis.\n\n### Investigating PowerShell Keylogging Script\n\nPowerShell is one of the main tools used by system administrators for automation, report routines, and other tasks.\n\nAttackers can abuse PowerShell capabilities to capture user Keystrokes with the goal of stealing credentials and other\nvaluable information as Credit Card data and confidential conversations.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n\n- Examine script content that triggered the detection. \n- Investigate script execution chain (parent process tree)\n- Inspect any file or network events from the suspicious powershell host process instance.\n- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n\n- Verify whether the script content is malicious/harmful.\n\n### Related Rules\n\n- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe\n\n### Response and Remediation\n\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate, investigate, and potentially contain the activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\n\nThe 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nAdministrative Templates > \nWindows PowerShell > \nTurn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)\n```\n\nSteps to implement the logging policy via registry:\n\n```\nreg add \"hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1\n```\n", "query": "event.category:process and \n ( \n powershell.file.script_block_text : (GetAsyncKeyState or NtUserGetAsyncKeyState or GetKeyboardState or Get-Keystrokes) or \n powershell.file.script_block_text : ((SetWindowsHookA or SetWindowsHookW or SetWindowsHookEx or SetWindowsHookExA or NtUserSetWindowsHookEx) and (GetForegroundWindow or GetWindowTextA or GetWindowTextW or WM_KEYBOARD_LL))\n )\n", "references": [ "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/collection/Get-Keystrokes.ps1", @@ -74,5 +75,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 1 + "version": 2 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_screen_grabber.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_screen_grabber.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..916939dc652a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/collection_posh_screen_grabber.json @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Elastic" + ], + "description": "Detects PowerShell Scripts that can take screenshots, which is a common feature in post-exploitation kits and RATs (Remote Access Tools).", + "from": "now-9m", + "index": [ + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-windows.*" + ], + "language": "kuery", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities", + "query": "event.category:process and \n powershell.file.script_block_text : (\n CopyFromScreen and\n (System.Drawing.Bitmap or Drawing.Bitmap)\n )\n", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen" + ], + "risk_score": 47, + "rule_id": "959a7353-1129-4aa7-9084-30746b256a70", + "severity": "medium", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Host", + "Windows", + "Threat Detection", + "Collection" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0009", + "name": "Collection", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1113", + "name": "Screen Capture", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113/" + } + ] + }, + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0002", + "name": "Execution", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1059", + "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/", + "subtechnique": [ + { + "id": "T1059.001", + "name": "PowerShell", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "query", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_common_webservices.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_common_webservices.json index b1774ab3dd052..50deb969b57a6 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_common_webservices.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/command_and_control_common_webservices.json @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Connection to Commonly Abused Web Services", - "query": "network where network.protocol == \"dns\" and\n process.name != null and user.id not in (\"S-1-5-18\", \"S-1-5-19\", \"S-1-5-20\") and\n /* Add new WebSvc domains here */\n dns.question.name :\n (\n \"raw.githubusercontent.*\",\n \"*.pastebin.*\",\n \"*drive.google.*\",\n \"*docs.live.*\",\n \"*api.dropboxapi.*\",\n \"*dropboxusercontent.*\",\n \"*onedrive.*\",\n \"*4shared.*\",\n \"*.file.io\",\n \"*filebin.net\",\n \"*slack-files.com\",\n \"*ghostbin.*\",\n \"*ngrok.*\",\n \"*portmap.*\",\n \"*serveo.net\",\n \"*localtunnel.me\",\n \"*pagekite.me\",\n \"*localxpose.io\",\n \"*notabug.org\",\n \"rawcdn.githack.*\",\n \"paste.nrecom.net\",\n \"zerobin.net\",\n \"controlc.com\",\n \"requestbin.net\"\n ) and\n /* Insert noisy false positives here */\n not process.executable :\n (\n \"?:\\\\Program Files\\\\*.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\*.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WWAHost.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\smartscreen.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Platform\\\\*\\\\MsMpEng.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\Application\\\\chrome.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Fiddler\\\\Fiddler.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Microsoft VS Code\\\\Code.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\OneDrive\\\\OneDrive.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mobsync.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\mobsync.exe\"\n )\n", + "query": "network where network.protocol == \"dns\" and\n process.name != null and user.id not in (\"S-1-5-18\", \"S-1-5-19\", \"S-1-5-20\") and\n /* Add new WebSvc domains here */\n dns.question.name :\n (\n \"raw.githubusercontent.*\",\n \"*.pastebin.*\",\n \"*drive.google.*\",\n \"*docs.live.*\",\n \"*api.dropboxapi.*\",\n \"*dropboxusercontent.*\",\n \"*onedrive.*\",\n \"*4shared.*\",\n \"*.file.io\",\n \"*filebin.net\",\n \"*slack-files.com\",\n \"*ghostbin.*\",\n \"*ngrok.*\",\n \"*portmap.*\",\n \"*serveo.net\",\n \"*localtunnel.me\",\n \"*pagekite.me\",\n \"*localxpose.io\",\n \"*notabug.org\",\n \"rawcdn.githack.*\",\n \"paste.nrecom.net\",\n \"zerobin.net\",\n \"controlc.com\",\n \"requestbin.net\",\n \"cdn.discordapp.com\",\n \"discordapp.com\",\n \"discord.com\"\n ) and\n /* Insert noisy false positives here */\n not process.executable :\n (\n \"?:\\\\Program Files\\\\*.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\*.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WWAHost.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\smartscreen.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Platform\\\\*\\\\MsMpEng.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\Application\\\\chrome.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Fiddler\\\\Fiddler.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Microsoft VS Code\\\\Code.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\OneDrive\\\\OneDrive.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\mobsync.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\mobsync.exe\",\n \"?:\\\\Users\\\\*\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Discord\\\\-*\\\\Discord.exe\"\n )\n", "risk_score": 21, "rule_id": "66883649-f908-4a5b-a1e0-54090a1d3a32", "severity": "low", @@ -69,5 +69,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "eql", - "version": 5 + "version": 6 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_posh_minidump.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_posh_minidump.json index fd72ceb6d5318..1bdba2064b4a4 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_posh_minidump.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_posh_minidump.json @@ -14,10 +14,12 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "PowerShell MiniDump Script", + "note": "## Triage and analysis.\n\n### Investigating PowerShell MiniDump Script\n\nPowerShell is one of the main tools used by system administrators for automation, report routines, and other tasks.\n\nProcess Memory Dump capabilities can be abused by attackers to extract credentials from LSASS or to obtain other privileged\ninformation stored in the process memory.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n\n- Examine script content that triggered the detection. \n- Investigate script execution chain (parent process tree)\n- Inspect any file or network events from the suspicious powershell host process instance.\n- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n\n- Verify whether the script content is malicious/harmful.\n\n### Related Rules\n\n- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe\n- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d\n\n### Response and Remediation\n\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate, investigate, and potentially contain the activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\n\nThe 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nAdministrative Templates > \nWindows PowerShell > \nTurn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)\n```\n\nSteps to implement the logging policy via registry:\n\n```\nreg add \"hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1\n```\n", "query": "event.category:process and powershell.file.script_block_text:(MiniDumpWriteDump or MiniDumpWithFullMemory or pmuDetirWpmuDiniM)\n", "references": [ "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Out-Minidump.ps1", - "https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Get-ProcessMiniDump.ps1" + "https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Get-ProcessMiniDump.ps1", + "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md" ], "risk_score": 73, "rule_id": "577ec21e-56fe-4065-91d8-45eb8224fe77", @@ -77,5 +79,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 2 + "version": 3 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_createdcredential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_created.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_createdcredential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_created.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..80604018e8d55 --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_createdcredential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_created.json @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Austin Songer" + ], + "description": "Identifies the creation of symbolic links to a shadow copy. Symbolic Links can be used to access files in the shadow copy, including sensitive files that may contain credential information.", + "false_positives": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity related to shadow copies" + ], + "from": "now-9m", + "index": [ + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-endpoint.events.*", + "logs-windows.*" + ], + "language": "eql", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created", + "query": "process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and\nprocess.pe.original_file_name == \"Cmd.Exe\" and\nprocess.args : \"*mklink*\" and\nprocess.args : \"*\\\\GLOBALROOT\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*\"\n", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mklink", + "https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf" + ], + "risk_score": 47, + "rule_id": "d117cbb4-7d56-41b4-b999-bdf8c25648a0", + "severity": "medium", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Host", + "Windows", + "Threat Detection", + "Credential Access" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0006", + "name": "Credential Access", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1003", + "name": "OS Credential Dumping", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/" + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "eql", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_user_excessive_sso_logon_errors.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_user_excessive_sso_logon_errors.json index 9c1a259ae3e1e..14f44ed3c3824 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_user_excessive_sso_logon_errors.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/credential_access_user_excessive_sso_logon_errors.json @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "O365 Excessive Single Sign-On Logon Errors", "note": "## Config\n\nThe Microsoft 365 Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.", - "query": "event.dataset:o365.audit and event.provider:AzureActiveDirectory and event.category:web and o365.audit.LogonError:\"SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired\"\n", + "query": "event.dataset:o365.audit and event.provider:AzureActiveDirectory and event.category:authentication and o365.audit.LogonError:\"SsoArtifactInvalidOrExpired\"\n", "risk_score": 73, "rule_id": "2de10e77-c144-4e69-afb7-344e7127abd0", "severity": "high", @@ -52,5 +52,5 @@ "value": 5 }, "type": "threshold", - "version": 2 + "version": 3 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_microsoft_365_mailboxauditbypassassociation.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_microsoft_365_mailboxauditbypassassociation.