diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index c79788c..362ac24 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,4 +1,13 @@
-### External links:
+# COEP reflection
+
+## Authors:
+- Arthur Sonzogni
+
+## Participate
+This is a minor proposal. You are encouraged to discuss directly in the
+[original HTML feature proposal](https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/7912)
+
+## External links:
 - [Demo](https://coep-reflection.glitch.me/)
 - [HTML original discussion](https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/7912)
 - [HTML specification PR](https://github.com/whatwg/html/pull/7948)
@@ -7,38 +16,58 @@
 - [Chrome status](https://chromestatus.com/feature/5074103873568768)
 - [Mozilla: request for position](https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/645): ["it should be fine from our side"](https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/645#issuecomment-1160546542).
 - [Webkit: request for position](https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2022-May/032258.html): ["Seems reasonnable"](https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2022-June/032259.html).
-### Description 
+
+## Description 
 Add the API:
 ```js
-self.crossOriginEmbedderPolicy;
+window.crossOriginEmbedderPolicy;
 ```
 It reflects the environment's [cross-origin-embedder-policy](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/origin.html#coep)'s value.
 
 The possibles values are: `unsafe-none`, `credentialless`, and `require-corp`.
 
-### Security/Privacy
-It is already possible to deduce the value returned by the API, by making a
-no-cors `fetch` request toward a known cross-origin URL whose response depends
-on the request's cookies and omit the CORP headers.
+The API exposed to window and workers.
 
-It is costly, but theoretically polyfillable. As such, it should be a
-security/privacy no-op.
+## Motivating use cases. 
+
+Depending on the Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy (COEP) value, not every
+iframe/subresources can be loaded inside the document.
+
+For instance:
+- If the document uses COEP, then its `<iframe>` need to use COEP too, or they
+  will be blocked.
+- If `COEP` is `require-corp` then cross-origin 'no-cors' subresources are
+  required to send the appropriate `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy` header, or
+  they will be blocked.
+
+If this reflection API is provided, 1st party and 3rd party scripts can take
+better decisions. They can implement appropriate fallbacks. For instance, this
+was asked [here].
+
+[here]: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1335034#c10:~:text=actions.%20%0A%0AIn%20the%20meantime%2C%20what%20possible%20solutions%3F-,Is%20there%20a%20way%20to%20detect%20this%20kind%20of%20header,-and%20don%27t%20inject%20iFrames%20(without%20asking%20for
+
+In particular, COEP reflection was originally part of the [Anonymous
+Iframe](https://github.com/WICG/anonymous-iframe) propsal. Since it is useful on
+its own, it became in independent mini-proposal.
+To use anonymous iframe, third party script needs to know if the `<iframe>` they
+are going to create will be blocked by COEP or not. By using COEP reflection,
+they can decide to load an anonymous iframe instead of a normal one.
+
+## Questions / Considered alternatives
 
-See also the [Security/Privacy questionnaire](./security-privacy-questionnaire.md)
 
-### Motivation
+### An HTTP header
 
-Depending on the Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy value, not every
-iframe/subresources can be loaded inside the document. If this reflection API is
-provided, 3rd party scripts can take better decisions. They can implement
-fallbacks.
+The original plan was to use an HTTP header. This was initially part of
+[Anonymous Iframe](https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/639)
 
-In particular, for trying [Anonymous
-Iframe](https://github.com/WICG/anonymous-iframe), Google DisplayAds, needs a
-way to know the COEP policy. The Ads's script could this way be able to decide
-in between inserting a normal or an anonymous iframe.
+We changed out mind, because:
+- Sending an HTTP header to every requests is potentially costly for the
+  network. It is better if it can be avoided.
+- Developers wanting to use the Origin Trial said they were prefering a
+  Javascript API instead, if possible. 
 
