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We have carried out several in-depth case studies using our DY* framework. Below, you find an overview on these case studies and pointers to the respective publications and code repositories.
The Signal protocol is used in popular messaging applications like WhatsApp and Skype. Signal is notable for its sophisticated use of Diffie-Hellman computations to obtain strong security guarantees against adversaries who can compromise both short-term and long-term secrets. Its innovative multi-round (or ratcheted) protocol design has inspired a line of work on new security definitions and proof techniques for properties like post compromise security.
Thanks to DY*, unlike previous analyses with mechanized provers, our analysis does not have severly restrict the protocol to tame its verification complexity. Furthermore, our work is the first that applies a modular verification technique to analyse Signal.
Our verification target is an interoperable implementation of Signal in F* developed in prior work. This implementation was verified for correctness against a purely functional protocol specification (also in F*), but the security of this protocol specification was not verified in F*. We close this gap by extending this specification code to a full DY* protocol model and proving that it achieves the secrecy and authentication goals of Signal, even for an unbounded number of rounds.
{% cite_details dystareurosp2021 --text Paper %} | Code
The ACME certificate issuance and management protocol, standardized as {% cite_details rfc8555 --text RFC 8555 %} by the IETF, is an essential element of the web public key infrastructure (PKI). It has been used by Let's Encrypt and other certification authorities to issue over a billion certificates, and a majority of HTTPS connections are now secured with certificates issued through ACME.
We have carried out the first in-depth formal security analysis of the ACME standard. Our model of ACME is executable and comprehensive, with a level of detail that lets our ACME client interoperate with other ACME servers.
{% cite_details acmeccs2021 --text Paper %} | Code
The Needham-Schroeder public key protocol (NS-PK) is one of the most well-known examples for an authentication protocol in the literature. Since its {% cite_details Needham-Schroeder-CACM-1978 --text initial proposal in 1978 %}, the security of such cryptographic protocols has become a continuous field of study for the research community. While the first formalization for symbolic protocol analysis has been proposed by {% cite_details Dolev-Yao-1983 --text Dolev and Yao in 1983 %}, a severe protocol flaw in the NS-PK protocol remained undiscovered for 17 years: Lowe {% cite_details Lowe-IPL-1995 --text presented an attack %} that breaks the security of the NS-PK protocol by mixing two concurrent protocol sessions. Lowe also {% cite_details Lowe-TACAS-1996 --text proposed a fix and showed that this fix is indeed sufficient %} using the symbolic tool FDR.
As NS-PK is such a widely used example, we illustrate how to analyse this protocol and Lowe's fix using DY*.
{% cite_details dystareurosp2021 --text Paper %} | Code
{% cite_details guttmanfest2021 --text Paper %} | Code