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..169ad751e6144 --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_microsoft_365_mailboxauditbypassassociation.json @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Elastic" + ], + "description": "Detects the occurrence of mailbox audit bypass associations. The mailbox audit is responsible for logging specified mailbox events (like accessing a folder or a message or permanently deleting a message). However, actions taken by some authorized accounts, such as accounts used by third-party tools or accounts used for lawful monitoring, can create a large number of mailbox audit log entries and may not be of interest to your organization. Because of this, administrators can create bypass associations, allowing certain accounts to perform their tasks without being logged. Attackers can abuse this allowlist mechanism to conceal actions taken, as the mailbox audit will log no activity done by the account.", + "false_positives": [ + "Legitimate whitelisting of noisy accounts" + ], + "from": "now-30m", + "index": [ + "filebeat-*", + "logs-o365*" + ], + "language": "kuery", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "O365 Mailbox Audit Logging Bypass", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Microsoft 365 Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.", + "query": "event.dataset:o365.audit and event.provider:Exchange and event.action:Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation and event.outcome:success\n", + "references": [ + "https://twitter.com/misconfig/status/1476144066807140355" + ], + "risk_score": 47, + "rule_id": "675239ea-c1bc-4467-a6d3-b9e2cc7f676d", + "severity": "medium", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Cloud", + "Microsoft 365", + "Continuous Monitoring", + "SecOps", + "Initial Access" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0005", + "name": "Defense Evasion", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1562", + "name": "Impair Defenses", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/", + "subtechnique": [ + { + "id": "T1562.001", + "name": "Disable or Modify Tools", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "query", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_microsoft_defender_tampering.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_microsoft_defender_tampering.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..f73b96015f885 --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_microsoft_defender_tampering.json @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Austin Songer" + ], + "description": "Identifies when one or more features on Microsoft Defender are disabled. Adversaries may disable or tamper Microsoft Defender features to evade detection and conceal malicious behavior.", + "false_positives": [ + "Legitimate Windows Defender configuration changes" + ], + "from": "now-9m", + "index": [ + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-endpoint.events.*", + "logs-windows.*" + ], + "language": "eql", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "Microsoft Windows Defender Tampering", + "query": "registry where event.type in (\"creation\", \"change\") and\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\PUAProtection\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"0\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender Security Center\\\\App and Browser protection\\\\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"1\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\DisableAntiSpyware\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"1\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"0\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"1\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"1\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableScriptScanning\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"1\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\\\Controlled Folder Access\\\\EnableControlledFolderAccess\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"0\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableIOAVProtection\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"1\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Reporting\\\\DisableEnhancedNotifications\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"1\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet\\\\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"1\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet\\\\SpynetReporting\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"0\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\SpyNet\\\\SubmitSamplesConsent\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"0\") or\n (registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Real-Time Protection\\\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring\" and\n registry.data.strings : \"1\")\n", + "references": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/32236-enable-disable-microsoft-defender-pua-protection-windows-10-a.html", + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/104025-turn-off-core-isolation-memory-integrity-windows-10-a.html", + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/105533-enable-disable-windows-defender-exploit-protection-settings.html", + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/123792-turn-off-tamper-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html", + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/51514-turn-off-microsoft-defender-periodic-scanning-windows-10-a.html", + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/3569-turn-off-real-time-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html", + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/99576-how-schedule-scan-microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows-10-a.html" + ], + "risk_score": 47, + "rule_id": "fe794edd-487f-4a90-b285-3ee54f2af2d3", + "severity": "medium", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Host", + "Windows", + "Threat Detection", + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0005", + "name": "Defense Evasion", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1562", + "name": "Impair Defenses", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/" + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "eql", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_posh_compressed.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_posh_compressed.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..03de37966bbd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_posh_compressed.json @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Elastic" + ], + "description": "Identifies the use of .Net functionality for decompression and base64 decoding combined in PowerShell scripts, which Malware and security tools heavily use to deobfuscate payloads and load them directly in memory to bypass defenses.", + "false_positives": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell Scripts which makes use of compression and encoding" + ], + "from": "now-9m", + "index": [ + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-windows.*" + ], + "language": "kuery", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed", + "query": "event.category:process and \n powershell.file.script_block_text : (\n (System.IO.Compression.DeflateStream or System.IO.Compression.GzipStream or IO.Compression.DeflateStream or IO.Compression.GzipStream) and\n FromBase64String\n )\n", + "risk_score": 47, + "rule_id": "81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a", + "severity": "medium", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Host", + "Windows", + "Threat Detection", + "Defense Evasion" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0005", + "name": "Defense Evasion", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1140", + "name": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/" + }, + { + "id": "T1027", + "name": "Obfuscated Files or Information", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/" + } + ] + }, + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0002", + "name": "Execution", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1059", + "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/", + "subtechnique": [ + { + "id": "T1059.001", + "name": "PowerShell", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "query", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_posh_process_injection.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_posh_process_injection.json index fad9076ab2f28..873969efa49c0 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_posh_process_injection.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_posh_process_injection.json @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Potential Process Injection via PowerShell", + "note": "## Triage and analysis.\n\n### Investigating Potential Process Injection via PowerShell\n\nPowerShell is one of the main tools used by system administrators for automation, report routines, and other tasks.\n\nPowerShell also has solid capabilities to make the interaction with the Win32 API in an uncomplicated and reliable way,\nlike the execution of inline C# code, PSReflect, Get-ProcAddress, etc.\n\nRed Team tooling and Malware Developers take advantage of these capabilities to develop stagers and loaders that inject\npayloads directly into the memory, without touching the disk.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n\n- Examine script content that triggered the detection. \n- Investigate script execution chain (parent process tree)\n- Inspect any file or network events from the suspicious powershell host process instance.\n- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n\n- Verify whether the script content is malicious/harmful.\n\n### Related Rules\n\n- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe\n\n### Response and Remediation\n\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate, investigate, and potentially contain the activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\n\nThe 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nAdministrative Templates > \nWindows PowerShell > \nTurn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)\n```\n\nSteps to implement the logging policy via registry:\n\n```\nreg add \"hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1\n```\n", "query": "event.category:process and \n powershell.file.script_block_text : (\n (VirtualAlloc or VirtualAllocEx or VirtualProtect or LdrLoadDll or LoadLibrary or LoadLibraryA or\n LoadLibraryEx or GetProcAddress or OpenProcess or OpenProcessToken or AdjustTokenPrivileges) and\n (WriteProcessMemory or CreateRemoteThread or NtCreateThreadEx or CreateThread or QueueUserAPC or\n SuspendThread or ResumeThread)\n )\n", "references": [ "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/management/Invoke-PSInject.ps1", @@ -61,5 +62,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 1 + "version": 2 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_suppression_rule_created.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_suppression_rule_created.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..cce222e233838 --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/defense_evasion_suppression_rule_created.json @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Austin Songer" + ], + "description": "Identifies the creation of suppression rules in Azure. Suppression rules are a mechanism used to suppress alerts previously identified as False Positives or too noisy to be in Production. This mechanism can be abused or mistakenly configured, resulting in defense evasions and loss of security visibility.", + "false_positives": [ + "Suppression Rules can be created legitimately by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Suppression Rules created by unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "from": "now-25m", + "index": [ + "filebeat-*", + "logs-azure*" + ], + "language": "kuery", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "Azure Alert Suppression Rule Created or Modified", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Azure Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.", + "query": "event.dataset:azure.activitylogs and azure.activitylogs.operation_name:\"MICROSOFT.SECURITY/ALERTSSUPPRESSIONRULES/WRITE\" and \nevent.outcome: \"success\"\n", + "references": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/securitycenter/alerts-suppression-rules/update" + ], + "risk_score": 21, + "rule_id": "f0bc081a-2346-4744-a6a4-81514817e888", + "severity": "low", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Cloud", + "Azure", + "Continuous Monitoring", + "SecOps", + "Configuration Audit" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0005", + "name": "Defense Evasion", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1562", + "name": "Impair Defenses", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/" + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "query", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/discovery_posh_suspicious_api_functions.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/discovery_posh_suspicious_api_functions.json index 10d7bf56e57f3..6a38ff75d6660 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/discovery_posh_suspicious_api_functions.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/discovery_posh_suspicious_api_functions.json @@ -14,9 +14,11 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions", + "note": "## Triage and analysis.\n\n### Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions\n\nPowerShell is one of the main tools used by system administrators for automation, report routines, and other tasks.\n\nAttackers can use PowerShell to interact with the Win32 API to bypass file based AntiVirus detections, using libraries\nlike PSReflect or Get-ProcAddress Cmdlet.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n\n- Examine script content that triggered the detection. \n- Investigate script execution chain (parent process tree).\n- Inspect any file or network events from the suspicious powershell host process instance.\n- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n\n- Verify whether the script content is malicious/harmful.\n\n### Related Rules\n\n- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe\n\n### Response and Remediation\n\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate, investigate, and potentially contain the activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\n\nThe 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nAdministrative Templates > \nWindows PowerShell > \nTurn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)\n```\n\nSteps to implement the logging policy via registry:\n\n```\nreg add \"hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1\n```\n", "query": "event.category:process and \n powershell.file.script_block_text : (\n NetShareEnum or\n NetWkstaUserEnum or\n NetSessionEnum or\n NetLocalGroupEnum or\n NetLocalGroupGetMembers or\n DsGetSiteName or\n DsEnumerateDomainTrusts or\n WTSEnumerateSessionsEx or\n WTSQuerySessionInformation or\n LsaGetLogonSessionData or\n QueryServiceObjectSecurity\n )\n", "references": [ - "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/9259e5106986847d2bb770c4289c0c0f1adf2344/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1#L21413" + "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/9259e5106986847d2bb770c4289c0c0f1adf2344/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1#L21413", + "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md" ], "risk_score": 47, "rule_id": "61ac3638-40a3-44b2-855a-985636ca985e", @@ -86,5 +88,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 2 + "version": 3 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/domain_added_to_google_workspace_trusted_domains.