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Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and
clients.
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by Http2MultiplexHandler as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (HttpRequest, HttpContent, etc.) via Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: HTTP2MultiplexCodec or Http2FrameCodec is used, Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom ChannelInboundHandler that is put in the ChannelPipeline behind Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec.
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CVE-2021-21295 (Medium) detected in netty-codec-http-4.1.48.Final.jar
CVE-2021-21295 (Medium) detected in netty-codec-http-4.1.48.Final.jar - autoclosed
Oct 3, 2022
CVE-2021-21295 - Medium Severity Vulnerability
Vulnerable Library - netty-codec-http-4.1.48.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients.
Library home page: https://netty.io/
Path to dependency file: /pom.xml
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.m2/repository/io/netty/netty-codec-http/4.1.48.Final/netty-codec-http-4.1.48.Final.jar
Dependency Hierarchy:
Found in HEAD commit: db2daaaa6e4c89345eab62750cf92bcd729190f7
Found in base branch: main
Vulnerability Details
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by
Http2MultiplexHandler
as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (HttpRequest
,HttpContent
, etc.) viaHttp2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec
and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true:HTTP2MultiplexCodec
orHttp2FrameCodec
is used,Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec
is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a customChannelInboundHandler
that is put in theChannelPipeline
behindHttp2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec
.Publish Date: 2021-03-09
URL: CVE-2021-21295
CVSS 3 Score Details (5.9)
Base Score Metrics:
Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj
Release Date: 2021-03-09
Fix Resolution (io.netty:netty-codec-http): 4.1.60.Final
Direct dependency fix Resolution (com.amazonaws:aws-java-sdk): 1.11.875
⛑️ Automatic Remediation is available for this issue
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