-### Questions
+### Different naming / location
 
 The API was added inside the global object, similarly to `crossOriginIsolated`:
 ```js
@@ -51,3 +80,44 @@ Should we continue adding API one by one, inside the global object?
 A suggestion from @mikewest [here](https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/7912#issuecomment-1123407921):
 COEP is part of the [policy container](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/origin.html#policy-containers).
 It might make sense to wrap them inside `window.policies` instead?
+
+## Security/Privacy
+
+This is a reflection API. It reflects the value the server set to its own
+document, so there are no new information revealed to the document. It is just
+easier to access using JavaScript.
+
+Third party script can also use this API. It is useful to know what kind of
+policy the current document/worker is subject to. Unless proven otherwise
+knowing this is not a concern. Anyway, it is already deducible via other means,
+by observing the effects of COEP. It should be polyfillable. As such, it should
+be a security/privacy no-op.
+
+Example of a polyfill:
+1. `fetch()` a known collaborating cross-origin URL in 'no-cors' mode.
+2. The server reply with the request credentials and omits a CORP header.
+3. Set window.crossOriginEmbedderPolicy to:
+  - 'require-corp' if the response was blocked.
+  - 'credentialless' if the request omitted credentials.
+  - 'unsafe-none' otherwise.
+
+See also the [Security/Privacy questionnaire](./security-privacy-questionnaire.md)
+
+## Stakeholder Feedback / Opposition
+
+- Chrome: Implemented [status](https://chromestatus.com/feature/5074103873568768)
+- Mozilla: Positive ["it should be fine from our side"](https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/645#issuecomment-1160546542). [Implementation bug](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1774447)
+- Safari: Positive ["Seems reasonable"](https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2022-June/032259.html). [Implementation bug](https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=230550).
+
+## Acknowledgements
+
+Many thanks for anyone who provided feedbacks, discussion, code reviews or took
+time to reply to requests:
+- Alex Christensen
+- [Anne van Kesteren](https://github.com/annevk)
+- [Antonio Sartori](https://github.com/antosart)
+- [Camille Lamy](https://github.com/camillelamy)
+- [Domenic Denicola](https://github.com/domenic)
+- [Mike West](https://github.com/mikewest)
+- [Rossen Atanassov](https://github.com/atanassov)
+- [Sean Feng](https://github.com/sefeng211)
diff --git a/security-privacy-questionnaire.md b/security-privacy-questionnaire.md
index a270deb..7a1c12f 100644
--- a/security-privacy-questionnaire.md
+++ b/security-privacy-questionnaire.md
@@ -4,23 +4,35 @@
 
 It exposes the current environment's crossOriginEmbedderPolicy's value:
 ```js
-self.crossOriginEmbedderPolicy = ('unsafe-none' | 'credentialless' | 'require-corp');
+window.crossOriginEmbedderPolicy = ('unsafe-none' | 'credentialless' | 'require-corp');
 ```
 
 Depending on the Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy value, not every
 iframe/subresources can be loaded inside the document. By using this new API, 
-3rd party script can take better decisions and implement appropriate fallbacks.
-
-It is already possible to deduce the value returned by the API, by making a
-no-cors `fetch` request toward a known cross-origin URL whose response depends
-on the request's cookies and omit the CORP headers.
-
-It is costly, but theoretically polyfillable. As such, it should be a
-security/privacy no-op.
+3rd party script can take better decisions. They can implement appropriate
+fallbacks.
+
+This is a reflection API. It reflects the value the server set to its own
+document, so there are no new information revealed to the document. It is just
+easier to access using JavaScript.
+
+Third party script can also use this API. It is useful to know what kind of
+policy the current document/worker is subject to. Unless proven otherwise
+knowing this is not a concern. Anyway, it is already deducible via other means,
+by observing the effects of COEP. It should be polyfillable. As such, it should
+be a security/privacy no-op.
+
+Example of a polyfill:
+1. `fetch()` a known collaborating cross-origin URL in 'no-cors' mode.
+2. The server reply with the request credentials and omits a CORP header.
+3. Set window.crossOriginEmbedderPolicy to:
+  - 'require-corp' if the response was blocked.
+  - 'credentialless' if the request omitted credentials.
+  - 'unsafe-none' otherwise.
 
 ### 02.  Do features in your specification expose the minimum amount of information necessary to enable their intended uses?
 
-Yes.
+Yes. We expose a single value.
 
 In particular, we do expose neither the
 `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy-Report-Only` nor the potential report endpoints.