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/domain_added_to_google_workspace_trusted_domains.json index 9ee112bd9eec3..3f9e9ca343bd4 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/domain_added_to_google_workspace_trusted_domains.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/domain_added_to_google_workspace_trusted_domains.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Domain Added to Google Workspace Trusted Domains", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:ADD_TRUSTED_DOMAINS\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:ADD_TRUSTED_DOMAINS\n", "references": [ "https://support.google.com/a/answer/6160020?hl=en" ], @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 5 + "version": 6 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_adversary_behavior_detected.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_adversary_behavior_detected.json index ff690710b5ba3..abe19ac7e0a69 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_adversary_behavior_detected.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_adversary_behavior_detected.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Adversary Behavior - Detected - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and (event.action:rules_engine_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:rules_engine_event)\n", "risk_score": 47, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_dumping_detected.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_dumping_detected.json index 4aaf9938c29da..d08d5cdc79ba0 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_dumping_detected.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_dumping_detected.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Credential Dumping - Detected - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:detection and (event.action:cred_theft_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:cred_theft_event)\n", "risk_score": 73, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_dumping_prevented.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_dumping_prevented.json index 11e8dece47fb5..48159cfc3a07f 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_dumping_prevented.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_dumping_prevented.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Credential Dumping - Prevented - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:prevention and (event.action:cred_theft_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:cred_theft_event)\n", "risk_score": 47, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_manipulation_detected.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_manipulation_detected.json index b6753cbbf784e..30a94c67f9999 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_manipulation_detected.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_manipulation_detected.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Credential Manipulation - Detected - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:detection and (event.action:token_manipulation_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:token_manipulation_event)\n", "risk_score": 73, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_manipulation_prevented.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_manipulation_prevented.json index 9f409b00d6421..cbacfb8310a93 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_manipulation_prevented.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_cred_manipulation_prevented.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Credential Manipulation - Prevented - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:prevention and (event.action:token_manipulation_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:token_manipulation_event)\n", "risk_score": 47, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_exploit_detected.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_exploit_detected.json index 0cc778cc12714..51151f3ad264f 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_exploit_detected.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_exploit_detected.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Exploit - Detected - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:detection and (event.action:exploit_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:exploit_event)\n", "risk_score": 73, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_exploit_prevented.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_exploit_prevented.json index fe7218fe878ee..44e13fc83f15a 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_exploit_prevented.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_exploit_prevented.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Exploit - Prevented - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:prevention and (event.action:exploit_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:exploit_event)\n", "risk_score": 47, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_malware_detected.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_malware_detected.json index 92795c3811345..7e375f9aca154 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_malware_detected.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_malware_detected.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Malware - Detected - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:detection and (event.action:file_classification_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:file_classification_event)\n", "risk_score": 99, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_malware_prevented.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_malware_prevented.json index f712f3f1b221d..b26a0ab2eedb7 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_malware_prevented.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_malware_prevented.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Malware - Prevented - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:prevention and (event.action:file_classification_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:file_classification_event)\n", "risk_score": 73, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_permission_theft_detected.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_permission_theft_detected.json index 96b64c026ad0d..3ecfb461d2c49 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_permission_theft_detected.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_permission_theft_detected.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Permission Theft - Detected - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:detection and (event.action:token_protection_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:token_protection_event)\n", "risk_score": 73, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_permission_theft_prevented.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_permission_theft_prevented.json index fcb453d16100f..7f1853af6910c 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_permission_theft_prevented.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_permission_theft_prevented.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Permission Theft - Prevented - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:prevention and (event.action:token_protection_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:token_protection_event)\n", "risk_score": 47, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_process_injection_detected.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_process_injection_detected.json index 83a8ff2f83c8d..8018ba8027bb7 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_process_injection_detected.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_process_injection_detected.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Process Injection - Detected - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:detection and (event.action:kernel_shellcode_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:kernel_shellcode_event)\n", "risk_score": 73, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_process_injection_prevented.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_process_injection_prevented.json index e171fbcf6bb83..c8fa9f26e7c71 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_process_injection_prevented.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_process_injection_prevented.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Process Injection - Prevented - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:prevention and (event.action:kernel_shellcode_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:kernel_shellcode_event)\n", "risk_score": 47, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_ransomware_detected.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_ransomware_detected.json index 95049fa75c25d..94534cf3a82c0 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_ransomware_detected.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_ransomware_detected.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Ransomware - Detected - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:detection and (event.action:ransomware_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:ransomware_event)\n", "risk_score": 99, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 7 + "version": 8 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_ransomware_prevented.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_ransomware_prevented.json index 3bfa5f9ead442..3f493d89a0ff7 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_ransomware_prevented.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/endgame_ransomware_prevented.json @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ "interval": "10m", "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", + "max_signals": 10000, "name": "Ransomware - Prevented - Elastic Endgame", "query": "event.kind:alert and event.module:endgame and endgame.metadata.type:prevention and (event.action:ransomware_event or endgame.event_subtype_full:ransomware_event)\n", "risk_score": 73, @@ -20,5 +21,5 @@ "Elastic Endgame" ], "type": "query", - "version": 7 + "version": 8 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/execution_posh_portable_executable.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/execution_posh_portable_executable.json index 66627e7ce9e12..f4e07c6fa15b5 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/execution_posh_portable_executable.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/execution_posh_portable_executable.json @@ -11,7 +11,11 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script", + "note": "## Triage and analysis.\n\n### Investigating Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script\n\nPowerShell is one of the main tools used by system administrators for automation, report routines, and other tasks.\n\nAttackers can abuse PowerShell In-Memory capabilities to inject executables into memory without touching the disk, bypassing\nAntiVirus software. These executables are generally base64 encoded.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n\n- Examine script content that triggered the detection. \n- Investigate script execution chain (parent process tree).\n- Inspect any file or network events from the suspicious powershell host process instance.\n- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n\n- Verify whether the script content is malicious/harmful.\n\n### Related Rules\n\n- PowerShell Reflection Assembly Load - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad\n- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a\n- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe\n\n### Response and Remediation\n\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate, investigate, and potentially contain the activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\n\nThe 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nAdministrative Templates > \nWindows PowerShell > \nTurn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)\n```\n\nSteps to implement the logging policy via registry:\n\n```\nreg add \"hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1\n```\n", "query": "event.category:process and \n powershell.file.script_block_text : (\n TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA\n )\n", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md" + ], "risk_score": 47, "rule_id": "ad84d445-b1ce-4377-82d9-7c633f28bf9a", "severity": "medium", @@ -48,5 +52,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 2 + "version": 3 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/execution_posh_psreflect.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/execution_posh_psreflect.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..4cdb6edcde1b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/execution_posh_psreflect.json @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Elastic" + ], + "description": "Detects the use of PSReflect in PowerShell scripts. Attackers leverage PSReflect as a library that enables PowerShell to access win32 API functions.", + "false_positives": [ + "Legitimate Powershell Scripts that make use of PSReflect to access the win32 API" + ], + "from": "now-9m", + "index": [ + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-windows.*" + ], + "language": "kuery", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "PowerShell PSReflect Script", + "note": "## Triage and analysis\n### Investigating PowerShell PSReflect Script\n\nPowerShell is one of the main tools in the belt of system administrators for automation, report routines, and other tasks.\n\nPSReflect is a library that enables PowerShell to access win32 API functions in an uncomplicated way. It also helps to\ncreate enums and structs easily\u2014all without touching the disk.\n\nAlthough this is an interesting project for every developer and admin out there, it is mainly used in the red team and\nmalware tooling for its capabilities.\n\nDetecting the core implementation of PSReflect means detecting most of the tooling that uses windows API through\nPowerShell, enabling the defender to discover tools being dropped in the environment.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n- Check for additional PowerShell logs that indicate that the script/command was run.\n- Gather the script content that may be split into multiple script blocks, and identify its capabilities.\n- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.\n- Look for additional alerts involving the host and the user.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n- Verify whether the script content is malicious/harmful.\n\n### Related Rules\n- PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions - 61ac3638-40a3-44b2-855a-985636ca985e\n- PowerShell Keylogging Script - bd2c86a0-8b61-4457-ab38-96943984e889\n- PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities - 2f2f4939-0b34-40c2-a0a3-844eb7889f43\n- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d\n- PowerShell Reflection Assembly Load - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad\n- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a\n- PowerShell Suspicious Script with Screenshot Capabilities - 959a7353-1129-4aa7-9084-30746b256a70\n\n### Response and Remediation\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate activity, investigate and potentially isolate activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\nThe 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy is required be configured (Enable).\n\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nAdministrative Templates > \nWindows PowerShell > \nTurn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)\n```\nSteps to implement the logging policy via registry:\n```\nreg add \"hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1\n```\n", + "query": "event.category:process and \n powershell.file.script_block_text:(\n New-InMemoryModule or\n Add-Win32Type or\n psenum or\n DefineDynamicAssembly or\n DefineDynamicModule or\n Reflection.TypeAttributes or\n Reflection.Emit.OpCodes or\n Reflection.Emit.CustomAttributeBuilder or\n Runtime.InteropServices.DllImportAttribute\n )\n", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/mattifestation/PSReflect/blob/master/PSReflect.psm1", + "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md" + ], + "risk_score": 47, + "rule_id": "56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe", + "severity": "medium", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Host", + "Windows", + "Threat Detection", + "Execution" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0002", + "name": "Execution", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1059", + "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/", + "subtechnique": [ + { + "id": "T1059.001", + "name": "PowerShell", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/" + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "T1106", + "name": "Native API", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/" + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "query", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_admin_role_deletion.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_admin_role_deletion.json index 3e0f974490481..657128132d559 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_admin_role_deletion.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_admin_role_deletion.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Google Workspace Admin Role Deletion", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:DELETE_ROLE\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:DELETE_ROLE\n", "references": [ "https://support.google.com/a/answer/2406043?hl=en" ], @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 5 + "version": 6 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.json index ffb73f2e513be..a90fd8c18266e 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Google Workspace MFA Enforcement Disabled", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION and (gsuite.admin.new_value:false or google_workspace.admin.new_value:false)\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION and google_workspace.admin.new_value:false\n", "references": [ "https://support.google.com/a/answer/9176657?hl=en#" ], @@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_policy_modified.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_policy_modified.json index 56c1d51a25655..d29b41bdf56c3 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_policy_modified.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/google_workspace_policy_modified.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Google Workspace Password Policy Modified", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and\n event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and\n event.action:(CHANGE_APPLICATION_SETTING or CREATE_APPLICATION_SETTING) and\n gsuite.admin.setting.name:(\n \"Password Management - Enforce strong password\" or\n \"Password Management - Password reset frequency\" or\n \"Password Management - Enable password reuse\" or\n \"Password Management - Enforce password policy at next login\" or\n \"Password Management - Minimum password length\" or\n \"Password Management - Maximum password length\"\n ) or\n google_workspace.admin.setting.name:(\n \"Password Management - Enforce strong password\" or\n \"Password Management - Password reset frequency\" or\n \"Password Management - Enable password reuse\" or\n \"Password Management - Enforce password policy at next login\" or\n \"Password Management - Minimum password length\" or\n \"Password Management - Maximum password length\"\n )\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and\n event.action:(CHANGE_APPLICATION_SETTING or CREATE_APPLICATION_SETTING) and\n google_workspace.admin.setting.name:(\n \"Password Management - Enforce strong password\" or\n \"Password Management - Password reset frequency\" or\n \"Password Management - Enable password reuse\" or\n \"Password Management - Enforce password policy at next login\" or\n \"Password Management - Minimum password length\" or\n \"Password Management - Maximum password length\"\n )\n", "risk_score": 47, "rule_id": "a99f82f5-8e77-4f8b-b3ce-10c0f6afbc73", "severity": "medium", @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/index.ts b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/index.ts index ce14d64c3ac0f..eba920055a4f2 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/index.ts +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/index.ts @@ -545,65 +545,65 @@ import rule532 from './ml_rare_destination_country.json'; import rule533 from './ml_spike_in_traffic_to_a_country.json'; import rule534 from './command_and_control_tunneling_via_earthworm.json'; import rule535 from './lateral_movement_evasion_rdp_shadowing.json'; -import rule536 from './threat_intel_filebeat7x.json'; -import rule537 from './threat_intel_fleet_integrations.json'; -import rule538 from './exfiltration_ec2_vm_export_failure.json'; -import rule539 from './exfiltration_ec2_full_network_packet_capture_detected.json'; -import rule540 from './impact_azure_service_principal_credentials_added.json'; -import rule541 from './persistence_ec2_security_group_configuration_change_detection.json'; -import rule542 from './defense_evasion_disabling_windows_logs.json'; -import rule543 from './persistence_route_53_domain_transfer_lock_disabled.json'; -import rule544 from './persistence_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.json'; -import rule545 from './initial_access_okta_user_attempted_unauthorized_access.json'; -import rule546 from './credential_access_user_excessive_sso_logon_errors.json'; -import rule547 from './persistence_exchange_suspicious_mailbox_right_delegation.json'; -import rule548 from './privilege_escalation_new_or_modified_federation_domain.json'; -import rule549 from './privilege_escalation_sts_assumerole_usage.json'; -import rule550 from './privilege_escalation_sts_getsessiontoken_abuse.json'; -import rule551 from './defense_evasion_suspicious_execution_from_mounted_device.json'; -import rule552 from './defense_evasion_unusual_network_connection_via_dllhost.json'; -import rule553 from './defense_evasion_amsienable_key_mod.json'; -import rule554 from './impact_rds_group_deletion.json'; -import rule555 from './persistence_rds_group_creation.json'; -import rule556 from './persistence_route_table_created.json'; -import rule557 from './persistence_route_table_modified_or_deleted.json'; -import rule558 from './exfiltration_rds_snapshot_export.json'; -import rule559 from './persistence_rds_instance_creation.json'; -import rule560 from './privilege_escalation_gcp_kubernetes_rolebindings_created_or_patched.json'; -import rule561 from './ml_auth_rare_hour_for_a_user_to_logon.json'; -import rule562 from './ml_auth_rare_source_ip_for_a_user.json'; -import rule563 from './ml_auth_rare_user_logon.json'; -import rule564 from './ml_auth_spike_in_failed_logon_events.json'; -import rule565 from './ml_auth_spike_in_logon_events.json'; -import rule566 from './ml_auth_spike_in_logon_events_from_a_source_ip.json'; -import rule567 from './privilege_escalation_cyberarkpas_error_audit_event_promotion.json'; -import rule568 from './privilege_escalation_cyberarkpas_recommended_events_to_monitor_promotion.json'; -import rule569 from './defense_evasion_kubernetes_events_deleted.json'; -import rule570 from './impact_kubernetes_pod_deleted.json'; -import rule571 from './exfiltration_rds_snapshot_restored.json'; -import rule572 from './privilege_escalation_printspooler_malicious_driver_file_changes.json'; -import rule573 from './privilege_escalation_printspooler_malicious_registry_modification.json'; -import rule574 from './privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_file_deletion.json'; -import rule575 from './privilege_escalation_unusual_printspooler_childprocess.json'; -import rule576 from './defense_evasion_disabling_windows_defender_powershell.json'; -import rule577 from './defense_evasion_enable_network_discovery_with_netsh.json'; -import rule578 from './defense_evasion_execution_windefend_unusual_path.json'; -import rule579 from './defense_evasion_agent_spoofing_mismatched_id.json'; -import rule580 from './defense_evasion_agent_spoofing_multiple_hosts.json'; -import rule581 from './defense_evasion_parent_process_pid_spoofing.json'; -import rule582 from './impact_microsoft_365_potential_ransomware_activity.json'; -import rule583 from './impact_microsoft_365_unusual_volume_of_file_deletion.json'; -import rule584 from './initial_access_microsoft_365_user_restricted_from_sending_email.json'; -import rule585 from './defense_evasion_elasticache_security_group_creation.json'; -import rule586 from './defense_evasion_elasticache_security_group_modified_or_deleted.json'; -import rule587 from './impact_volume_shadow_copy_deletion_via_powershell.json'; -import rule588 from './persistence_route_53_hosted_zone_associated_with_a_vpc.json'; -import rule589 from './defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.json'; -import rule590 from './defense_evasion_dns_over_https_enabled.json'; -import rule591 from './defense_evasion_whitespace_padding_in_command_line.json'; -import rule592 from './defense_evasion_frontdoor_firewall_policy_deletion.json'; -import rule593 from './credential_access_azure_full_network_packet_capture_detected.json'; -import rule594 from './persistence_webshell_detection.json'; +import rule536 from './threat_intel_fleet_integrations.json'; +import rule537 from './exfiltration_ec2_vm_export_failure.json'; +import rule538 from './exfiltration_ec2_full_network_packet_capture_detected.json'; +import rule539 from './impact_azure_service_principal_credentials_added.json'; +import rule540 from './persistence_ec2_security_group_configuration_change_detection.json'; +import rule541 from './defense_evasion_disabling_windows_logs.json'; +import rule542 from './persistence_route_53_domain_transfer_lock_disabled.json'; +import rule543 from './persistence_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.json'; +import rule544 from './initial_access_okta_user_attempted_unauthorized_access.json'; +import rule545 from './credential_access_user_excessive_sso_logon_errors.json'; +import rule546 from './persistence_exchange_suspicious_mailbox_right_delegation.json'; +import rule547 from './privilege_escalation_new_or_modified_federation_domain.json'; +import rule548 from './privilege_escalation_sts_assumerole_usage.json'; +import rule549 from './privilege_escalation_sts_getsessiontoken_abuse.json'; +import rule550 from './defense_evasion_suspicious_execution_from_mounted_device.json'; +import rule551 from './defense_evasion_unusual_network_connection_via_dllhost.json'; +import rule552 from './defense_evasion_amsienable_key_mod.json'; +import rule553 from './impact_rds_group_deletion.json'; +import rule554 from './persistence_rds_group_creation.json'; +import rule555 from './persistence_route_table_created.json'; +import rule556 from './persistence_route_table_modified_or_deleted.json'; +import rule557 from './exfiltration_rds_snapshot_export.json'; +import rule558 from './persistence_rds_instance_creation.json'; +import rule559 from './privilege_escalation_gcp_kubernetes_rolebindings_created_or_patched.json'; +import rule560 from './ml_auth_rare_hour_for_a_user_to_logon.json'; +import rule561 from './ml_auth_rare_source_ip_for_a_user.json'; +import rule562 from './ml_auth_rare_user_logon.json'; +import rule563 from './ml_auth_spike_in_failed_logon_events.json'; +import rule564 from './ml_auth_spike_in_logon_events.json'; +import rule565 from './ml_auth_spike_in_logon_events_from_a_source_ip.json'; +import rule566 from './privilege_escalation_cyberarkpas_error_audit_event_promotion.json'; +import rule567 from './privilege_escalation_cyberarkpas_recommended_events_to_monitor_promotion.json'; +import rule568 from './defense_evasion_kubernetes_events_deleted.json'; +import rule569 from './impact_kubernetes_pod_deleted.json'; +import rule570 from './exfiltration_rds_snapshot_restored.json'; +import rule571 from './privilege_escalation_printspooler_malicious_driver_file_changes.json'; +import rule572 from './privilege_escalation_printspooler_malicious_registry_modification.json'; +import rule573 from './privilege_escalation_printspooler_suspicious_file_deletion.json'; +import rule574 from './privilege_escalation_unusual_printspooler_childprocess.json'; +import rule575 from './defense_evasion_disabling_windows_defender_powershell.json'; +import rule576 from './defense_evasion_enable_network_discovery_with_netsh.json'; +import rule577 from './defense_evasion_execution_windefend_unusual_path.json'; +import rule578 from './defense_evasion_agent_spoofing_mismatched_id.json'; +import rule579 from './defense_evasion_agent_spoofing_multiple_hosts.json'; +import rule580 from './defense_evasion_parent_process_pid_spoofing.json'; +import rule581 from './impact_microsoft_365_potential_ransomware_activity.json'; +import rule582 from './impact_microsoft_365_unusual_volume_of_file_deletion.json'; +import rule583 from './initial_access_microsoft_365_user_restricted_from_sending_email.json'; +import rule584 from './defense_evasion_elasticache_security_group_creation.json'; +import rule585 from './defense_evasion_elasticache_security_group_modified_or_deleted.json'; +import rule586 from './impact_volume_shadow_copy_deletion_via_powershell.json'; +import rule587 from './persistence_route_53_hosted_zone_associated_with_a_vpc.json'; +import rule588 from './defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.json'; +import rule589 from './defense_evasion_dns_over_https_enabled.json'; +import rule590 from './defense_evasion_whitespace_padding_in_command_line.json'; +import rule591 from './defense_evasion_frontdoor_firewall_policy_deletion.json'; +import rule592 from './credential_access_azure_full_network_packet_capture_detected.json'; +import rule593 from './persistence_webshell_detection.json'; +import rule594 from './defense_evasion_suppression_rule_created.json'; import rule595 from './impact_efs_filesystem_or_mount_deleted.json'; import rule596 from './defense_evasion_execution_control_panel_suspicious_args.json'; import rule597 from './defense_evasion_azure_blob_permissions_modified.json'; @@ -624,17 +624,27 @@ import rule611 from './collection_posh_keylogger.json'; import rule612 from './defense_evasion_posh_assembly_load.json'; import rule613 from './defense_evasion_powershell_windows_firewall_disabled.json'; import rule614 from './execution_posh_portable_executable.json'; -import rule615 from './credential_access_suspicious_comsvcs_imageload.json'; -import rule616 from './impact_aws_eventbridge_rule_disabled_or_deleted.json'; -import rule617 from './initial_access_azure_active_directory_high_risk_signin_atrisk_or_confirmed.json'; -import rule618 from './persistence_remote_password_reset.json'; -import rule619 from './privilege_escalation_azure_kubernetes_rolebinding_created.json'; -import rule620 from './collection_posh_audio_capture.json'; -import rule621 from './defense_evasion_suspicious_process_creation_calltrace.json'; -import rule622 from './defense_evasion_clearing_windows_console_history.json'; -import rule623 from './threat_intel_filebeat8x.json'; -import rule624 from './credential_access_via_snapshot_lsass_clone_creation.json'; -import rule625 from './persistence_via_bits_job_notify_command.json'; +import rule615 from './execution_posh_psreflect.json'; +import rule616 from './credential_access_suspicious_comsvcs_imageload.json'; +import rule617 from './impact_aws_eventbridge_rule_disabled_or_deleted.json'; +import rule618 from './defense_evasion_microsoft_defender_tampering.json'; +import rule619 from './initial_access_azure_active_directory_high_risk_signin_atrisk_or_confirmed.json'; +import rule620 from './persistence_remote_password_reset.json'; +import rule621 from './privilege_escalation_azure_kubernetes_rolebinding_created.json'; +import rule622 from './collection_posh_audio_capture.json'; +import rule623 from './collection_posh_screen_grabber.json'; +import rule624 from './defense_evasion_posh_compressed.json'; +import rule625 from './defense_evasion_suspicious_process_creation_calltrace.json'; +import rule626 from './privilege_escalation_group_policy_iniscript.json'; +import rule627 from './privilege_escalation_group_policy_privileged_groups.json'; +import rule628 from './privilege_escalation_group_policy_scheduled_task.json'; +import rule629 from './defense_evasion_clearing_windows_console_history.json'; +import rule630 from './threat_intel_filebeat8x.json'; +import rule631 from './privilege_escalation_installertakeover.json'; +import rule632 from './credential_access_via_snapshot_lsass_clone_creation.json'; +import rule633 from './persistence_via_bits_job_notify_command.json'; +import rule634 from './credential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_createdcredential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_created.json'; +import rule635 from './defense_evasion_microsoft_365_mailboxauditbypassassociation.json'; export const rawRules = [ rule1, @@ -1262,4 +1272,14 @@ export const rawRules = [ rule623, rule624, rule625, + rule626, + rule627, + rule628, + rule629, + rule630, + rule631, + rule632, + rule633, + rule634, + rule635, ]; diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_hta.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_hta.json index f832eb51336f8..7af0be2b52d48 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_hta.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_hta.json @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement via MSHTA", - "query": "sequence with maxspan=1m\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and\n process.name : \"mshta.exe\" and process.args : \"-Embedding\"\n ] by host.id, process.entity_id\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.name : \"mshta.exe\" and \n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\" and\n source.port > 49151 and destination.port > 49151 and not source.address in (\"127.0.0.1\", \"::1\")\n ] by host.id, process.entity_id\n", + "query": "sequence with maxspan=1m\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and\n process.name : \"mshta.exe\" and process.args : \"-Embedding\"\n ] by host.id, process.entity_id\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.name : \"mshta.exe\" and \n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\" and\n source.port > 49151 and destination.port > 49151 and source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\"\n ] by host.id, process.entity_id\n", "references": [ "https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html" ], @@ -73,5 +73,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 4 + "version": 5 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_mmc20.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_mmc20.json index 8cb2e2c3690e6..a44185290f41d 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_mmc20.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_mmc20.json @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with MMC", - "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.name : \"mmc.exe\" and\n source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152 and source.address not in (\"127.0.0.1\", \"::1\") and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\"\n ] by process.entity_id\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.parent.name : \"mmc.exe\"\n ] by process.parent.entity_id\n", + "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.name : \"mmc.exe\" and source.port >= 49152 and\n destination.port >= 49152 and source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\" and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\"\n ] by process.entity_id\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.parent.name : \"mmc.exe\"\n ] by process.parent.entity_id\n", "references": [ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/" ], @@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 4 + "version": 5 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_shellwindow_shellbrowserwindow.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_shellwindow_shellbrowserwindow.json index 9ca759cc2facd..aed31f6b2f903 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_shellwindow_shellbrowserwindow.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_dcom_shellwindow_shellbrowserwindow.json @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows", - "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.name : \"explorer.exe\" and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\" and\n source.port > 49151 and destination.port > 49151 and not source.address in (\"127.0.0.1\", \"::1\")\n ] by process.entity_id\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and\n process.parent.name : \"explorer.exe\"\n ] by process.parent.entity_id\n", + "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.name : \"explorer.exe\" and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\" and\n source.port > 49151 and destination.port > 49151 and source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\"\n ] by process.entity_id\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and\n process.parent.name : \"explorer.exe\"\n ] by process.parent.entity_id\n", "references": [ "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/" ], @@ -51,5 +51,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 4 + "version": 5 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_executable_tool_transfer_smb.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_executable_tool_transfer_smb.json index 5fe9d066bc76d..887b23e8018c8 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_executable_tool_transfer_smb.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_executable_tool_transfer_smb.json @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Lateral Tool Transfer", - "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=30s\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.pid == 4 and destination.port == 445 and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\" and\n source.address != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.address != \"::1\"\n ] by process.entity_id\n /* add more executable extensions here if they are not noisy in your environment */\n [file where event.type in (\"creation\", \"change\") and process.pid == 4 and file.extension : (\"exe\", \"dll\", \"bat\", \"cmd\")] by process.entity_id\n", + "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=30s\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.pid == 4 and destination.port == 445 and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and\n network.transport == \"tcp\" and source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\"\n ] by process.entity_id\n /* add more executable extensions here if they are not noisy in your environment */\n [file where event.type in (\"creation\", \"change\") and process.pid == 4 and file.extension : (\"exe\", \"dll\", \"bat\", \"cmd\")] by process.entity_id\n", "risk_score": 47, "rule_id": "58bc134c-e8d2-4291-a552-b4b3e537c60b", "severity": "medium", @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 3 + "version": 4 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_incoming_winrm_shell_execution.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_incoming_winrm_shell_execution.json index 04a60f99556f4..1599836d7b7b0 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_incoming_winrm_shell_execution.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_incoming_winrm_shell_execution.json @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Incoming Execution via WinRM Remote Shell", - "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=30s\n [network where process.pid == 4 and network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and\n destination.port in (5985, 5986) and network.protocol == \"http\" and not source.address in (\"::1\", \"127.0.0.1\")\n ]\n [process where event.type == \"start\" and process.parent.name : \"winrshost.exe\" and not process.name : \"conhost.exe\"]\n", + "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=30s\n [network where process.pid == 4 and network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and\n destination.port in (5985, 5986) and network.protocol == \"http\" and source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\"\n ]\n [process where event.type == \"start\" and process.parent.name : \"winrshost.exe\" and not process.name : \"conhost.exe\"]\n", "risk_score": 47, "rule_id": "1cd01db9-be24-4bef-8e7c-e923f0ff78ab", "severity": "medium", @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 3 + "version": 4 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_incoming_wmi.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_incoming_wmi.json index 9b13ade43812f..2430477e7df28 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_incoming_wmi.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_incoming_wmi.json @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "WMI Incoming Lateral Movement", - "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan = 2s\n\n /* Accepted Incoming RPC connection by Winmgmt service */\n\n [network where process.name : \"svchost.exe\" and network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and\n source.address != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.address != \"::1\" and \n source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152\n ]\n\n /* Excluding Common FPs Nessus and SCCM */\n\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.parent.name : \"WmiPrvSE.exe\" and\n not process.args : (\"C:\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\nessus_*.txt\", \n \"C:\\\\windows\\\\TEMP\\\\nessus_*.TMP\", \n \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\CCM\\\\SystemTemp\\\\*\", \n \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\CCMCache\\\\*\", \n \"C:\\\\CCM\\\\Cache\\\\*\")\n ]\n", + "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan = 2s\n\n /* Accepted Incoming RPC connection by Winmgmt service */\n\n [network where process.name : \"svchost.exe\" and network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and\n source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\" and source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152\n ]\n\n /* Excluding Common FPs Nessus and SCCM */\n\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.parent.name : \"WmiPrvSE.exe\" and\n not process.args : (\"C:\\\\windows\\\\temp\\\\nessus_*.txt\", \n \"C:\\\\windows\\\\TEMP\\\\nessus_*.TMP\", \n \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\CCM\\\\SystemTemp\\\\*\", \n \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\CCMCache\\\\*\", \n \"C:\\\\CCM\\\\Cache\\\\*\")\n ]\n", "risk_score": 47, "rule_id": "f3475224-b179-4f78-8877-c2bd64c26b88", "severity": "medium", @@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 3 + "version": 4 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_powershell_remoting_target.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_powershell_remoting_target.json index 94708f90d20bb..9749106831904 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_powershell_remoting_target.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_powershell_remoting_target.json @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Incoming Execution via PowerShell Remoting", - "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan = 30s\n [network where network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and destination.port in (5985, 5986) and\n network.protocol == \"http\" and source.address != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.address != \"::1\"\n ]\n [process where event.type == \"start\" and process.parent.name : \"wsmprovhost.exe\" and not process.name : \"conhost.exe\"]\n", + "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan = 30s\n [network where network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and destination.port in (5985, 5986) and\n network.protocol == \"http\" and source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\"\n ]\n [process where event.type == \"start\" and process.parent.name : \"wsmprovhost.exe\" and not process.name : \"conhost.exe\"]\n", "references": [ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1" ], @@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 3 + "version": 4 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_rdp_sharprdp_target.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_rdp_sharprdp_target.json index 0e5b7e7bc9001..e5bfc3242be34 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_rdp_sharprdp_target.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_rdp_sharprdp_target.json @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Potential SharpRDP Behavior", - "query": "/* Incoming RDP followed by a new RunMRU string value set to cmd, powershell, taskmgr or tsclient, followed by process execution within 1m */\n\nsequence by host.id with maxspan=1m\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.name : \"svchost.exe\" and destination.port == 3389 and \n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\" and\n source.address != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.address != \"::1\"\n ]\n\n [registry where process.name : \"explorer.exe\" and \n registry.path : (\"HKEY_USERS\\\\*\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\RunMRU\\\\*\") and\n registry.data.strings : (\"cmd.exe*\", \"powershell.exe*\", \"taskmgr*\", \"\\\\\\\\tsclient\\\\*.exe\\\\*\")\n ]\n \n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and\n (process.parent.name : (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"taskmgr.exe\") or process.args : (\"\\\\\\\\tsclient\\\\*.exe\")) and \n not process.name : \"conhost.exe\"\n ]\n", + "query": "/* Incoming RDP followed by a new RunMRU string value set to cmd, powershell, taskmgr or tsclient, followed by process execution within 1m */\n\nsequence by host.id with maxspan=1m\n [network where event.type == \"start\" and process.name : \"svchost.exe\" and destination.port == 3389 and \n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\" and\n source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\"\n ]\n\n [registry where process.name : \"explorer.exe\" and \n registry.path : (\"HKEY_USERS\\\\*\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\RunMRU\\\\*\") and\n registry.data.strings : (\"cmd.exe*\", \"powershell.exe*\", \"taskmgr*\", \"\\\\\\\\tsclient\\\\*.exe\\\\*\")\n ]\n \n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and\n (process.parent.name : (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"taskmgr.exe\") or process.args : (\"\\\\\\\\tsclient\\\\*.exe\")) and \n not process.name : \"conhost.exe\"\n ]\n", "references": [ "https://posts.specterops.io/revisiting-remote-desktop-lateral-movement-8fb905cb46c3", "https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Lateral%20Movement/LM_sysmon_3_12_13_1_SharpRDP.evtx" @@ -52,5 +52,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 4 + "version": 5 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_remote_services.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_remote_services.json index 5220506d37f58..3e7313c43fc8b 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_remote_services.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_remote_services.json @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Remotely Started Services via RPC", - "query": "sequence with maxspan=1s\n [network where process.name : \"services.exe\" and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\" and \n source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152 and source.address not in (\"127.0.0.1\", \"::1\")\n ] by host.id, process.entity_id\n\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.parent.name : \"services.exe\" and \n not (process.name : \"svchost.exe\" and process.args : \"tiledatamodelsvc\") and \n not (process.name : \"msiexec.exe\" and process.args : \"/V\")\n \n /* uncomment if psexec is noisy in your environment */\n /* and not process.name : \"PSEXESVC.exe\" */\n ] by host.id, process.parent.entity_id\n", + "query": "sequence with maxspan=1s\n [network where process.name : \"services.exe\" and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and network.transport == \"tcp\" and \n source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152 and source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\"\n ] by host.id, process.entity_id\n\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.parent.name : \"services.exe\" and \n not (process.name : \"svchost.exe\" and process.args : \"tiledatamodelsvc\") and \n not (process.name : \"msiexec.exe\" and process.args : \"/V\")\n \n /* uncomment if psexec is noisy in your environment */\n /* and not process.name : \"PSEXESVC.exe\" */\n ] by host.id, process.parent.entity_id\n", "risk_score": 47, "rule_id": "aa9a274d-6b53-424d-ac5e-cb8ca4251650", "severity": "medium", @@ -41,5 +41,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 3 + "version": 4 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.json index b60717e61765a..710f08ce5213a 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.json @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Remote Scheduled Task Creation", "note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Creation of Remote Scheduled Tasks\n\n[Scheduled tasks](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/about-the-task-scheduler) are a great mechanism used for persistence and executing programs. These features can\nbe used remotely for a variety of legitimate reasons, but at the same time used by malware and adversaries.\nWhen investigating scheduled tasks that have been set-up remotely, one of the first methods should be determining the\noriginal intent behind the configuration and verify if the activity is tied to benign behavior such as software installations or any kind\nof network administrator work. One objective for these alerts is to understand the configured action within the scheduled\ntask, this is captured within the registry event data for this rule and can be base64 decoded to view the value.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n- Review the base64 encoded tasks actions registry value to investigate the task configured action.\n- Determine if task is related to legitimate or benign behavior based on the corresponding process or program tied to the\nscheduled task.\n- Further examination should include both the source and target machines where host-based artifacts and network logs\nshould be reviewed further around the time window of the creation of the scheduled task.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n- There is a high possibility of benign activity tied to the creation of remote scheduled tasks as it is a general feature\nwithin Windows and used for legitimate purposes for a wide range of activity. Any kind of context should be found to\nfurther understand the source of the activity and determine the intent based on the scheduled task contents.\n\n### Related Rules\n- Service Command Lateral Movement\n- Remotely Started Services via RPC\n\n### Response and Remediation\n- This behavior represents post-exploitation actions such as persistence or lateral movement, immediate response should\nbe taken to review and investigate the activity and potentially isolate involved machines to prevent further post-compromise\nbehavior.\n- Remove scheduled task and any other related artifacts to the activity.\n- Review privileged account management and user account management settings such as implementing GPO policies to further\nrestrict activity or configure settings that only allow Administrators to create remote scheduled tasks.\n", - "query": "/* Task Scheduler service incoming connection followed by TaskCache registry modification */\n\nsequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 1m\n [network where process.name : \"svchost.exe\" and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152 and\n source.address != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.address != \"::1\"\n ]\n [registry where registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Schedule\\\\TaskCache\\\\Tasks\\\\*\\\\Actions\"]\n", + "query": "/* Task Scheduler service incoming connection followed by TaskCache registry modification */\n\nsequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 1m\n [network where process.name : \"svchost.exe\" and\n network.direction : (\"incoming\", \"ingress\") and source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152 and\n source.ip != \"127.0.0.1\" and source.ip != \"::1\"\n ]\n [registry where registry.path : \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Schedule\\\\TaskCache\\\\Tasks\\\\*\\\\Actions\"]\n", "risk_score": 47, "rule_id": "954ee7c8-5437-49ae-b2d6-2960883898e9", "severity": "medium", @@ -64,5 +64,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 5 + "version": 6 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/mfa_disabled_for_google_workspace_organization.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/mfa_disabled_for_google_workspace_organization.json index 34d215b5b54e8..257aca34e3444 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/mfa_disabled_for_google_workspace_organization.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/mfa_disabled_for_google_workspace_organization.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "MFA Disabled for Google Workspace Organization", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:(ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION or ALLOW_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION) and (gsuite.admin.new_value:false or google_workspace.admin.new_value:false)\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:(ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION or ALLOW_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION) and google_workspace.admin.new_value:false\n", "risk_score": 47, "rule_id": "e555105c-ba6d-481f-82bb-9b633e7b4827", "severity": "medium", @@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 6 + "version": 7 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_creation_modif_launch_deamon_sequence.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_creation_modif_launch_deamon_sequence.json index 0f3ea54a9c5be..70e3f67f10f65 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_creation_modif_launch_deamon_sequence.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_creation_modif_launch_deamon_sequence.json @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "LaunchDaemon Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading", - "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m\n [file where event.type != \"deletion\" and file.path in (\"/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/*\", \" /Library/LaunchDaemons/*\")]\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.name == \"launchctl\" and process.args == \"load\"]\n", + "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m\n [file where event.type != \"deletion\" and file.path in (\"/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/*\", \"/Library/LaunchDaemons/*\")]\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.name == \"launchctl\" and process.args == \"load\"]\n", "references": [ "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html" ], @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 2 + "version": 3 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_folder_action_scripts_runtime.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_folder_action_scripts_runtime.json index fbf9bcc44ed44..5e86647877d8c 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_folder_action_scripts_runtime.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_folder_action_scripts_runtime.json @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ "language": "eql", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Persistence via Folder Action Script", - "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\", \"info\") and process.name == \"com.apple.foundation.UserScriptService\"] by process.pid\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.name in (\"osascript\", \"sh\")] by process.parent.pid\n", + "query": "sequence by host.id with maxspan=5s\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\", \"info\") and process.name == \"com.apple.foundation.UserScriptService\"] by process.pid\n [process where event.type in (\"start\", \"process_started\") and process.name in (\"osascript\", \"python\", \"tcl\", \"node\", \"perl\", \"ruby\", \"php\", \"bash\", \"csh\", \"zsh\", \"sh\")] by process.parent.pid\n", "references": [ "https://posts.specterops.io/folder-actions-for-persistence-on-macos-8923f222343d" ], @@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ } ], "type": "eql", - "version": 3 + "version": 4 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_admin_role_assigned_to_user.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_admin_role_assigned_to_user.json index a8f00924ce33c..d0e7e2654685e 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_admin_role_assigned_to_user.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_admin_role_assigned_to_user.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Google Workspace Admin Role Assigned to a User", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:ASSIGN_ROLE\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:ASSIGN_ROLE\n", "references": [ "https://support.google.com/a/answer/172176?hl=en" ], @@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 5 + "version": 6 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_api_access_granted_via_domain_wide_delegation_of_authority.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_api_access_granted_via_domain_wide_delegation_of_authority.json index aec03ee3dc307..a1a8abe98d323 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_api_access_granted_via_domain_wide_delegation_of_authority.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_api_access_granted_via_domain_wide_delegation_of_authority.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Google Workspace API Access Granted via Domain-Wide Delegation of Authority", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:AUTHORIZE_API_CLIENT_ACCESS\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:AUTHORIZE_API_CLIENT_ACCESS\n", "references": [ "https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/directory/v1/guides/delegation" ], @@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 5 + "version": 6 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_custom_admin_role_created.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_custom_admin_role_created.json index 7c5036a494a87..1ebf2e5c1f80d 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_custom_admin_role_created.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_custom_admin_role_created.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Google Workspace Custom Admin Role Created", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:CREATE_ROLE\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:CREATE_ROLE\n", "references": [ "https://support.google.com/a/answer/2406043?hl=en" ], @@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 5 + "version": 6 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_role_modified.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_role_modified.json index 84000a468c9ac..123d318150601 100644 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_role_modified.json +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/persistence_google_workspace_role_modified.json @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ "language": "kuery", "license": "Elastic License v2", "name": "Google Workspace Role Modified", - "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-gsuite.html", - "query": "event.dataset:(gsuite.admin or google_workspace.admin) and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:(ADD_PRIVILEGE or UPDATE_ROLE)\n", + "note": "## Config\n\nThe Google Workspace Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.\n\n### Important Information Regarding Google Workspace Event Lag Times\n- As per Google's documentation, Google Workspace administrators may observe lag times ranging from minutes up to 3 days between the time of an event's occurrence and the event being visible in the Google Workspace admin/audit logs.\n- This rule is configured to run every 10 minutes with a lookback time of 130 minutes.\n- To reduce the risk of false negatives, consider reducing the interval that the Google Workspace (formerly G Suite) Filebeat module polls Google's reporting API for new events.\n- By default, `var.interval` is set to 2 hours (2h). Consider changing this interval to a lower value, such as 10 minutes (10m).\n- See the following references for further information:\n - https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566\n - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-google_workspace.html", + "query": "event.dataset:google_workspace.admin and event.provider:admin and event.category:iam and event.action:(ADD_PRIVILEGE or UPDATE_ROLE)\n", "references": [ "https://support.google.com/a/answer/2406043?hl=en" ], @@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ ], "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", "type": "query", - "version": 5 + "version": 6 } diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_group_policy_iniscript.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_group_policy_iniscript.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..df4716596039d --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_group_policy_iniscript.json @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Elastic" + ], + "description": "Detects the modification of Group Policy Objects (GPO) to add a startup/logon script to users or computer objects.", + "false_positives": [ + "Legitimate Administrative Activity" + ], + "index": [ + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-system.*" + ], + "language": "kuery", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object", + "note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO\n\nGroup Policy Objects can be used by attackers as a mechanism for an attacker to instruct an arbitrarily large group of clients to\nexecute specified commands at Startup, Logon, Shutdown, and Logoff. This is done by creating/modifying the `scripts.ini` or \n`psscripts.ini` files. The scripts are stored in the following path: `\\Machine\\Scripts\\`, `\\User\\Scripts\\`\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of the Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate\nand the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.\n- Retrieve the contents of the script file, check for any potentially malicious commands and binaries.\n- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n- Verify if the execution is allowed and done under change management, and legitimate.\n\n### Related Rules\n- Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition - b9554892-5e0e-424b-83a0-5aef95aa43bf\n- Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO - 15a8ba77-1c13-4274-88fe-6bd14133861e\n\n### Response and Remediation\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate activity, investigate and potentially isolate activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\n\nThe 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy is required be configured (Success Failure).\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nPolicies > \nWindows Settings > \nSecurity Settings > \nAdvanced Audit Policies Configuration > \nAudit Policies > \nObject Access > \nAudit Detailed File Share (Success,Failure)\n```\n\nThe 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy is required be configured (Success Failure).\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nPolicies > \nWindows Settings > \nSecurity Settings > \nAdvanced Audit Policies Configuration > \nAudit Policies > \nDS Access > \nAudit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)\n```\n", + "query": "(\n event.code:5136 and winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:(gPCMachineExtensionNames or gPCUserExtensionNames) and\n winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*42B5FAAE-6536-11D2-AE5A-0000F87571E3* and\n (*40B66650-4972-11D1-A7CA-0000F87571E3* or *40B6664F-4972-11D1-A7CA-0000F87571E3*))\n)\nor\n(\n event.code:5145 and winlog.event_data.ShareName:\\\\\\\\*\\\\SYSVOL and\n winlog.event_data.RelativeTargetName:(*\\\\scripts.ini or *\\\\psscripts.ini) and\n (message:WriteData or winlog.event_data.AccessList:*%%4417*)\n)\n", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md", + "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/f2bbb51ecf68e2c9f488e3c70dcdd3df51d2a46b/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0029_windows_audit_detailed_file_share.md", + "https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse" + ], + "risk_score": 47, + "rule_id": "16fac1a1-21ee-4ca6-b720-458e3855d046", + "severity": "medium", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Host", + "Windows", + "Threat Detection", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Active Directory" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0004", + "name": "Privilege Escalation", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1547", + "name": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/" + }, + { + "id": "T1484", + "name": "Domain Policy Modification", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/", + "subtechnique": [ + { + "id": "T1484.001", + "name": "Group Policy Modification", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "query", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_group_policy_privileged_groups.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_group_policy_privileged_groups.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..d25b729d967c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_group_policy_privileged_groups.json @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Elastic" + ], + "description": "This rule detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins.", + "index": [ + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-system.*" + ], + "language": "kuery", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition", + "note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition\n\nGroup Policy Objects can be used to add rights and/or modify Group Membership on GPOs by changing the contents of an INF file named\nGptTmpl.inf, which is responsible for storing every setting under the Security Settings container in the GPO, this file is unique\nfor each GPO, and only exists if the GPO contains security settings.\nExample Path: \"\\\\DC.com\\SysVol\\DC.com\\Policies\\{21B9B880-B2FB-4836-9C2D-2013E0D832E9}\\Machine\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SecEdit\\GptTmpl.inf\"\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of the Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate\nand the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.\n- Retrieve the contents of the `GptTmpl.inf` file, under the `Privilege Rights` section, look for potentially dangerous high privileges,\nfor example: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, etc.\n- Inspect the user SIDs associated with these privileges\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n- Verify if these User SIDs should have these privileges enabled.\n- Inspect whether the user that has done these modifications should be allowed to do it. The user name can be found in the\n`winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName` field\n\n### Related Rules\n- Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO\n- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object\n\n### Response and Remediation\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate activity, investigate and potentially isolate activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\n\nThe 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy is required be configured (Success Failure).\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nPolicies > \nWindows Settings > \nSecurity Settings > \nAdvanced Audit Policies Configuration > \nAudit Policies > \nDS Access > \nAudit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)\n```\n", + "query": "event.code: \"5136\" and winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:\"gPCMachineExtensionNames\" and \nwinlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*827D319E-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F79F83A* and *803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B*)\n", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md", + "https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse" + ], + "risk_score": 73, + "rule_id": "b9554892-5e0e-424b-83a0-5aef95aa43bf", + "severity": "high", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Host", + "Windows", + "Threat Detection", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Active Directory" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0004", + "name": "Privilege Escalation", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1484", + "name": "Domain Policy Modification", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/", + "subtechnique": [ + { + "id": "T1484.001", + "name": "Group Policy Modification", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "query", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_group_policy_scheduled_task.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_group_policy_scheduled_task.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..bad9948b08e1c --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_group_policy_scheduled_task.json @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Elastic" + ], + "description": "Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO.", + "index": [ + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-system.*" + ], + "language": "kuery", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO", + "note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO\n\nGroup Policy Objects can be used by attackers to execute Scheduled Tasks at scale to compromise Objects controlled by a given GPO,\nthis is done by changing the contents of the `\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml` file.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of the Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate\nand the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.\n- Retrieve the contents of the `ScheduledTasks.xml` file, check the `` and `` XML tags for any potentially malicious\ncommands and binaries.\n- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n- Verify if the execution is allowed and done under change management, and if the execution is legitimate.\n\n### Related Rules\n- Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition\n- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object\n\n### Response and Remediation\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate activity, investigate and potentially isolate activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n\n## Config\n\nThe 'Audit Detailed File Share' audit policy is required be configured (Success Failure).\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nPolicies > \nWindows Settings > \nSecurity Settings > \nAdvanced Audit Policies Configuration > \nAudit Policies > \nObject Access > \nAudit Detailed File Share (Success,Failure)\n```\n\nThe 'Audit Directory Service Changes' audit policy is required be configured (Success Failure).\nSteps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:\n```\nComputer Configuration > \nPolicies > \nWindows Settings > \nSecurity Settings > \nAdvanced Audit Policies Configuration > \nAudit Policies > \nDS Access > \nAudit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)\n```\n", + "query": "(event.code: \"5136\" and winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName:(\"gPCMachineExtensionNames\" or \"gPCUserExtensionNames\") and \n winlog.event_data.AttributeValue:(*CAB54552-DEEA-4691-817E-ED4A4D1AFC72* and *AADCED64-746C-4633-A97C-D61349046527*)) \nor\n(event.code: \"5145\" and winlog.event_data.ShareName: \"\\\\\\\\*\\\\SYSVOL\" and winlog.event_data.RelativeTargetName: *ScheduledTasks.xml and\n (message: WriteData or winlog.event_data.AccessList: *%%4417*))\n", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md", + "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/f2bbb51ecf68e2c9f488e3c70dcdd3df51d2a46b/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0029_windows_audit_detailed_file_share.md", + "https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse", + "https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1106899890377052160", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/win_gpo_scheduledtasks.yml" + ], + "risk_score": 47, + "rule_id": "15a8ba77-1c13-4274-88fe-6bd14133861e", + "severity": "medium", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Host", + "Windows", + "Threat Detection", + "Privilege Escalation", + "Active Directory" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0004", + "name": "Privilege Escalation", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1053", + "name": "Scheduled Task/Job", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", + "subtechnique": [ + { + "id": "T1053.005", + "name": "Scheduled Task", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/" + } + ] + }, + { + "id": "T1484", + "name": "Domain Policy Modification", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/", + "subtechnique": [ + { + "id": "T1484.001", + "name": "Group Policy Modification", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/" + } + ] + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "query", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_installertakeover.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_installertakeover.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..a8ad50511283a --- /dev/null +++ b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/privilege_escalation_installertakeover.json @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +{ + "author": [ + "Elastic" + ], + "description": "Identifies a potential exploitation of InstallerTakeOver (CVE-2021-41379) default PoC execution. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate privileges to SYSTEM.", + "from": "now-9m", + "index": [ + "winlogbeat-*", + "logs-endpoint.events.*", + "logs-windows.*" + ], + "language": "eql", + "license": "Elastic License v2", + "name": "Potential Privilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver", + "note": "## Triage and analysis.\n\n### Investigating Potential Priivilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver\n\nInstallerFileTakeOver is a weaponized EoP PoC to the CVE-2021-41379 vulnerability. Upon successful exploitation,\nan unprivileged user will escalate privileges to SYSTEM/NT AUTHORITY.\n\nThis rule detects the default execution of the PoC, which overwrites the `elevation_service.exe` DACL and copy itself\nto the location to escalate privileges. An attacker is able to still take over any file that is not in use (locked), which is outside the scope of this rule.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n\n- Check for the digital signature of the executable\n- Look for additional processes spawned by the process, command lines and network communications.\n- Look for additional alerts involving the host and the user.\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n\n- Verify whether the digital signature exists in the executable, and if it is valid.\n\n### Related Rules\n\n- Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation - bfeaf89b-a2a7-48a3-817f-e41829dc61ee\n\n### Response and Remediation\n\n- Immediate response should be taken to validate activity, investigate and potentially isolate activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n", + "query": "/* This rule is compatible with both Sysmon and Elastic Endpoint */\n\nprocess where event.type == \"start\" and \n user.id : \"S-1-5-18\" and\n (\n (process.name : \"elevation_service.exe\" and \n not process.pe.original_file_name == \"elevation_service.exe\") or\n\n (process.parent.name : \"elevation_service.exe\" and \n process.name : (\"rundll32.exe\", \"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\")) \n )\n", + "references": [ + "https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver" + ], + "risk_score": 73, + "rule_id": "58c6d58b-a0d3-412d-b3b8-0981a9400607", + "severity": "high", + "tags": [ + "Elastic", + "Host", + "Windows", + "Threat Detection", + "Privilege Escalation" + ], + "threat": [ + { + "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK", + "tactic": { + "id": "TA0004", + "name": "Privilege Escalation", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/" + }, + "technique": [ + { + "id": "T1068", + "name": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", + "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/" + } + ] + } + ], + "timestamp_override": "event.ingested", + "type": "eql", + "version": 1 +} diff --git a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/threat_intel_filebeat7x.json b/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/threat_intel_filebeat7x.json deleted file mode 100644 index abac06736c0ad..0000000000000 --- a/x-pack/plugins/security_solution/server/lib/detection_engine/rules/prepackaged_rules/threat_intel_filebeat7x.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,198 +0,0 @@ -{ - "author": [ - "Elastic" - ], - "description": "This rule is triggered when indicators from the Threat Intel Filebeat module (v7.x) has a match against local file or network observations.", - "from": "now-65m", - "index": [ - "auditbeat-*", - "endgame-*", - "filebeat-*", - "logs-*", - "packetbeat-*", - "winlogbeat-*" - ], - "interval": "1h", - "language": "kuery", - "license": "Elastic License v2", - "name": "Threat Intel Filebeat Module (v7.x) Indicator Match", - "note": "## Triage and Analysis\n\n### Investigating Threat Intel Indicator Matches\n\nThreat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation such as an endpoint event that records a file\nhash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel Filebeat module. Other examples of matches can occur on\nan IP address, registry path, URL and imphash.\n\nThe matches will be based on the incoming feed data so it's important to validate the data and review the results by\ninvestigating the associated activity to determine if it requires further investigation.\n\nIf an indicator matches a local observation, the following enriched fields will be generated to identify the indicator, field, and type matched.\n\n- `threatintel.indicator.matched.atomic` - this identifies the atomic indicator that matched the local observation\n- `threatintel.indicator.matched.field` - this identifies the indicator field that matched the local observation\n- `threatintel.indicator.matched.type` - this identifies the indicator type that matched the local observation\n\n#### Possible investigation steps:\n- Investigation should be validated and reviewed based on the data (file hash, registry path, URL, imphash) that was matched\nand viewing the source of that activity.\n- Consider the history of the indicator that was matched. Has it happened before? Is it happening on multiple machines?\nThese kinds of questions can help understand if the activity is related to legitimate behavior.\n- Consider the user and their role within the company, is this something related to their job or work function?\n\n### False Positive Analysis\n- For any matches found, it's important to consider the initial release date of that indicator. Threat intelligence can\nbe a great tool for augmenting existing security processes, while at the same time it should be understood that threat\nintelligence can represent a specific set of activity observed at a point in time. For example, an IP address\nmay have hosted malware observed in a Dridex campaign six months ago, but it's possible that IP has been remediated and\nno longer represents any threat.\n- Adversaries often use legitimate tools as network administrators such as `PsExec` or `AdFind`, these tools often find their\nway into indicator lists creating the potential for false positives.\n- It's possible after large and publicly written campaigns, curious employees might end up going directly to attacker infrastructure and generating these rules\n\n### Response and Remediation\n- If suspicious or malicious behavior is observed, immediate response should be taken to isolate activity to prevent further\npost-compromise behavior.\n- One example of a response if a machine matched a command and control IP address would be to add an entry to a network\ndevice such as a firewall or proxy appliance to prevent any outbound activity from leaving that machine.\n- Another example of a response with a malicious file hash match would involve validating if the file was properly quarantined,\nreview current running processes looking for any abnormal activity, and investigating for any other follow-up actions such as persistence or lateral movement\n", - "query": "file.hash.*:* or file.pe.imphash:* or source.ip:* or destination.ip:* or url.full:* or registry.path:*\n", - "references": [ - "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html" - ], - "risk_score": 99, - "rule_id": "dc672cb7-d5df-4d1f-a6d7-0841b1caafb9", - "severity": "critical", - "tags": [ - "Elastic", - "Windows", - "Elastic Endgame", - "Network", - "Continuous Monitoring", - "SecOps", - "Monitoring" - ], - "threat_filters": [ - { - "$state": { - "store": "appState" - }, - "meta": { - "disabled": false, - "key": "event.module", - "negate": false, - "params": { - "query": "threatintel" - }, - "type": "phrase" - }, - "query": { - "match_phrase": { - "event.module": "threatintel" - } - } - }, - { - "$state": { - "store": "appState" - }, - "meta": { - "disabled": false, - "key": "event.category", - "negate": false, - "params": { - "query": "threat" - }, - "type": "phrase" - }, - "query": { - "match_phrase": { - "event.category": "threat" - } - } - }, - { - "$state": { - "store": "appState" - }, - "meta": { - "disabled": false, - "key": "event.kind", - "negate": false, - "params": { - "query": "enrichment" - }, - "type": "phrase" - }, - "query": { - "match_phrase": { - "event.kind": "enrichment" - } - } - }, - { - "$state": { - "store": "appState" - }, - "meta": { - "disabled": false, - "key": "event.type", - "negate": false, - "params": { - "query": "indicator" - }, - "type": "phrase" - }, - "query": { - "match_phrase": { - "event.type": "indicator" - } - } - } - ], - "threat_index": [ - "filebeat-*" - ], - "threat_indicator_path": "threatintel.indicator", - "threat_language": "kuery", - "threat_mapping": [ - { - "entries": [ - { - "field": "file.hash.md5", - "type": "mapping", - "value": "threatintel.indicator.file.hash.md5" - } - ] - }, - { - "entries": [ - { - "field": "file.hash.sha1", - "type": "mapping", - "value": "threatintel.indicator.file.hash.sha1" - } - ] - }, - { - "entries": [ - { - "field": "file.hash.sha256", - "type": "mapping", - "value": "threatintel.indicator.file.hash.sha256" - } - ] - }, - { - "entries": [ - { - "field": "file.pe.imphash", - "type": "mapping", - "value": "threatintel.indicator.file.pe.imphash" - } - ] - }, - { - "entries": [ - { - "field": "source.ip", - "type": "mapping", - "value": "threatintel.indicator.ip" - } - ] - }, - { - "entries": [ - { - "field": "destination.ip", - "type": "mapping", - "value": "threatintel.indicator.ip" - } - ] - }, - { - "entries": [ - { - "field": "url.full", - "type": "mapping", - "value": "threatintel.indicator.url.full" - } - ] - }, - { - "entries": [ - { - "field": "registry.path", - "type": "mapping", - "value": "threatintel.indicator.registry.path" - } - ] - } - ], - "threat_query": "@timestamp >= \"now-30d\" and event.module:threatintel and (threatintel.indicator.file.hash.*:* or threatintel.indicator.file.pe.imphash:* or threatintel.indicator.ip:* or threatintel.indicator.registry.path:* or threatintel.indicator.url.full:*)", - "timeline_id": "495ad7a7-316e-4544-8a0f-9c098daee76e", - "timeline_title": "Generic Threat Match Timeline", - "type": "threat_match", - "version": 4 -}